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ABSTRACT
This thesis is concerned with the extent to which young children
co-ordinate diverse sources of information when recognising and
categorising representational materials. Previous investigators
have concluded that young children are not generally able to make
such co-ordinations and traditionally, this poor performance has
been attributed to young children's tendency to focus their attention
upon specific, salient features of the stimuli.
Chapter One reviews the relevant literatures and considers
several shortcomings of previous studies. Four main areas of
interest emerge; these areas were the subject of inquiry of seven
studies (reported in Chapters Two-to-Five) and are as follows
(i) Young children's spontaneous judgements of correspondence
between objects and pictures (Chapters Two and Five),
(ii) Young children's spontaneous and second-choice classifi¬
cations (Chapter Three).
(iii) Young children's ability to select representations of
model stimuli (including, where necessary, quite arbitrary
representations) in such a way as to permit specific and
external informational constraints to be satisfied
(Chapter Four).
(iv) Young children's ability to detect ambiguities (Chapter Five)
The studies reported yield strong evidence that young children
systematically co-ordinate diverse sources of information in ways
which often, are comparable to adults' co-ordinations. In particular,
young children simultaneously co-ordinate multiple dimensions of
correspondence in ways which vary systematically as a function of the
circumstances of the identification or grouping; these circumstances
include the degree to which correspondences permit stimuli to be
unambiguously labelled, the manner by which stimuli are presented
(eg., whether physically and/or verbally) and the composition of the
stimulus sets. In addition, evidence was gained that a majority of
children will re-classify stimuli by a second grouping criterion when
they are given a sound reason for doing so and that a considerable
proportion of young children detect certain ambiguities.
The main results are reviewed and discussed in Chapter Six. It
is suggested that the present findings have considerable implications
for the methods which should be used to tap and develop the co¬
ordinations made by children in relation to representational materials.
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CHAPTER ONE: YOUNG CHILDREN'S IDENTIFICATION OF EVERYDAY OBJECTS
AND PICTURES OF SUCH OBJECTS
1.1 Preliminary remarks; setting the scene
This thesis is concerned with how preschool children co¬
ordinate visual and/or verbal cues when identifying representational
materials - especially pictures. It is evident that Western
children are exposed to a 'barrage' of pictorial representations of
objects of varying degrees of familiarity; this barrage comprises
for example, family photographs, pictures in comics, picture books,
magazines and newspapers, pictures on television, retail packages,
cards, stamps and even on china, bedspreads, T-shirts and place-
mats and the like; besides which many games children are encouraged
to play (for example, picture dominoes and jigsaw puzzles) are
picture-based. These various pictorial media vary considerably in
the accuracy with which they portray their referents; this accuracy
would seem to depend partly at least upon the function to which the
picture is to be put; that is, whether it is intended as an accurate
record (as for example in the case of family photographs) or simply
as an amusing illustration (as for example in the case of
caricatures). Informal observation tends to suggest that young
children are quite competent at identifying pictures accurately.
There is however, as will be seen, a considerable body of opinion
which whilst recognising that children may succeed in making many
identifications correctly nevertheless emphasises that young
children are extremely limited in their ability to co-ordinate the
diverse sources of information which may be present in represent¬
ational stimuli. The primary experimental focus of the present
investigations has been with how young children judge correspondence
between pictures and objects in circumstances in which a fairly
high degree of representational accuracy is implicitly assumed.
Arguments will be advanced and evidence presented which suggests
that the case for young children's poor co-ordinative skill is not
as unequivocal as might first appear. In particular, because it
seems reasonable to suppose that children will expect there to be
some positive correspondence between pictures of objects and the
objects portrayed, the particular correspondences which children
demand to be present in pictures of model objects would seem to be
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likely to reveal something about the features of the objects which
are dominant in children's concepts of those objects.
Several preliminary points should be made in this section as
to the kind of correspondence judgements which may be made and as
to which of these were investigated in the present studies. The
first point is that the kinds of correspondence which can be
compared depends upon the amount of information which is given
about the model object. If a specific object model is physically
presented then the correspondence may be judged very precisely. If
however a model object is not physically presented but is instead
verbally described then correspondence may be judged, depending on
the information given, at a number of different levels of
abstraction. The present correspondence studies have been mainly
concerned with these two kinds of object presentation - that is
physical presentation and verbal description. (In the case of the
verbal presentations the objects were described at very specific
levels of abstraction.) Some consideration has also been given
however to preschool children's judgements concerning the adequacy
of pictures when no specific object models are given - either
physically or verbally.
The basic method adopted in the present correspondence studies
was to show children several model objects and to then show them one
picture - or alternatively a few pictures - of each object. Typically,
the picture or pictures failed to correspond to the pertinent object in
some substantial way. The children were then asked either to judge
whether individual pictures corresponded adequately to their respective
object models or to judge the relative adequacy of different pictures
of the same object models. This method was preferred to that of
getting children to draw their own pictures because the act of drawing
itself tends to produce considerable inter-subject variance. Thus
Freeman (1977), for example, observes that young children may have
considerable planning problems when drawing their own pictures, that
they are also influenced by external frames or reference such as the
paper edge and that when they draw from memory they may have
considerable retrieval problems. Ey presenting children with pre¬
drawn pictures such confounding influences were avoided.
There are of course many kinds of possible discordance between
an object and a picture of that object. Some or all of the parts
present can be changed in various ways (omission of parts, addition
of parts, substitution of parts and alteration of the proportion of
parts); the arrangement of some or all of the parts present can be
changed in either ecologically valid or invalid ways (cf., Kennedy,
1974); and finally, colouring, portrayed texture and perspective
can all be manipulated. The present studies have however been
concerned with young children's object-picture correspondence
judgements with regard just to two kinds of discordance: changes of
parts present (ie., shape) and changes of colour.
Although the investigation of preschool children's object-
picture correspondence judgements was the major issue addressed by
the present studies, a number of other areas of interest were also
examined. In the first place (and as indicated above), the results
of the correspondence studies are considered to have a number of
implications for the nature of children's (and adults') concepts of
everyday objects and these implications were followed up using more
traditional conceptual tasks. A second area of additional interest
has been that of the extent to which young children are able to use
more symbolic (or arbitrary) means of representing objects than
that involved in straightforward pictures of objects. It is
widely recognised that young children do possess some ability to
treat objects as though they are something other than what they are
(see, for example, Piaget, 1951; what is not so clear however is
the extent to which young children are able to select relatively
arbitrary representations in such a way as to permit specific and
external informational constraints to be satisfied. Young
children's ability to use more arbitrary forms of external
representation in a manner calculated to satisfy some external
informational requirement was the subject of a specific investigation
by one of the present series of studies. This skill is quite
demanding cognitively and the degree to which preschool children
succeed on such a task would seem likely to provide important
information concerning the development of the ability to think
systematically in symbolic terms.
The third and final topic with which the present investigations
have been concerned is that of young children's ability to detect
ambiguities in representational materials. Previous reports have
suggested that young children are unable to detect such ambiguities
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and these findings have added credence to the traditional view that
young children are severely limited in their ability to co-ordinate
diverse sources of information on identification tasks.
Altogether then the present enquiry focuses upon four subject
areas. The primary issue concerns how preschool children judge
correspondence between objects and pictures. Additionally however
the present studies investigate the nature of children's concepts
of objects and the ability of young children to think systematically
in symbolic terms and to detect ambiguities. There is a considerable
body of opinion which holds that preschool children will be
generally unable to respond in a systematic and co-ordinated fashion
on the kinds of task envisaged. The critical issues are reviewed
in the three remaining sections of the present chapter. The next
section (Section 1.2) considers critically the evidence for the
view that preschool children are severely limited in their ability to
co-ordinate information when identifying representational materials.
The identification of such materials necessarily presupposes that
the relevant objects have been conceptualised and the following
section (that is, Section 1.3) discusses the kind of concepts which
young children seem likely to possess. The final section (Section 1.4)
presents a brief overview of the experimental work undertaken.
1.2 A consideration of young children's picture identification skills
Genuine picture perception would seem to require that an
observer grasp that pictures evoke what Deregowski (1980) calls an
'ambiguous percept', that is, the observer must appreciate that
whilst the picture is itself merely an artificially treated surface,
it nevertheless represents an absent object or objects. Failure to
discern either of these defining characteristics of pictures cannot
then lead to genuine picture perception. At least two sorts of
error may occur. In the first case, the picture may merely be
directly perceived as a display without there being any appreciation
of its representational significance (cf., Gibson, 1954, cited by
Kennedy, 1974). Alternatively, in the second case, the observer
may recognise the object or objects portrayed by the picture but
may fail to understand that the picture is merely a display, in
other words, the picture may be mistaken for the object or objects
it is in fact only representing. In this second case - as with the
first - genuine picture perception does not occur because of a failure
to appreciate the reprosentational significance of Ihe picture.
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It seems fairly clear that from about two years onwards at
least, children begin to recognise objects portrayed in
pictures. Indeed the facility with which most young children name
pictures of familiar objects (their so-called 'picture-vocabularies')
has been exploited on intelligence test items since the days
of Binet. According to the Stanford-Binet norms the correct naming
of eighteen outline drawings of common objects increases from an
average of three at two years to an average of fourteen at four
years. An important study by Hochberg and Brooks (1962) confirmed
that the ability to recognise outline drawings and also photographs
is acquired by two years and demonstrated moreover that the
development of this ability requires no specific training. This
latter finding has done much to invalidate the view that the
recognition of pictures requires some sort of instruction in a
convention of representation. It should be noted that young
children do evidence some deficits in their ability to grasp the
spatial relations of two-dimensional patterns (for example,
they do not make accurate judgements of the represented sizes of
pictured objects in certain experimental situations), however on
the whole their pictorial spatial skills are reasonably well
developed (cf., Olson, Yonas and Cooper, 1980). Certainly the
recognition of representational pictures of isolated, everyday
objects should not present any difficulty; indeed,such simple
identification tasks are now widely acknowledged to be,
"a very simple task for nearly all people indepen¬
dently of culture or education (Jones and Hagen,
1980 p. 219)."
The ease of such tasks appears moreover to be unaffected by the mode
of representation (eg., whether colour or black and white photo¬
graphs, outline or coloured drawings, etc.) Even animals who have
been, conditioned by operant procedures to discriminate between
objects, transfer readily to discriminate between drawings of these
objects (Herrnstein and Loveland, 1964; see also Hayes and Hayes,
1953; Herrnstein, Loveland and Cable, 1976; Kohler, 1925.)
It seems likely then that young children readily recognise
familiar objects portrayed in simple pictures. Whether or
not they also understand that pictures are simply displays is
however more problematic. In particular, both Piaget (1951) and
Werner (1948) have suggested - each on the basis of rather limited
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anecdotal evidence - that young children sometimes mistake
pictures of objects for the objects themselves. The present writer
is aware however of only one empirical study which bears directly on this
issue and its results moreover do, if anything, tend to suggest
that young children do appreciate that pictures are in themselves
simply two-dimensional displays. Specifically, Wheeler (1972)
conducted two experiments in which preschool children (with a mean
age of four years) were shown a series of matching object and
picture pairs (for example, a toy train and a picture of a train).
The first experiment found that, given instructions such as, 'show
me the train' the majority of subjects pointed to the picture at
least once. As Wheeler herself notes however, adults will often
refer to or describe a picture by giving the name of the object it
represents and consequently the results are not decisive;
significantly moreover, hardly any subjects pointed to the object
when asked specifically to point to the picture (for example, when
given the instruction, 'show me the picture of the train'). In the
second experiment, Wheeler asked a comparable group of children to
perform actions which, she assumed, could be legitimately carried
out with the object but not with the picture. For example, having
presented subjects with the train object-picture pair, Wheeler
instructed her subjects to 'push the train to me'. Wheeler found
that the great majority of her subjects chose to perform the actions
upon the objects rather than the pictures. Wheeler herself does
not however take these results to disconfirm the view that young
children fail to appreciate that pictures are two-dimensional. In
particular, she stresses that the justifications offered by the
subjects for their choices were not generally wholly satisfactory.
There is however a danger in making too much of such justifications
(after all, the kind of evidence which they yield is little
different to that upon which Piaget (op.cit.) and Werner (op.cit.)
based their original suggestions). To define what pictures are
precisely is not an easy task and preschool children have only a
small vocabulary. Certainly, the mere fact that young children
tend to draw attention to the representational aspect of pictures
should not be taken to indicate that they are necessarily unaware
of their two-dimensional properties.
As was implied in the previous section (1.1) young children
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have, for a long time been reported to perform poorly on a
considerable range of tasks of perceptual identification and
differentiation (see, for example, Vurpillot, 1976a). These alleged
limitations have not shown up on simple object or picture
identification tasks (as may be deduced from the preceding
discussion); rather they have surfaced on tasks where children have
been required to identify impoverished or ambiguous stimuli or to
judge equivalence between stimuli. Young children have, for
example, been found to be less competent than either older children
or adults on tasks requiring the accurate identification of
incomplete pictures (cf., Gollin, 1960; 1961; 1962; 1965; 1966; Rey
1947; Vurpillot, 1962), the detection of anomalies in represent¬
ational material (Segers, 1926a; Vurpillot, 1962), the spotting of
ambiguities in ambiguous figures (eg., Elkind, 1964; Elkind and
Scott, 1962) and the integration of parts and wholes in pictures
having a number of elements, each element constituting a picture in
its own right and the configuration of elements comprising another
object (cf., Elkind, Koegler and Go, 1964; Meili-Dworetski, 1956,
originally published 1939; Whiteside, Elkind and Golbeck, 1976).
In addition it is widely reported that when young children are given
two or more visual stimuli to compare, they are unable to make
satisfactory judgements either of logical classes of equivalence or
of logical identity (cf., Beagles-Roos and Greenfield, 1979;
Vurpillot, 1968; see also, Forman, Kuschner and Dempsey, 1975).
It is often concluded that young children perform poorly in
these studies because, lacking the ability to co-ordinate perceptual
information from a variety of sources they tend instead to focus
their attention on specific salient features of the stimuli. So,
for example, the young child's poor ability to reliably identify
incomplete pictures has been attributed to a relative inability to
co-ordinate the elements systematically (Kennedy, 1974). Similarly,
the young child's poor detection of anomalies and ambiguities has
Following Fisher (1968), the term 'ambiguous figure' is used in
this thesis to refer solely to figures where it is the subject
seemingly represented which is reversible and should not be taken
to refer to figures such as the Necker cube which are ambiguous in
the alternative sense that they may be interpreted as the same form
from either one of two different vantage points (Fisher calls these
latter figures 'reversible figures').
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been attributed to a tendency to focus on one part of the stimulus
or one perceptual organisation of the figure respectively (see, for
reviews, Elkind, 1969; Elkind, 1975; Vurpillot, 1976b). Comparable
conclusions have been reached with regard to young children's
acceptance of non-identical pictures as identical and the lack of
any apparent basis to their judgements of equivalence (see, for
example, Vurpillot, 1976a).
In concluding her review article, Vurpillot sums up the nature
of young children's difficulty with such identification tasks as
follows:
"The young child takes into consideration only a part of
the available information at a given moment. He makes a
comparison of the objects on only one of their dimensions,
preferably the most perceptually salient. He identifies
them according to a critical characteristic. His scanning
is limited to a small number of details or elements. His
responses fluctuate and are often contradictory from one
moment to the other because he focuses his attention
first on one detail, then on another or refers first to
one dimension and then to another, or uses one cue and
then another to localize or identify. Thus, his greatest
weakness lies in an absence of co-ordination between all
the cues he is capable of perceiving and the rules he is
capable of using (1976b, p.231, emphasis not in original)."
The implication of this kind of argument is that children succeed
in identifying simple pictures (and objects) not because they adopt
a more advanced strategy but simply because the strategy which is
ineffective for the more complicated pictures is typically though
not always sufficient for success with the straightforward pictures.
That is, because the latter pictures do not contain anomalies or
ambiguities the child who focuses his attention on one part of the
picture will be quite likely to make a correct identification. The
suggestion that young children perceive objects and pictures in
this way is by no means novel. The old debate (at the beginning of
the century) between elementarism and syncretism, recognising as it
did that young children's strategies for identifying pictures and
objects are in some way immature, turned precisely on the issue as
to whether the young child bases his identifications upon one or a
few of the parts (elementarism or, as it is otherwise called, the
analytic view) or upon a confused view of the whole (the syncretist
view). Indeed, some of the studies cited above were conducted
specifically to distinguish between these views; Segers for example
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(1926a) himself a supporter of the syncretist position, presented
groups of children of various ages with a series of monster stimuli,
each stimulus comprising a head and a body from different kinds of
animals. Apparently assuming identifications of the stimuli based
on the body parts to be equivalent to a focus of attention on the
'allure generale' (that is, the 'general look') of the stimulus and
therefore equivalent also to the syncretist position, Segers
concluded from his results that children only begin to take details
(2)
into account from about seven years onwards.
In recent years Vurpillot (1976a) has convincingly argued that
the distinction between analytic and syncretic perception is of
virtually no explanatory value. Freeman (1980) concurs with this
conclusion. Vurpillot (op.cit.) makes a particularly strong case
in relation to the studies using composite figures of the kind
illustrated in Figure 1. Specifically, Meili-Dworetski (1956) found
that young children first perceive the wholes rather than the parts
whereas Elkind (eg., Elkind, Koegler and Go, 1964) found that
children first perceive the parts and progress only later to
perceiving the wholes before finally, later still, being able to
integrate both parts and wholes. Examples of the figures used by
these investigators are illustrated in Figure l:a and Figure l:b
respectively. Vurpillot points out that the figures used by Meili-
Dworetski and by Elkind and his associates respectively are
qualitatively very different; specifically, in Meili-Dworetski's
figures the wholes are highly articulated relative to the parts
whereas in Elkind's figures the parts are highly articulated relative
Figure 1 Some of the composite figures presented by Meili-Dworetski
(1956) and Elkind et al., (1964), respectively.
This study is further discussed below and also in Section 5.2.1a.
to the wholes. As Vurpillot concludes, it seems likely that young
children will actually attend to either the parts or the wholes
(3)
depending upon the properties of the stimuli presented. Vurpillot
denies however that such children can attend to both parts and wholes
simultaneously; this ability does not, she suggests, generally
develop until eight years or so. Consequently, she continues to view
the manner of young children's identification of pictures and objects
in terms of a failure to attend to all the aspects - a position which
is in line with the spirit if not the precise format of classical
traditions. This assessment of young children's identification
skills which, as has been noted, is fairly widespread has often been
explicitly associated with Piaget's theories of perceptual and
cognitive development and it is Piaget's theories which will next be
considered.
In his theory of perceptual development, Piaget (eg.,1969)
argued that young children's perceptions are centred on one or
another dominant feature in the perceptual field (these are referred
to as 'field effects'); which features are dominant being said to be
determined by the Gestalt properties (continuity, closure and
proximity) of the stimulus. Piaget's notion of centring does, when
applied in this perceptual context, appear to be virtually inter¬
changeable with the idea discussed above that children tend to focus
on salient aspects of a picture or object when identifying it.
However an element of caution is required when so doing; specifically,
Piaget himself only applied his theory of perceptual development to
quantitative perceptual judgements made with respect to visual
illusions. Consequently, the application of his theory by Elkind and
others to children's identification of representational materials -
which are qualitative judgements requiring the use of conceptual as
well as perceptual processes (Elkind, 1969; the same point is also
made by, for example, Bruner 1957; Neisser 1967; Piaget 1969; Potter
1966) - constitutes an extension of his theory which Piaget himself
(4)
might not have sanctioned. Elkind (eg., 1969) recognises his
(3)
NJB. Vurpillot acknowledges that this conclusion is anticipated by
Meili (1931).
(4)
In this regard,Wohlwill (1968), has suggested that whilst Piaget's
perceptual theory is appropriate for quantitative perceptual judgements
it is not appropriate for 'qualitative judgements and more particular1
with judgements of identity or difference among discrete categories of
stimuli (where) we typically find something closely approaching the
reliability and specificity of conceptual classifications (p. '182;
originaliy published 1962)'. Indeed, Piaget himself (1968a) drew a
clear distinction between the acquisition of qualitative and quantitati
invariance.
extension of Piaget's theory explicitly. He does not however, stop
here. Specifically, he (eg., Elkind, Koegler and Go, 1964) and
Vurpillot (1976a) have each further suggested that the young child's
inability to integrate the parts and the wholes of composite figures
(for example, to recognise that the same group of lines can be seen
both as a banana and as the body of a cyclist) is analogous to his
inability to recognise that, in the logic of classes, an object can
belong to several inclusive classes simultaneously. Whether or not
they are analogous is not actually of great significance since
analogies are in no way explanatory nor are their subjects necessarily
related. Such a consideration does however raise the important
issue of the relation in Piaget's theory between the development of
perceptual flexibility and that of mental (or operational) revers¬
ibility. Piaget, in his theory of perceptual development,argues
that conception - which he equates primarily with inference and
intelligence and not with the kind of conceptualisation required for
the recognition of representational materials - develops independently
of perception but that intellectual developments lead, eventually,
to the enrichment of perception such that perceptual activities (a
technical term) become guided by intelligence and also become semi-
reversible (centration-induced perceptual distortions are therefore
only partially compensated). Perception then never attains the
power and flexibility of conception which, with the development of
operations (particularly that of reversibility) at about seven years,
becomes fully reversible. As Flavell observes (1963), the zenith of
perceptual structures is roughly equivalent to the structure of
late preoperational thought. A clear distinction should therefore
be made between the limited perceptual flexibility which Piaget
notes to be shown by maturer subjects when they view visual illusions
(and which Elkind and others apply to explain the perception of
ambiguities in composite and ambiguous figures) and the mental
operation of reversibility which is required in order to solve
logical problems such as class inclusion.
For the purposes of this thesis the process of centring will be
defined very generally as, 'a tendency to focus attention on single
sources of information rather than co-ordinate information from a
variety of sources.' Such a broad definition encompasses both the
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kind of centring that may occur on purely perceptual problems as
well as that kind of centring which occurs when children recourse to
centring on a transient perception as a method of solving a logical
problem; it can also handle the possibility of the sources of
information being linguistic. This definition whilst it does not
perhaps (as has been noted) accord strictly with the limited senses
in which Piaget originally used the term does nevertheless appear to
accurately reflect the senses in which the term has been used by
other investigators. Of particular relevance to the present study
is that young children's predispositions to centre on single sources
of information has been widely used as a theoretical basis for
interpreting children's performance on a variety of tasks involving
the presentation of representational materials. In recent years
however the whole Piagetian view of early development has been
increasingly challenged by the emergence of a considerable
literature which has suggested that, in a number of areas, Piaget
consistently underestimated children's ability to integrate
information. Wilkening, Becker and Trabasso (1980), in reviewing
these areas include perceptual judgement, moral and social judgement,
decision making, problem solving, discrimination learning, story
comprehension and discourse processing in their list. In addition
Donaldson (1978) in reporting some of the recently obtained evidence
indicating that young children possess some ability to make judgements
of quantitative invariance, has suggested that young children
sometimes centre on such tasks for reasons other than a lack of the
logical operations required. Such a suggestion raises the possibility
- not previously given much attention - that centring may, in some
circumstances, be a reasonable thing for a child to do. This latter
suggestion does not accord with the rather doctrinaire assumption
made in relation to the process of centring in the past to the effect
that it is an immature, unco-ordinated and pre-logical response.
One overriding concern in the present study then was to
investigate whether young children are indeed as limited in their
ability to co-ordinate information with regard to representational
materials as has tended to have been assumed in the past and in
particular to investigate the possibility that centring on some
tasks which use representational materials may not be, from the
child's point of view, an unreasonable thing to do. Of considerable
relevance for this issue is whether the poor performance recorded by
young children on the identification and equivalence judgement tasks
reviewed above can be explained without recourse to the conclusion
that young children lack the co-ordinative skill necessary for
success on such tasks.
Consider first the case of incomplete figures (see Figure 2 for
some examples of the kinds of figures which have been used). One
reason why young children perform poorly may be that their knowledge












The series of figures illustrated are the only ones reproduced
by Gollin in this paper (cf., Gollin 1961 for further figures).
Other identities used by Gollin (1960) included a bell, a chair, a
table viewed from below, a table viewed from above, a telephone etc.
of the visual appearance of the objects represented (and also their
knowledge of those objects which they think might be represented) is
insufficient to allow them to make correct identifications when the
drawings are relatively incomplete. Additionally, several at least
of the drawings which have been presented (see Vurpillot, 1962) have
been of a schematic type with which young children may not be
generally familiar. Young children's lack of knowledge relative to
older children and adults may not be the sole explanation of their
performance on these tasks; however it does seem possible that a
failure to take note of knowledge factors has led to the under¬




Nevertheless it should be pointed out that Gollin (1960) did find
that the performance of children as young as 54 months to 65 months
(no mean age is given) did not differ significantly from that of an
adult control group.
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The same reasons may be applied as a counter explanation (or
partial explanation) of young children's inability to detect the
anomalies and ambiguities contained in anomalous stimuli and conposite and
ambiguous figures respectively. Examples of the anomalous stimuli presented
by Segers (1926a) and Vurpillot (1962) are not readily available;
Vurpillot (op.cit.) does however reproduce two non-anomalous stimuli,
the elements of which she combined in every possible way to produce
the anomalous stimuli used in the study. As can be seen from the
drawings illustrated in Figure 3, the stimuli Vurpillot used are
highly schematised and not necessarily blatantly monstrous at all.
Most importantly however, neither Vurpillot nor Segers took any
account of whether their subjects knew the identity of the parts
combined; certainly, it would not be unreasonable for a child who
knew the identity of only some of the parts to base his identification
of the whole upon the identity of those parts whose identity was
known.
Figure 3 Reconstruction (from Vurpillot, 1976 b) of some of the





Examples of some of the composite figures that have been
presented to young children have already been illustrated in Figure
1 and, as has already been observed, such figures do not tend to
possess well articulated parts and wholes, instead, one of these
perceptual organisations is typically rather indistinct. The same
may be said - as a consideration of Figure 4 will verify - for
the ambiguous figures used by Elkind and his colleagues (Elkind 1964;
Elkind and Scott 1962).
Figure 4 Some of the ambiguous figures presented by Elkind (1964).
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Besides having drawbacks arising from the materials used, most of
the studies of children's detection of anomalies and ambiguities
cited have additional limitations. To begin with, the studies
carried out by Segers (op.cit.) and Vurpillot (op.cit.) each failed
to take any account methodologically of the possibility that whether
or not young children detect anomalies may to some degree be
dependent upon whether parts from similar or dissimilar kinds of
animals are combined (consider, for example, cow and horse versus
cow and duck). For Segers1 study, the relevance of this argument is
that 'centring' may have been a dominant strategy simply because his
subjects were not given anomalous stimuli which would have been
regarded as sufficiently monstrous to warrant objection. The
significance of this argument for Vurpillot's study is however
negated by 'virtue' of an even more serious weakness. Specifically,
curious as it may seem, the nature of Vurpillot's experimental design
prevented her subjects from identifying any of the stimuli as
monsters. (A full account of the rationale of Vurpillot's study is
given in Section. 5.2.1.a .) Elkind's studies of children's ability
to detect ambiguities in ambiguous figures and composite figures also
have an additional limitation. Specifically, Elkind failed to give
any information to his subjects indicating the special nature of the
pictures to be presented. Subjects were simply given an instruction
such as:-
"I am going to show you some pictures, one at a time,
and I want you to tell me what you see, what it looks
like to you (Elkind, 1964 p. 1393)."
It seems unlikely that such a neutral instruction would have
motivated young children to attend the figures for any length of
time. So far, the limitations of the studies which have been
discussed have been methodological. There is however one aspect of
the results of the studies cited which should be commented upon.
Specifically, whilst the performance of the older (control) subjects
is generally superior to that of preschool children, the level of
success achieved is considerably below that which is possible (see,
especially, Elkind and Scott 1962; Segers, 1926a). This point
warrants mention because it indicates that the relative inferiority
of preschool children's performance is not so great as might be
supposed.
The fifth and final area cited above in which studies using figurative
materials have been interpreted in terms of young children's
predispositions to centre in an unco-ordinated fashion upon salient
aspects of the stimuli presented is that of judgements of logical
identity and logical classes of equivalence. Most of the studies of
interest here have been conducted by Vurpillot and her associates.
According to Vurpillot (1976b), two perceptual stimuli are logically
identical if they are exactly the same. Logical classes of
equivalence on the other hand are said to require merely that a
group of stimuli should be subordinated to a single set of attributes
(Vurpillot, 1976a). Vurpillot's use of the term 'logical classes of
equivalence' therefore accords strictly with classical definitions
of conceptual groupings (see, for example, Bruner and Olver, 1963;
Inhelder and Piaget, 1964; Vygotsky, 1962, originally published,
1934; Werner, 1948).
Vurpillot's primary interest has been in the development of the
ability to correctly judge logical identity; her concern with the
emergence of logical classes of equivalence having been more
incidental. The technique generally used for investigating the
possession of identity relationships has been to present subjects
with pairs of identical and non-identical stimuli and to require
subjects to judge whether the stimuli are, 'the same' or 'not the
same'; the presentation of non-identical as well as identical pairs
being necessitated by the finding that whereas the great majority of
young children accurately judge physically identical pairs of stimuli
as the same from the age of about 3:6 years, a comparable majority
do not systematically judge dissimilar pairs to be different until
at least 6:6 years (Vurpillot, 1976a). These studies have typically
used pairs of pictures (eg., Beagles-Roos and Greenfield, 1979;
Oleron, 1962; Vurpillot, 1968; Vurpillot and Moal,1970) but
occasionally, object-picture pairs have been used (eg., Babska 1965).
The conclusion reached by Vurpillot (eg., 1976a) is that these
studies indicate that logically defined identity relationships (that
is, of logical identity and logical classes of equivalence) do not
generally occur until six years of age. Before that, she says, the
child's groupings are based only on partial equivalences which,
because they involve changing criteria of equivalence are pre-logical.
Vurpillot (1976a) actually outlines five stages in the acquisition
of logical identity relationships. In the first of these stages,
'same' judgements, she says,
"express a communality of representational meaning between
two objects; there does not appear to be any extraction of
a common part or attribute. Two pictures or two objects
are judged the same because their perceived form represents
the same thing. For example, all pictures identified as
'houses' are described as the same, whilst a picture
identified as 'a house' and another one identified as 'a
duck' are described as 'not the same' (p.309, emphasis
not in original)."
Vurpillot then describes how, in the following stages, the child
progresses to using adult criteria of 'same' and 'not the same'
though initially only for part of the stimuli and only for some of
those dimensions to which he is sensitive. (Vurpillot identifies
real differences of form as being, apparently, the first kind of
difference which is widely judged to be incompatible with a 'same'
judgement.) Gradually however, the child's perceptual searches
become more extensive and a reciprocal correspondence is then
required between each part; finally, in the fifth stage, the spatial
arrangement of the parts is'required to be identical and only then
is the development of the relation of logical identity complete.
Vurpillot's developmental analysis closely resembles that made
by Piaget and Inhelder (1956) when they examined young children's
ability to make copies of model necklaces and model washing lines.
The question arises however as to whether Vurpillot is entirely
justified in concluding that young children lack appreciation of
logical identity and logical classes of equivalence. With regard
first to the ability to judge logical identity, it is evident that,
in the studies upon which Vurpillot's conclusion is based, subjects
were required to grasp that when they were asked if two stimuli were
the same or different, it was a judgement of logical identity which
was being requested. It is possible however that young children
will not typically appreciate that this is the kind of judgement
required; specifically, Vurpillot's subjects may have supposed the
request to be for a judgement of correspondence at a less absolute
level than that which Vurpillot intended them to. If this is so,
Vurpillot's results may merely map developmental changes in children'
interpretation of what her task required rather than developmental
changes in children's ability to judge logical identity.
Consider the first stage which Vurpillot describes. Vurpillot
assumes that children at this stage operate with classes of
equivalence which are pre-logical. Her reason for this assumption
is based, as has been stated, on the classical approach to concept
formation; specifically, these children's equivalence judgements are
held to be pre-logical because they do not appear to be governed by
the presence or absence of any single attributes or sets of
attributes. In recent years however, the validity of the classical
approach to concept formation in relation to everyday objects has
been severely questioned. In particular, it has been suggested that
natural concepts are seldom composed of a set of defining features
(eg., Anglin, 1974; Fodor, 1972; Labov, 1973; Mervis and Rosch, 1981;
Miller and Johnson - Laird, 1976; Nelson, 1974; see also Cassirer,
1953, originally published, 1923; Cassirer, 1946 and Wittgenstein,
1958). One suggestion (eg., Bransford, 1970; Johnson-Laird and
Wason, 1977) is that the essence of natural concepts may often be
best characterised in terms of what may be called a relational
structure (such a structure being perceptually and/or functionally
defined). Take, for example, the concept of 'house'. Houses do not
have the same value on any dimension of perceptual correspondence,
be it colour, shape, size, texture or anything else. The essence of
a house is rather that it is a secure and comfortable object to live
in. Such an object will tend to have certain features (for example,
a roof, walls and windows) which are distributed in fairly predictable
ways (for example, the roof is positioned above the walls); these
features however, will vary greatly in very many ways - for example,
in their precise position relative to each other and in their
appearance. These considerations suggest then that the young child
who judges two houses to be the same on the basis that they are both
houses (that is the kind of equivalence judgement occuring on
Vurpillot's stage one) may not be making the pre-logical judgement
which Vurpillot supposes. In the course of a discussion of her
studies, Vurpillot (1976a) comments, in a passage which conveys some
astonishment:
"In these experiments, 5-year old children were quite able
to see permutations involving two of the windows of a house
or two parts of a configuration, comment on them, and at
the same time conclude that, nonetheless, the house or the
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(6)
configuration had not been changed (p.212)
A sample of the kind of material used in these experiments is
reproduced in Figure 5. It is evident however that if Vurpillot's
purely classical approach to the bases upon which logical categori¬
sations may be based is replaced by a more relation orientated model,
such judgements do not then appear to be at all unreasonable.
Figure 5 Some of the house pairs used in Vurpillot's studies of the














(a) Identical house pair (b) Non-identical house pair
To summarise the main points so far. A considerable body of literature
has been reviewed which, in the past, has been taken to support the
view that when performing a variety of tasks involving figurative
materials, young children consistently fail to co-ordinate information.
There are however, alternative explanations of these poor performances
which, if accepted, suggest that young children may not be so limited
in their ability to co-ordinate information as has been previously
supposed. One important point which emerged is that accurate
identification of representational materials and logical judgements
of equivalence between representational items necessarily require
that the observer use his conceptual knowledge of the objects or
( 0 )
Two houses differ by a permutation when the contents of each
window of one house is exactly the same as that of the corresponding
window in the other house with the exception that, for a given
number of windows, identical contents appear in different positions
in the two houses. The non-identical pair of houses shown in Figure
5 differ not by permutation but by substitution, that is> the contents
of a given number (in this case, two) of windows in one house do not
correspond to those in any of the windows in the other house.
depicted objects. Very often however, investigators do not seem to
have paid adequate attention to the assessment of the kind and
extent of the relevant conceptual knowledge which their subjects
possessed. The next section (1.3) addresses just this question;
specifically, it considers the conceptual knowledge of concrete
objects which young children seem likely to have.
1.3 On the nature of young children's concepts of everyday objects
Precise definitions of what concepts are vary. Most if not all
such definitions recognise however, that concepts permit the
categorisation of discriminable stimuli into the same category or
class (eg., Anglin, 1977; Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956;
Donaldson, 1976; Smith and Medin, 1981). However although concepts
underlie the processes of categorisation, concepts are probably
best not equated with the resultant categories. This is because
concepts are richer than categories. Concepts comprise all the
knowledge possessed by a person about a category and its members but
not all of this knowledge is necessarily used in categorisation.
Different people are more likely to possess categories which are
exactly the same than they are to possess concepts which are
exactly the same. The classificatory systems which concepts provide
are generally agreed to serve a number of functions the most
important of which are, perhaps, that they permit the reduction of
complexity in the world so as to make it more manageable and
predictable and that they make possible inferences which can
transcend mere perception. There is though considerable disagreement
as to which of the possible bases of similarity are those actually
used in the formation of categories. The primary concern of the
present section is to consider the development of the classificatory
systems operating in relation to concrete objects; however, inso¬
far as such systems are based upon conceptual knowledge, the
following discussion also constitutes a consideration of the
development of concepts. The classificatory systems (and, by
definition, the concepts underlying them) arising in relation to
concrete objects operate at a number of levels of abstraction. The
higher the level of abstraction, the more abstract is the category
(or concept) supporting it. It might be supposed that 'categories'
of concrete objects at the very lowest levels of abstraction are not
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abstractions at all; there is however a sense in which all such
knowledge is abstracted knowledge (cf., Pikas, 1966, cited by
Donaldson, 1976).
The classical view of concepts (so called because it dates back
to Aristotle) is that all instances of a concept share common
properties that are necessary and sufficient to define the concept.
There is some dispute as to whether the classical view defines
concepts purely in terms of appearance. Anglin (1977), Cassirer
(1953) and Nelson (1974) for example, assume that this is the case;
however, Smith and Medin (1981) argue that this is a misconception
arising from the fact that traditional studies of concept formation
have, for practical, but not as has been assumed for theoretical
reasons, tended to investigate the attainment of concepts that have
been defined exclusively in terms of appearance. The traditional
studies have been of two kinds: classification tasks (eg,, Bruner,
Olver and Greenfield, 1966; Inhelder and Piaget, 1964; Reichard,
Schneider and Rapaport, 1944; Vygotsky, 1962;. Werner, 1948) and
concept attainment tasks (eg., Bruner, Goodnow and Austin, 1956;
Kendler, 1961). In both kinds of study subjects are presented with
an array of stimuli which vary greatly in their values on a variety
of perceptual dimensions; these stimuli are often artificial (for
example, geometric forms of various colours and sizes). In class¬
ification tasks subjects are typically asked to put together those
stimuli that 'are the same in some way'. Two requirements are
traditionally made for a demonstration of proper classificatory
skill: first, subjects should adhere rigidly to a chosen criterion
of grouping and second, subjects should be able to abandon this
criterion by a deliberate act of decision and reclassify the stimuli
on a completely different basis (Campbell, Donaldson and Young,
1976). Concept attainment tasks are, on the other hand, rather akin
to the modern game of mastermind. In these tasks, subjects are
required to identify a concept chosen by the experimenter (for
example, spheres of any size which are coloured with red and green
stripes) by using feedback indicating whether particular stimuli are,
or are not, instances of the concept chosen.
Given these requirements for success, young children have rarely
been found to perform very adequately on either classification tasks
or concept attainment tasks. In particular young children have been
found to be almost wholly unable either to reclassify the materials
presented on classification tasks or to deduce the target concepts
on concept attainment tasks. They have though been sometimes found
to make apparently satisfactory initial groupings on classification
tasks. Traditional investigators tend however to regard these
initial categorisations as immature; specifically, it is often said
that these categorisations are perceptually mediated whereas the
categorisations of older children (from about six or seven years or
so) are conceptually mediated (see, for example, Vygotsky, 1962).
The main difference between perceptual and conceptual categorisations
would seem to be that only in the case of conceptual categorisations
are subjects held to be consciously aware of the grouping principles
underlying the categorisations. Werner (1948) makes this distinction
very clearly. Perceptual grouping (says Werner) is relatively
automated:-
"conspicious properties of objects themselves (color or
form) quasi-automatically force similar things into
groups (p.239, emphasis not in original)."
By contrast, conceptual grouping, he says, requires conscious
recognition that the objects have a number of properties and that
ordering may use any one.
It is important to recognise that the classical accounts do not
deny that young children possess internal representations of objects
of a fashion; what is denied however is that these representations
are genuinely conceptual. There is a surprising measure of agreement
(cf., Vurpillot, 1976b) as to the different kinds of internal
representations which infants and young children are deemed to
possess and their order in ontogenesis. Specifically, infants'
first representations are said to be motoric; these are followed, in
very early childhood, by the development of images and images are
finally followed in turn by the emergence of concepts. Thus Piaget
speaks of sensori-motor schemas, figurative structures and operational
structures. Bruner speaks of enactive, iconic and symbolic
representations respectively and at least some Russian psychologists
speak of practical activity, ideal activity and conceptual imagery
(Zaporozhets and Zinchenko, 1966). There are of course differences
between these three accounts. In particular, the modes of
representation identified by Piaget are more strictly sequential
than those described by Bruner; nevertheless, so far as preschool-
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aged children are concerned, imagistic representations are widely
assumed to be the dominant mode of representing information in
memory. Images are widely held to be unstable, unsystematic and
static and consequently the predominance of imagery in young children
is traditionally regarded as a root-cause of their lack of deductive
thought. Such children are able to use images to identify objects
and pictures but the reliability of these identifications is not
held to be very high. Only with developments in what has been
termed the symbolic function is the child considered to gain proper
concepts of objective realities which are organised into fixed and
stable classes. The importance of a proper understanding of
conceptual hierarchies is emphasised by both Vygotsky (1962) and
Piaget (Inhelder and Piaget, 1964). Thus for Vygotsky, concepts do
not become conscious until full appreciation of such hierarchies is
grasped whilst for Piaget, representations of objects cannot be
completely stable until they are logically arranged in their
respective classes (satisfactory performance on his concrete
operational tasks of class inclusion being regarded as the chief
test for proper conceptual thought). Finally, it should be noted
that although there is considerable disagreement as to the role of
language in early conceptual development, it is fairly widely
believed that language is the ultimate means by which stable
classifications are coded and manipulated (Bruner et al, 1966;
Piaget, 1951; Vygotsky, 1962; Werner, 1948).
In recent years however the relevance of the 'classical' views
of concept formation for the acquisition of everyday concepts have
been severely questioned. The most important criticisms have been
as follows. First, the classical assumption that conceptual
representations are always determinate and underwritten by a set of
definitive features has been challenged (cf., Section 1.2). In
particular it has been demonstrated empirically that category
boundaries are not always well defined (eg., Berlin and Kay, 1969;
Hampton, 1979; McCloskey and Glucksbepg, 1978; see also, Lenneberg,
1957) and that some exemplars of a category are generally more
representative than others (eg., Rips, Shoben and Smith, 1973; Rosch
and Mervis, 1975; Whitfield and Slatter, 1979). In addition it has
been pointed out that the classical views cannot handle disjunctive
concepts although some doubts have been expressed (cf., Smith and
Medin, 1981) as to whether many natural concepts are of this type.
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A second and related criticism is the argument that attributes are
not arbitrarily (or orthogonally) combined to form natural
categories. In other words, attributes of objects do not occur in
every possible combination with equal probability. Rather, - as has
been pointed out by Rosch and her associates - there is a correlated
attribute structure amongst natural objects. Rosch (1977) comments
for example that creatures with feathers are more likely to have
wings than creatures with fur.
A third source of criticisms of the classical views of concept
acquisition has been the recent reports in the literature on
language acquisition (see, for example, Anglin, 1977; Bowerman,
1977; Clark, 1973) which indicate that before they enter school,
some children have learnt to use common concrete nouns (for example,
'dog', 'apple' and 'flower') to refer to roughly the same set of
objects as adults use them for. These observations are not new
(see, for example, Welch, 1940); however, they do indicate that
young children possess considerable conceptual knowledge. In
addition there is some evidence that infants (and prelinguistic
infants at that) can form concepts (Ling, 1941; Nelson, 1973;
Ricciuti, 1965; see also Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson and Boyes-
Braem, 1976).
Consideration of these and other difficulties with the classical
concept formation paradigms has led to the proposition of a variety
of alternative approaches. One of the least radical proposals has
occurred in the literature on language acquisition where Clark's
influential account of concept acquisition has retained the
traditional assumption of defining attributes (Clark,1973; 1974;
1975; see also Brown, 1956; 1958a). Clark's suggestion is that
concept development and the development of word meaning influence
each other reciprocally; specifically, concepts are said to be
acquired as children learn what words refer to. Some recent
proposals in the cognitive psychological literature have also
basically retained the assumption that concepts are determinate.
Glass and Holyoak (1975) have, for example, suggested that findings
of varying representativeness between instances of the same category
and of fuzzy category boundaries are, in various ways due to
processing characteristics. A more radical proposal has been made
by Nelson (eg., 1974, Nelson, Rescorla, Gruendel and Benedict, 1978; see
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also Anglin, 1977). Nelson's contention is that concepts are
generated solely on the basis of function; interestingly however,
she does suggest that concepts are generalised on the basis of form.
Another thesis is that concepts are represented primarily in terms
of separate descriptions of some of their exemplars (eg., Medin and
Schaffer, 1978); alternatively, other accounts have (as was noted
in Section 1.2) supposed the essence of concepts to be relational
information - for example, that the roof of a house is above the
walls. Then again, a number of other proposals (eg., Smith, Shoben
and Rips, 1974) have adopted what might be called a probabilistic
or prototypical view of concepts. These models assume that internal
representations are based on the central tendencies of the concept
instances to which an individual has been exposed; such models
recognise that representations may possess non-necessary properties
and may allow for degrees of disjunctiveness by permitting different
combinations of properties to yield the same concept.
The view of the present writer is that whilst the various
alternatives to the classical approaches to concept formation have
at least served to broaden the fields horizons, they have, almost
inevitably tended to become too polarised in outlook. To be sure,
these recent proposals do, to some extent, overlap (there are
similarities, for example, between the relational and probabilistic
approaches); however, what is required is a much more flexible
approach to the kind of concepts which develop. In particular
whilst qualitative differences between artificial and natural
objects have been widely commented upon, there appears to have been
relatively little consideration of the qualitative differences
(7)
arising between different kinds of natural object. One major
argument which will presently be advanced is that a consideration
of the variety of everyday objects which young children evidently
conceptualise strongly suggests that emphases in concept formation
vary according to the kind of object conceptualised. In other words
the relative balance of definitive perceptual attributes, functional
information, relational information, probabilistic information and
exemplar information stored will vary between different kinds of
Though there has been some consideration by Garner (eg., 1970;
1974; 1978) and with regard specifically to children by Shepp (1978;
Shepp, Burns and McDonough, 1980) of some of the ways in which
artificial stimulus input can constrain processing options.
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concept. In addition, it seems likely to be the case that, as
noted above, not all the information stored in relation to a given
concept will be used on every occasion the conceptual category is
accessed and, more than this, it seems likely too that the bases
upon which the same categorisations are made will vary even for a
particular person according to the circumstances of the identification
(consider, for example, the different kinds of conceptual information
used in a tactual versus a visual identification of the same
object).
The present concern however is with the differences in
encoding which seem likely to be widespread between different kinds
of object. Consider first the debate between Clark (eg., 1975) and
Nelson (eg., 1974; see also Anglin, 1977) as to whether perceptual
or functional cues are most important in the acquisition of concepts
of concrete objects. Bowerman (1977) having reported her obser¬
vations of the extensions occurring in her own children's early
speech, concludes that children's natural concepts are based on
a variety of both perceptual and functional similarities. In fact
the cases she cites suggest there to have been considerably more
evidence of extensions based on perceptual similarities than of
extensions based on functional similarities. Nevertheless, if
Bowerman's overall conclusion is correct, the relative importance
of perceptual and functional cues would seem to be likely to vary
according to the kind of object being dealt with. It should be
noted in considering this issue that Bruner and Olver (1963) have
distinguished two different kinds each of perceptual and functional
cue respectively. In their terms, intrinsic perceptual cues are
the properties of objects (for example, 'round and orange') whereas
extrinsic perceptual cues derive from the positions in time or
space where objects occur (for example, 'in the bowl on the
sideboard'). By contrast, intrinsic functional cues are the general
purposes to which objects may be put (for example, 'the provision
of light') whereas extrinsic functional cues correspond to the
actions performed by people in relation to objects (for example,
'people light them with matches'). It seems reasonably clear that
young children do readily make certain distinctions which can only
be based upon perceptual cues (for example, between certain foods).
The question is however whether there are also classes of object
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which the child must represent primarily in terms of function. The
most likely cases probably arise in relation to those classes of
object whose members have very little in the way of perceptual
resemblance to one another (for example, buttons or candles). Despite this
it is apparent that typically, adults are able to recognise members
of such classes of objects on the basis of intrinsic perceptual
cues alone. This observation indicates that it is not actually
clear whether or not the representations of such objects encoded by
adults are indeed functionally (rather then perceptually) dominated.
It does nevertheless seem reasonable to suggest though that
functional cues will play an important role in the representations
possessed by adults of such objects and also that the role of these
functional cues will be greater in the case of the representations
of such objects possessed by young children (who, it seems likely,
will not have abstracted all the complicated perceptual cues
necessary for the accurate identification of such objects on the
basis of perceptual cues alone).
A second area where the qualitative nature of objects may
influence the sort of concept acquired in relation to them arises
with regard to the debates as to which of the various perceptual
properties are these most used in the acquisition and generalisation
of concepts. Fundamental from the point of view of the present
thesis is the widely held belief that whereas shape cues are of
very great importance for these representations, colour cues by
contrast are of little if any importance. The relative importance
of shape is stressed for example in accounts of concept acquisition
in the literature on language acquisition (eg., Clark, 1975; Nelson,
1974) and, as has already been noted (cf., Section 1.2) in
Vurpillot's (1976a) account of the development of the ability to
judge logical identity relationships. Perhaps the main source of
supportive data for the primacy of shape over colour has been that
obtained by the so-called 'choice-preference' studies. The basic
procedure followed in these studies has been to present subjects
with a model stimulus and then to require subjects to choose between
two 'choice correspondents' - each of which fails to correspond to
the model with regard to one (and only one) of its properties - the
'correspondent' which is most like the model. Various perceptual
properties have been contrasted in this way but the two properties
most often contrasted have been colour and shape (eg. , Brian and
Goodenough, 1929; Colby and Robertson, 1942; Descoeudres, 1914;
Katz, 1913; Suchmann and Trabasso, 1966). Young children, it is
argued (eg., Tobie, 1926; Werner, 1948), are not disturbed by the
ambiguity of such a task because they are only able to attend to
one property at a time in any case. Tobie (op.cit.) for example,
argues that young children invariably exhibit a rigid and inflexible,
one-track abstraction process. More recently, Corah (1964;1966;
Corah and Gospodinoff, 1966; Corah and Gross, 1967; Corah, Jones
and Miller, 1966) has conducted a whole series of choice-preference
studies which have been based explicitly on the premise that the
results should be understood in terms of Piaget's (1950) notions of
centration and decentration. The choice-preference technique has
been used with both geometric coloured forms and representational
materials and, in either case, it is now customary to educe that
young children prefer to match by form than to match by colour.
Vernon (1971) concludes, for example, that the results
"substantiate the view that young children pay
comparatively little attention to colour as such when
they are concerned in the normal everyday life situation
of identifying and reacting to things (p.94)."
Now as a general statement, this widely held view that young
children pay comparatively more attention to shape than colour may
well be correct. The question arises however as to whether shape
is dominant over colour across the range of world objects or whether
the relative importance of the two dimensions varies systematically
between different kinds of object. This kind of thinking is well
exemplified by the answer to a question which appeared in one of
the Fringe shows at the 1981 Edinburgh Festival - 'Why' asked a
pundit thoughtfully, 'do you suppose British Rail food is always
served on blue plates?' Back came his partners reply, 'so that one
can tell where the food ends and the plate begins!' Presumably the
reasoning behind this couplet is that even British Rail could not
serve blue food and that their customers, being aware that this is
so, will be able to use the colour discontinuity between plate and
food to distinguish between them. It certainly does seem that
natural objects (and particularly plants) are rarely blue; the blue
orchid for example, has eluded horticulturalists for generations.
Indeed there are large numbers of naturally occurring classes of'
objects for which it might be expected that both children and adults
would tend to attach more importance to colour correspondence than
to shape correspondence (for example, grass). Additionally, there
are considerable numbers of naturally (and sometimes artificially)
occurring materials with a distinctive colour whose shape is, to say
the least, rather nebulous (for example, sand and blu-tack
respectively). Such objects and materials have not been given the
consideration in the choice-preference literature that they
warrant.(8)
A third area where the qualitative nature of objects may
influence how objects come to be conceptualised arises in relation
to the oft debated question as to whether shape information about
concrete objects is represented internally in terms of distinctive
features or prototypes. This debate parallels in some respects the
old debate in the perceptual sphere between the analytic and
syncretist views respectively (cf. , Section 1.2). However, an
increasingly wide body of opinion (eg., Bowerman, 1977; Caldwell
and Hall, 1970; Yurpillot, 1976b; Williams, Fryer and Aiken, 1977)
is now expressing the view that distinctive features and prototypes
are complementary rather than conflicting modes of representation.
As Caldwell and Hall (op.cit.) comment for example,
"schemata are composed of distinctive features and when
many distinctive features have been stored, one has a
'refined' schemata (p.7)."
Caldwell and Hall's case is perhaps most convincing with regard to
object classes such as that of oranges for which there is virtually
a one-to-one correspondence between a prototypical representation
and the sum of the defining features. There are however other
kinds of object where the match between prototypes and distinctive
features does not appear to be so close.
Consider at this point the influential view of conceptual
development, hitherto little discussed, which has been expounded by
Rosch and her associates (eg., Rosch, 1977; 1978; Mervis and Rosch,
1981). It has previously been noted that Rosch is of the opinion
Though there have, it should be noted, been a few reports in
the choice-preference literature indicating that changes in the
relative salience of the shape and colour differences between
artificial models and correspondents does influence the prop¬
erties upon which correspondence is preferred (eg., Corah, 1966;
Corah and Gross, 1967).
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that there is a correlated attribute structure amongst concrete
objects. Rosch (op.cit.) further considers however that this
correlational structure is reflected in certain basic levels of
abstraction: these levels are, she says, invariably defined in
terms of four inseparable aspects of the correlational structure.
These are: (1) attributes in common; (2) motor movements in common;
(3) objective similarities in shape, and (4) identifiability of
averaged shapes. Rosch also takes the view that basic level
categories tend to be internally structured into prototypes
consisting of those members of the category in which this
correlational structure is maximised.
One attractive feature of Rosch's notion of correlational
structure is that it encompasses many of the bases identified in
the various theories as important for the acquisition of concepts
(ie., intrinsic perceptual cues, extrinsic functional cues, shape
and shape prototypes respectively). From the present point of view
however, the drawback of Rosch's account is that these diverse
bases are held to be inseparable; specifically, as has been noted
in the last few paragraphs, there does appear to be considerable
variety in the bases upon which categories are primarily established.
Thus, some classes of object will have few if any attributes in
common (eg., buttons), other classes of object will not be acted
upon with any particularly differentiating motor movements (eg.,various
foods) and other classes of objects (particularly liquids and
materials) will have no shape in common. Reconsider at this point
the question raised above as to whether the products of the sum of
the defining features of a class of objects are always equivalent
to prototypical representations of the same object classes. One
finding reported by Rosch et al., (1976) is that adults spontaneously
classify objects such as birds and fish at a level of classification
which is one level higher than that which - according to the four
criteria of correlational structure - is the basic level. Rosch et
al., attribute this finding to their subjects' ignorance of the
pertinent correlational structures. This suggestion may well be
correct; however a more fundamental explanation of this finding is
that the factors which differentiate the various kinds of birds and
fish are more subtle than the factors by which other kinds of
object may be distinguished. The particular factors involved would
appear to be distinctive features. Consider by way of comparison
the case of terrestrial mammals. It is evident that these animals
are typically classified and named at the level of the genus (ie.,
horse, cow, etc.). The most obvious reason why terrestrial mammals
are so widely distinguished from each other appears to be that they
have distinguishing features which are much more marked than those
differentiating different kinds of birds and fish. In particular,
terrestrial mammals have highly developed sensory receptors
positioned close to the brain which in forming their heads seem
likely to be particularly informative clues as to identity; the
differentiation of the heads of different kinds of birds and fish
respectively are by contrast, much less marked. The crux of the
present argument is then that whereas the representations of objects
such as horses and cows tend to involve both prototypical and
featural information, the representations of other kinds- of object
(eg., those of birds and fish) are more completely prototypical.
In other words, different objects will vary in the extent to which
they are represented by distinctive features and prototypes. It
follows from the present suggestions that prototypes may tend to
carry information which is more superordinate than that carried by
distinctive features. This suggestion relates specifically to
Evans' (1967) proposal that prototypes tend to be used on
classification tasks whereas distinctive features tend to be used
on discrimination tasks.
Rosch's approach to category development is of very great
relevance to this thesis. One final example of its limitations
should therefore be given. Consider the taxonomy illustrated in
Figure 6. It is evident that the four criteria defining Rosch's
Figure 6 To illustrate some of the limitations of Rosch's approach
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'basic levels' of categorisation (which amount basically to a
marked similarity of attributes - particularly shape - and extrinsic
functional cues) cannot specify which level of categorisation in
this taxonomy is the basic one. The movements made in relation to
these objects are highly positively correlated at each level and
are certainly little more highly correlated at the level exemplified
by 'maltesers' than that of 'sweets'. Alternatively, when the
attributes of shape and colour are considered, it is apparent that
neither the colour values nor the shape values are positively
correlated in all the categories at any level. The inability of
Rosch's criteria to specify the basic level in this taxonomy appears
to stem largely from the fact that when she developed her criteria,
Rosch did not consider a suitably representative range of taxonomies
(despite her claims - cf., Rosch et al., 1976 - to have done so).
It therefore follows that Rosch has overestimated the amount of
correlational structure in the world and that the psychological
bases which are used to represent concrete categories are, - though
by no means arbitrary, - much more varied than she suggests. Thus
it seems likely that categories which arise in relation to concrete
objects may be based upon any one or a combination of Rosch's
psychological bases and that indeed, additional factors may be
involved as well (eg., the tastes, sounds, movements and intrinsic
functions of objects). In the present view then, there is no
single object originating factor (or limited set of factors) which
is either necessary or sufficient for the conception of all the
objects in the everyday world.
One critical question which arises from the present view is
that of how children manage to learn the various categories of
objects in the world when, as has been suggested, these categories
have a very wide range of bases. It is strikingly apparent that
the only factor which consistently unites the members of each of
these categories is that customarily they all share the same name.
Now this observation does not of course necessarily implicate
language in cognitive development. To be sure, there is a
considerable body of opinion which takes the view that concept
acquisition is, in some way mediated by language development (eg.,
Brown, 1956; 1958a; 1958b; but see also Brown, 1976; Bruner, 1974;
Clark, 1975; see also Werner, 1948). However, there is an equally
distinguished lobby which denies that language has an important
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role in conceptual development (eg., Lenneberg, 1967; Macnamara,
1972; Nelson, 1974; Piaget, 1968b). The latter view does, more¬
over, derive some support from the demonstrations (cited above) of
concept acquisition by prelinguistic infants. Certainly, it does
seem unwise to cling to an extreme version of the Whorfian view
(that is, the view that the categories a person thinks with is
determined by the particular language he speaks). What does not
seem to be in any doubt however, is that concepts ultimately become
thoroughly attuned with the categories inherent in language.
Language is the means by which conceptual information becomes
structured and, in particular, it provides a means of transmitting
obscure categorial information of various kinds. Thus language
serves both a discriminative role, that is, it serves to distinguish
categories which might not otherwise be differentiated (such as,
for example, horses from donkeys, sheep from goats or, as James
(1890) suggests, claret from burgundy) and it also serves a
grouping role, that is, it unites objects which might not spontan¬
eously be co-categorised (consider, for example, the visual,
auditory and tactile differences between chihuahuas and great danes,
yet children learn to label both these breeds as 'dogs').
Perhaps the central question then concerns the stage in
development at which concepts begin to become stabilised in terms
of language categories. Classical views tend, as has been noted,
to assume that this is a relatively late development; Piaget, for
example (cf., Berlyne, 1964; Flavell, 1963) has suggested that
words are used in reference to a variety of meanings varying greatly
with context during the preschool years. There is however, now
considerable evidence that children have learnt to use language to
refer to a considerable number of fairly stable classes by five-
years or so at the very least (cf., above). So then, the critical
question becomes whether stable knowledge of these classes develops
any earlier than five-years. In this connection it is interesting
to consider Clark's reports that the close of the period of wide¬
spread extensions (at about thirty months) is -
"generally marked by a large increase in questioning
activity (of the 'what(s) that?' type) combined with
a rapid growth in vocabulary (1974, p.110, 111)."
It seems possible that, having made various attempts to name new
objects on the basis of a wide variety of perceptual and functional
cues and been constantly corrected (ie., because names are not
consistently correlated to any great extent with any single such
characteristic or set of characteristics), children learn to ask
for the names of objects directly. It seems likely that in taking
this interest in the names by which things are called, young
children do, at least to some extent, appreciate the power of
language as a categorial system. Certainly, casual observation
would tend to confirm that children steadily acquire a considerable
number of reasonably stable linguistic-conceptual categories in
their preschool years.
The traditional view that young children do not acquire stable
categories which are coded in language is closely linked with the
more general discussion of the age at which children acquire an
(9)
awareness of the arbitrary nature of symbols. In particular, it
is traditionally held (eg., Greenfield and Bruner, 1974; Piaget,
1929; Vygotsky, 1962 and Werner, 1948) that up to at least five or
six years or so, children are nominal realists; that is,
that failing to appreciate that symbols are arbitrary, they believe
the name of an object to be inside or in some way attached to the
referent object. The tasks which have yielded the evidence for
nominal realism are however, fraught with difficulties arising from
uncertainties as to whether subjects have actually understood that
they are required on these tasks (no doubt for the first time in
their lives) to treat names independently of the referents to which
they habitually refer. Most importantly, several recent studies
(Ianco-Worrall, 1972; Osherson and Markman, 1975) have found that
when young children are asked questions of the form:- "Suppose you
were making up the names for things, could you then call a cow 'dog',
and a dog 'cow'?" - they do evidence some understanding of the
arbitrary character of words. Additionally, HoILobow (1981) reports
that in a study of children's appreciation of the lexical ambiguity
of homonyms, the majority of her two-year old subjects appreciated
that the same names may be used to refer to two completely different
(9)
Interestingly, a study by Klank, Huang and Johnson (1971) has
yielded some evidence which disconfirms the assumption that the
sound quality of concrete words is completely arbitrary. Specifically
Klank et al., obtained evidence suggesting that concrete words to
some extent reflect qualitative characteristics of the objects .they
denote (see also, Werner, 1948).
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kinds of object.
One outstanding question remains to be discussed. Specifically,
at what level of abstraction (if any) does conceptual knowledge
tend to be first acquired? In the past the dominant views (cf.,
Brown, 1958a) have been that initial concepts are either very
specific or else very superordinate and that conceptual knowledge
is progressively extended either to more superordinate or to more
specific levels of abstraction, respectively. More recently Rosch,
(eg., 1977, 1978), has cogently argued that children first acquire
concepts at what she calls the basic level of abstraction (an
intermediate level of abstraction roughly equivalent to that denoted
by common nouns such as 'dog' or 'cat'). Rosch's proposal is not
entirely new. In particular a number of writers have previously
suggested that the child's world is generically organised and this
generic level of abstraction (see, for example, Brian and Goodenough
1929; Brown, 1958a; Bruner, 1957) would seem to correspond closely
to Rosch's basic level of abstraction. One attraction of the kind
of view propounded by Rosch is that it appears to accord closely
with the nature of language development; that is, basic (or generic)
level names appear to be the kind of category labels first acquired
by children (see, for example, Anglin, 1977, Rosch et al., 1976).
Rosch herself (eg., Rosch et al., 1976) rejects the possibility
that the development of these categories could be 'simply' a
function of language development and contends that the main basis
for their acquisition are the four psychological criteria she
identifies as accounting for real world correlational structure.
Now clearly, language could not be the sole means by which
categories are acquired; names are, in general, virtually arbitrary
and must therefore generally derive their meaning from the
psychological factors with which their referents have come to be
associated. However, as has been seen, Rosch's psychological
criteria alone are unable to account for the development of
knowledge of all basic level categories. In the present view
therefore, language is held to be involved from the early preschool
years onwards in mediating the acquisition of stable concrete
categories (and, most especially the 'basic level' categories). It
is through learning the terms given to objects that children are
able to grasp the particular psychological bases (ie., perceptual,
functional, etc.) of the various concrete categories.
Whilst however it seems probable that the first comprehensive
and stabilised set of categories acquired by children will be
categories at the 'basic level' (or its linguistic equivalent) it
does also seem likely that young children acquire some categorial
knowledge at other levels of abstraction. In particular there does
seem to be fairly convincing evidence that young children acquire
some categorial knowledge at levels of abstraction higher than that
of the basic level. Figure 7 illustrates five levels of abstraction
identified by Welch (1947) in which level two 'that is 'dog')
Figure 7 Taxonomy described by Welch (1947)
corresponds to the level identified by Rosch as the basic level.
Interestingly, Anglin (1977) reports specifically that children
typically learn the term 'dog' before either that of 'collie' or
'animal'. Nevertheless, whilst Gunther Stern (aged eighteen months)
was able, when given various animal nouns, to point correctly to
many of the appropriate pictorial correspondents, he would, when
producing the names himself, name almost all of the animals as
'bebau' - which suggests that he had in some way grouped all these
animals together (reported by Werner, 1948). More precise evidence
that young children acquire categorial knowledge at levels of
abstraction higher than that of the basic level has been obtained by
Goldberg, Perlmutter and Myers (1974). These researchers found that
children as young as two-years evidenced some knowledge of super-
ordinate categories in the order in which they recalled categorically
(10)
related versus categorically unrelated items.
1.4 Overview of the issues addressed by the studies reported in
this thesis
1.4.1 Resume
The overall area of investigation is that of young children's
performance on a variety of identification tasks involving repres-
N.B. The present thesis is concerned with abstractions at the
basic level and at levels of abstraction higher than the basic level.
These abstractions each involve the making of categorisations between
different things. This thesis is not concerned with the kind of con¬
cept involved when recognising an individual object despite a change
in its outward appearance and/or inward state (eg., recognising a














entational materials (cf., Section 1.1). In Section 1.2 a number of
studies were reviewed which, in the past have been supposed to
indicate that young children perform poorly on such identification
tasks because, rather than co-ordinating the various visual cues
they tend, instead, to centre their attention upon specific, salient
features of the material. Several limitations of these studies were
discussed and it was suggested that young children may not perform
poorly on these tasks because of a lack of co-ordinative skill per
se. In particular it seems likely that young children often lack
the specific conceptual knowledge which is required for success on
these tasks. The concepts of objects which young children seem
likely to possess was discussed in Section 1.3. This discussion
raises a number of possibilities concerning various kinds of ident¬
ification tasks upon which young children may succeed. The present
series of studies investigated some of these possibilities. The
studies conducted are reviewed in the following sections.
1.4.2 Preschool children's judgements of correspondence
between objects and pictures of those objects
Chapter Two reports two studies which have investigated how young
children judge correspondence between highly specified objects and
pictures of those objects. It should be stressed at this point that
the relation which exists between an object and a picture of that
object is very different from the kind of relation which may exist
between an object and a picture per se (or between sets of objects or
sets of pictures, respectively). Specifically, whereas in the case of
ad-hoc object-picture pairs it is reasonable to judge correspondence
at a number of different levels of abstraction, in the case of
pictures of specific objects, correspondence is only reasonably jud¬
ged at the level of abstraction at which the object is specified.
For example, a model of a Red Setter and a picture of an Afghan hound
could be legitimately grouped together as equivalent on the basis that
both are dogs, indeed, the model of the Red Setter could also be legi¬
timately grouped with a picture of a cat on the basis that both are
animals; it is not however reasonable to accept a picture of an Afghan
hound (and even less so,a picture of a cat) as a legitimate picture
of the Red Setter.
It follows from these considerations that subjects who fail to
judge the correspondence between objects and pictures of those
objects at the level of abstraction at which the objects are
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specified have failed to judge such a correspondence satisfactorily.
The available evidence would appear to indicate (cf., Sections 1.2
and 1.3) that young children are incapable of making accurate
judgements of logical identity. This evidence - chiefly that
obtained by Vurpillot in her studies of the development of identity
relationships - was gained however on studies in which children
judged correspondence between picture pairs. By contrast, in the
studies reported in Chapter Two, preschool children were asked to
judge correspondences between objects (highly specified) and
pictures of those objects; this may be significant because, as has
just been observed, the latter kind of comparisons would seem
especially likely to elicit judgements of correspondence at the
level of logical identity.^^^
As it was noted in Section 1.2, besides denying that young
children can judge logical identity satisfactorily, Vurpillot has
also denied that young children can judge logical classes of
equivalence. A consideration of recent advances in the area of
category and concept acquisition suggests however (cf., Section 1.3)
that it is unreasonable to assume (as Vurpillot does) that a
category is not logical simply because the class members are not
subordinated to a given attribute or set of attributes. Instead,
it seems rather to be expected that a comprehensive understanding
of natural categories will be evidenced by a considerable flexibility
in the bases (perceptual and/or functional) upon which categories
are judged to be based. Two issues then were investigated by the
studies reported in Chapter Two. The first of these was whether
there is any evidence that preschool children can judge shape and
colour correspondence between highly specified objects and pictures
of those objects at the level of logical identity. The second
issue was whether, when making such judgements in terms other than
logical identity there is any systematic flexibility in the kinds
of correspondence which young children deem acceptable; in particular,
these studies investigated whether children judge the relative
importance of shape and colour respectively to vary between
different kinds of object and whether any such flexibility is
^"^Clearly the use of the phrase 'logical identity1 here is not
meant to imply that an object and a picture may legitimately be
judged to be identical; rather what is meant is a judgement of
correspondence which requires that a picture of an object be a
fully accurate two-dimensional representation of that object.
strudured in terms of the names by which pictured objects may be
legitimately called. It should be noted that these studies also
examined how children's correspondence judgements vary according to
whether the model objects are presented physically or are described
at the level of the noun phrase.
1.4.3 Preferred picture groupings of preschool children and
adults respectively
Although judgements of correspondence between objects and
pictures of those objects may reveal something about the nature of
subjects' concepts of those objects, such revelations (as will
become evident) may not always be clear-cut. Chapter Three reports
two studies which have, by using more classical procedures for
investigating conceptual organisation, followed up more directly
the hypothesis reached in Section 1.3 that whilst categories have
various bases, they become structured from early on in development
in terms of the names by which things are called. The first of
these studies (cf., Section 3.2) was conducted with preschoolers
and the second (cf., Section 3.3) with adults.
1.4.4 Further investigations of linguistic effects in preschool
children's correspondence judgements
Two studies are also reported in Chapter Four. The first of
these (cf., Section 4.2) investigates how young children judge the
importance of what an object is called relative to its visual-
perceptual and functional characteristics respectively. As
previously indicated (Section 1.3) varying claims have been made as
to whether perceptual or functional aspects are primary in concepts;
an alternative view however (confirmed by the outcome of the studies
reported in Chapters Two and Three) is that because the relative
importance of each of the perceptual and functional aspects of
concepts varies greatly between different kinds of concept, neither
the perceptual nor the functional aspects can really be said to be
primary and that rather, from early on in development it is the
linguistic factor which is of widespread importance in categorisa¬
tion .
One possible influence upon correspondence judgements is the
function (if any) to which the correspondent is to be put. In each
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of the studies reported in Chapters Two and Four the correspondents
served the function of illustrating the contents of boxes (one
model object was inside each box and one correspondent could be
placed on top of each box). Now in the first three correspondence
studies (reported in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 4.2, respectively) the
object models presented were very dissimilar from each other (perceptually,
functionally and linguistically) and consequently it seems reasonable
to suppose that the correspondence judgements made in relation to
these models would be fairly spontaneous and not systematically
biased and that they would indicate pretty accurately what each
subject considers to be the most satisfactory correspondents of
each model object.
By contrast however, in the second study reported in Chapter
Four (cf., Section 4.3) the composition of the sets of object
models was so manipulated that subjects were required to lay aside
their spontaneous correspondence preferences if they were to satisfy
the informational demands of the task. Thus whereas the earlier
correspondence studies investigated children's spontaneous notions
of what makes for a satisfactory correspondent, this study
investigated children's ability to use correspondents much more in
the role of symbols. It is evident (cf., Section 1.3) that such a
task is more in line with traditional notions of how to measure
children's potentiality for conceptual thought than are the more
spontaneous tasks. One particular concern of this sixth study was
to examine whether children's ability to satisfy the informational
demands of the task is in any way influenced by how, if at all, the
model objects are described.
1.4.5 Preschool children's ability to detect anomalies and
ambiguities respectively
Chapter Five reports an examination of young children's ability
to detect anomalies and ambiguities in pictorial material when no
specific object models are presented and when, therefore, subjects'
judgements must be based upon their knowledge of how particular
kinds of object may and may not appear in the real world. As
indicated in Section 1.2, young children have been widely reported
to perform poorly on such tasks and these results have been
supposed to support the traditional view that preschoolers are
somewhat limited in their ability to co-ordinate information. These
studies have however generally failed to take account of the kind
of knowledge possessed by subjects about the types of object
depicted and they have failed also to provide subjects with an
adequate description of the special nature of the materials. The
study reported in Chapter Five takes account of both of these
limitations.
The focal concern of the present studies then is to investigate
the ability of young children to co-ordinate diverse sources of
information when performing various identification tasks with
representational materials. These abilities, it has been suggested,
may have been underestimated in the past because of a general
failure to appreciate the kind of co-ordinations which are likely
to occur. In particular, it has previously been customary to
suppose that children's lack of co-ordination is evident from the
extent to which they tend to centre their attention upon single
sources of information. The present proposal however, is that so-
called 'centering' does not necessarily result from a lack of
co-ordinative skills per se. In the following experimental
chapters (that is, Chapters Two-to-Five) data will be presented
which will be interpreted to suggest that, in a variety of
circumstances, preschool children's centering processes yield
evidence of considerable co-ordinative skill.
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CHAPTER TWO: PRESCHOOL CHILDREN'S JUDGEMENTS OF CORRESPONDENCE
BETWEEN OBJECTS AND PICTURES
"'Perception as a faculty,' Aristotle says elsewhere,is of
'the such' and not merely of a 'this somewhat.'" Rudolph
Arnheim, 1969 (p.9).
2.1 Introduction to the issues for investigation with special
reference to the choice-preference literature
The present chapter reports two studies which have each
investigated how young children judge shape and colour correspon¬
dence between objects and pictures of those objects. Of particular
relevance to this topic is the enormous number of choice-preference
studies (in excess of forty) which have investigated children's
preferences for shape versus colour correspondence. This literature
will be considered in some detail in the present section.
The first point of interest concerns the widespread assumption
that young children cannot attend more than a single kind of
correspondence simultaneously and that consequently they are unable
to judge logical identity accurately. This assumption provides the
whole rationale for the investigation, via the choice-preference
method, of whether young children abstract shape before colour or
colour before shape (cf., Section 1.3). An important question
which arises however is whether this assumption that young children
cannot judge logical identity on such tasks is justified. There
has been little previous consideration of this question. Interest-
ingly however, Descoeudres (1914) in reporting one of the earliest
choice-preference studies conducted, comments that faced with the
critical choice between a colour-only correspondent and a shape-
only correspondent, 'some children reply to you that there is not a
(1)
card which is the same (p.308)'. Descoeudres fails to indicate
either the number or the age of the children who made these
observations; however her remark does raise the possibility that it
may be erroneous to assume that young children cannot attend to
more than one dimension of correspondence at a time. An experimental
test of this assumption (to the present writer's knowledge the only
such test) was made by Colby and Robertson (1942). These
_
Literally, "Certains enfants vous repondent qu'il n'y pas de
carte 'la meme chose'". Descoeudres indicated that her reply to
such observations was: "'Montre-moi une carte qui ressemble un peu,
qui est un peu la meme chose', (p.308)."
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investigators found that when an absolute concordant (that is, a
choice stimulus corresponding to the model stimulus on both shape
and colour) was included together with the shape-only-discordant
and colour-only-discordant options respectively, children as young
as forty-four months evidenced a preference for the absolute
concordant, thus giving some evidence of multiple abstraction. As
Colby and Robertson (op.cit.) observe, such performances, -
"do not support the claim (ie., by Tobie, 1926) that
young children invariably show a rigid, inflexible,
1-track abstraction process (p.400 emphasis in
original. " (2)
The question of the extent to which young children can judge shape
and colour correspondence simultaneously is clearly an important
one and was the first question examined by the present investig¬
ations .
The second issue with which the present studies are" concerned
is a systematic investigation of children's preferences for shape
correspondence relative to colour correspondence. As has been
previously noted (cf., Section 1.3) it is now customary to conclude
from the choice-preference literature that young children's
preferences are for shape rather than colour matching (Clark, 1974;
Vernon, 1971; Vurpillot, 1976a). It becomes apparent upon closer
inspection hov/ever that this conclusion is not consistent with the
results of a considerable number of the choice-preference studies.
In particular many of the early investigations (eg., Descoeudres,
1914; Katz, 1913; Volkelt, 1926) found that children's preferences
were, at least for geometric materials, for colour rather than shape
correspondence. In order to account for these findings it has been
suggested by some (Corah, 1966; Vurpillot, 1976a) that there has
actually been an historical shift in children's preferences towards
a greater preference for shape correspondence relative to colour
correspondence. Corah (op.cit.) observing that Descoeudres (op.cit.)
and Tobie (1926) each attributed their finding that preschool children
N.B. Colby and Robertson do nevertheless conclude their results to
be in general agreement with Tobie's claim that young children do not
recognise identity and, in consequence, this study is sometimes cited
in support of the traditional assumption that young children cannot
perform multiple abstractions; such citings fail however to give due
weight to Colby and Robertson's own qualifications of their results.
preferred colour correspondence for geometric but not represent¬
ational materials to the lack of meaning that artificial shapes
held for their subjects,suggests that contemporary children have
much more experience with shape orientated educational toys than
their forbears did and that this experience leads them to pay more
attention to shape than has been given by children in 'the past.
Vurpillot (op.cit.) makes the same point. The evidence that there
has actually been an historical shift in children's correspondence
preferences is however by no means irrefutable. Significantly,
Serpell (1969) in reviewing eight of the most prominent choice-
preference studies has concluded that there is no simple chronological
trend and that rather, individual children normally graduate from a
(3)
preference for colour to a preference for shape. It seems very
unlikely however that the dispute as to whether or not there has
been an historical shift in children's preferences for shape versus
colour correspondence, will ever be satisfactorily resolved. The
reason for this is that only in some of the more recent studies is
a precise specification given of the colours and shapes presented
and that since the relative salience of the particular shape and
colour differences between the model and choice stimuli are known
to have systematic effects upon correspondence preferences (Corah,
1965; Corah and Gross, 1967; Huang, 1945) the effects of stimulus
factors and of differences in methodology are irretrievably
confounded. Indeed, given these latter results it does seem
especially apparent that there are strong grounds for doubting
whether shape is indeed as primary over colour in attentional terms
as has been concluded by some recent reviewers.
Nevertheless, although some contemporary observers may have
overstated the case for young children having a general attentional
bias for shape relative to colour, there is no evidence that this
case has been overstated insofar as the choice-preference results
obtained with representational models (ie., as distinct from
coloured geometric models) are concerned. Specifically, the studies
that have examined choice-preference performance with representa-
(3)
It should be noted however that the studies reviewed by Serpell
appear to be unrepresentative of the choice-prei'erence literature
as a whole; specifically Serpell omits to consider those studies
(eg., Corah, 1966; Kagan and Lemkin, 1961; von Kuenburg, 1920) which
found shape preference to be dominant in early childhood.
tional models (ie., Descoeudres, 1914; Huang, 1945; Segers, 1926b;
see also Eljasch, 1928; Katz, 1913; Serpell, 1966; Tobie, 1926)
have found very little evidence that colour correspondence is ever
generally preferred to shape correspondence when representational
(4)
models are used. A critical question is however, whether these
results are definitive. In the present view, great stress is laid
upon the need to consider correspondence preferences as a function
of the kind of object serving as model. In particular it has been
suggested (cf., Section 1.3) that the relative importance of shape
and colour correspondence respectively, may be judged to vary
systematically according to the kind of object serving as model.
It may be then that the studies of children's correspondence
preferences which have used representational models, have been too
restricted with regard to the kinds of object which have been used
as models to yield a fair assessment of children's correspondence
preferences in relation to such models.
Consider at this point the choice-preference array shown in
Figure 8. Suppose that stimulus (a) constitutes the model object
Figure 8 To illustrate some influences upon how the relative
importance of shape versus colour correspondence is
judged (see text).




and that it is requested that the choice be made as to which of the
two remaining stimuli (ie., (b) or (c)) is most like it. It seems
likely that the choice made will depend to some extent upon what
the model is called. If, for example, the model stimulus (a) is
called, 'a smartie' it seems reasonable to suppose that there will
be a greater probability of stimulus (b) being chosen than when the
model is called 'a chocolate'. The most reasonable explanation of
(4)
Only Huang (1945) and Katz (1913) found any evidence of




this effect is that categorial knowledge of the category-
referenced by the model name governs the choices made; specifically,
the tendency is to choose (independently of shape or colour
correspondence per se) the choice stimulus which portrays something
which could be the same kind of object as that indexed by the model
name in preference to the stimulus portraying something which could
not be the same kind of object as that indexed by the model name.
It follows from this that the knowledge people possess about how
members of object categories may appear will be likely to have strong,
systematic and spontaneous effects upon judgements of visual
correspondence.
The idea that general or class cues are emphasised in
perception appears to have a long heritage. Arnheim's comment,
cited at the 'head' of the present chapter constitutes an exposition
of the view expounded by Aristotle. It means, essentially, that,-
"We always perceive in the particular kinds of thing,
general qualities rather than uniqueness (Arnheim,
1969 p.9, 10; emphases not in original)."
More recently(!) the theories of Bartlett (1932), Bruner (1957) and
Vernon (1954) have stressed the role of concepts and categories in
perception.
The present proposal is then that children and adults may, (if
they possess the categorial knowledge required) systematically
judge the relative importance of shape and colour correspondence to
vary according to the kind of object serving as model. This
suggestion does of course raise the question as to why so few
choice-preference studies have found representational object models
to elicit any preference for colour correspondence relative to
shape correspondence (cf., above, present section). One observation
which can be made is that the pertinent studies have tended to
present only model objects for which the categorial identity is
mediated by shape. This observation may be highly significant if
it is also the case that the pairs of choice stimuli offered have
each comprised a colour discordant which shares the same categorial
identity as the model and a shape discordant which does not accord
with the categorial identity of the model. Typically these studies
have not given sufficient information about the choice stimuli for
this to be determined. However, in the case of two studies
(5)
N.B. This account is based on a study carried out with adults
by the present writer (cf., Section 3.3 for a full report).
47
(Descoeudres, 1914 and the replication of Descoeudres' study by Segers,
1926b), sufficient information is given and, moreover, it is evident that
the categorial identity of the choice-stimuli has been confounded with
the dimensional discordances. Specifically the subjects in these studies
were required to choose between shape correspondents (ie., colour discor-
dants) of the same categorial identity as the model (pot, basket, bottle
and lamp respectively) and colour correspondents (ie., shape discordants)
with a different categorial identity to the model.
The present hypotheses concern the relative acceptability of
different pictures as pictures of particular objects. Crucially these
hypotheses contrast two kinds of object characteristic. (These
characteristics are referred to later as dimensional values.) Firstly
there are those characteristics of an object that are implicit in the
noun by which this object is customarily called. These characteristics
are possessed by all the objects which may be referred to by the same
noun; for example, balls are always round. Secondly, there are those
characteristics of an object that are not shared by all the objects which
may be referred to by the same noun; for example, different balls are
differently coloured. The central hypothesis is that, for a given
object: "correspondence with regard to dimensional values that are
implicit in the object noun will generally be judged to be
more important than correspondence with regard to any value
which distinguishes the object at a lower level of
abstraction".
Thus, for example, it would be hypothesised that for a red ball, shape
correspondence will be preferred to colour correspondence whilst, for a
tiger in a standing posture, colour correspondence will be preferred to
postural correspondence. In the present view therefore, it is considered
that young children's object categories are likely to be grounded in a
variety of bases of equivalence - which, so far as shape and colour
respectively are concerned, may include either shape or colour corresp¬
ondence (or even both shape and colour correspondence or neither shape
nor colour correspondence) - but, it is held, these diverse bases of
equivalence are systematically structured in terms of the names (eg.,
'ball', 'tiger', etc.) by which objects are customarily called (cf.,
Section 1.3). The level of abstraction denoted by such names corresponds
very closely to the basic level names described by Rosch; however, by
making the linguistic aspect of these categories criterial the present
hypothesis avoids the shortcomings of Rosch's psychological definition
of basic level categories and, in particular, avoids the limitation that
colour correspondence may be assumed at this level of abstraction (cf.,
Section 1.3). So as to clearly differentiate the system of
categories presently being proposed from those which Rosch
identifies, the present category names will, in this thesis, be
referred to as 'type names'. The hypothesis outlined above will
therefore be referred to as the 'type hypothesis'. The range of
dimensional values implicit in a type name (for example, a very
limited range of values occurs in the case of the colouring of
tigers whereas a rather wide range of values exists in the case of
the shapes of shoes) will be referred to as type-defining
dimensional values (abbreviated, 'type-defining values'). By
contrast, the dimensional values which vary between different
members of a given type of object and are not implicit in the type
name (eg., the values for the type 'ball' include an almost infinite
variety of sizes and colours) will be referred to as type-modifying
dimensional values (abbreviated, 'type-modifying values').
In addition to the general argument that young children's
object categories comprise many varied perceptual (and also
functional) bases but are systematised in terms of language (cf.,
Section 1.3) there is some more specific evidence which supports
the present proposition that young children will exhibit a preference
for correspondence with regard to type-defining values to
correspondence with regard to type-modifying values independently
of shape or colour correspondence per se. This evidence derives
from a study which is reported in the drawing literature.
Traditionally (cf., Luquet, 1913; 1927; Piaget and Inhelder, 1969)
young children have been regarded as intellectual realists (drawing
what they know) whereas older children have been supposed to be
visual realists (drawing what they see). Most importantly however,
Barrett and Light (1976) have observed that the notion of
intellectual realism is ambiguous because it does not specify
whether the young child draws what he knows about the individual
object or what he knows about the object's generic type. When
moreover Barrett and Light (op.cit.) investigated this issue
empirically (by presenting children with specific objects to draw)
they found that by far the most numerous kind of drawing over the
age groups studied (which ranged from 66 to 78 months) was symbolic
drawings; that is, the children tended to draw what they knew about
the genus of the object presented rather than either what they knew
about the individual object presented or what they saw when the
individual object was presented to them. This finding clearly
4y
(6)
provides strong support for the present type hypothesis.
In advancing the type hypothesis it has been argued that young
children may, in judging correspondence, be especially sensitive to
the dimensional values implicit in common nouns. The third and
final major issue examined by the present studies concerns the
effect upon young children's correspondence preferences of
describing model objects at the level of the noun phrase either
instead or else in addition to presenting the object physically.
Now it is well known that verbal labels may exert a very considerable
influence upon how older children and adults will perceive and
reproduce ambiguous stimuli (eg., Bartlett, 1916; Carmichael, Hogan
and Walters, 1932; Gibson, 1929; Luchins, 1945). What is not so
often noted however is that there is also evidence that the
perceptions of young children too may be sensitive to precisely how
stimuli are described. In particular Luria (1961) has reported a
number of experiments which have demonstrated that by drawing
attention to particular properties of objects, speech may substantially
modify natural patterns of salience and thereby alter young children's
perceptions. In one of these experiments three-and four-year-olds
were taught to respond differentially to two stimuli (stimuli (a)
and (b) respectively in Figure 9) and were then presented with a
third stimulus (stimulus (c) in Figure 9). The response obtained
for the third stimulus was the same as that elicited by stimulus
(a) which indicated that the children had based the initial
distinction between stimulus (a) and stimulus (b) upon the figures
Figure 9 Reconstruction of some stimuli presented in a study
described by Luria (1961) - see text.
(a) (b) (c)
____
It should also be noted that interestingly, both Descoeudres (1914)
and, rather more explicitly, Serpell (1969) have suggested that
children's correspondence preferences for representational objects
on choice-preference tasks may be mediated by the names by which
the stimuli offered may be called. Neither Descoeudres nor Serpell
suggests however that colour as well as shape cues might be
codeable by language.
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and not upon the grounds. When however meaningful information was
given to the children which drew attention to the grounds - for
example, 'the plane can fly when the sun is shining and the sky is
yellow' and 'when it's rainy the plane can't fly and has to be
stopped' - an overwhelming majority of the children were found to
respond to the backgrounds rather than the figures.
Another of the studies described by Luria (op.cit.) and also a
more elaborate study carried out by Babska (1965) investigated the
(7)
ability of infants and young children respectively to distinguish
target boxes from non-target boxes by remembering the characteristics
of the box covers. These studies each found that the introduction
of names for the covers on the boxes (eg., colour names) greatly
facilitated successful discrimination of the target boxes.
Luria (op.cit.) has proposed on the basis of the findings he
reports that one development in early childhood is that of a verbal
control on behaviour. This development begins when the child's
behaviour becomes modifiable by the speech of others and subsequently
the child begins to be influenced by his own overt speech before
finally, he becomes able to determine his own behaviour by using
covert speech in a deliberate and conscious fashion. Babska too
(op.cit.) concludes that speech plays a prominent role in structuring
the attention paid by young children to the various properties of
objects.
Reconsider at this point the choice-preference array illustrated
in Figure 8 (p.45). Ponder what might happen if stimulus (a) were to
be called 'a brown smartie' rather than 'a smartie'. It does seem
reasonable to suppose - in view of the findings reported by Luria
(op.cit.) and Babska (op.cit.) - that young children would be more
likely to choose the choice stimulus corresponding to the type-
modifying value if the model were to be described as 'a brown
smartie' rather than as simply 'a smartie'. A parallel effect
would be expected to occur if the model were to be called 'a round
chocolate' instead of 'a chocolate'.
To summarise this section so far. The present studies address
three issues. These are:
(1) Whether young children evidence a preference for absolute
concordants relative to 'correspondents' which are actually
J7)
N.B. The subjects in the study described by Luria were twelve-to-
thirty months; the effect reported by Babska typically occurred at
about thirty months.
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discordant with regard either to shape or colour.
(2) Whether when objects are physically presented young children
judge the relative importance of shape and colour correspondence
respectively to vary systematically according to the type of the
objects presented such that discordance on a type-modifying value
will be preferred to discordance on a type-defining value
independently of shape or colour correspondence per se.
(3) Whether when, instead of being physically presented, objects
are described at the level of the noun phrase, there is a shift
from a relative preference for correspondence with regard to the
type-defining values to a greater preference for correspondence
with regard to the type-modifying values.
In addition it should be noted that although the present
studies are primarily concerned with investigating children's
correspondence preferences for type-defining values and type-
modifying values respectively, there are at least two kinds of
object type where a contrast between type-defining and type-
modifying values is impossible. Thus, some object types (eg.,
winegums) may possess no substantial type-defining values whilst
other object types (eg., maltesers) may possess no substantial
type-modifying values. Children's correspondence preferences in
relation to both these kinds of type were also investigated in the
present studies.
It was suggested in Section 1.4.4 that judgements of
correspondence between objects and pictures may be expected to vary
as a function of the use (if any) to which the picture is to be put.
In the present studies the pictures served the function of
illustrating the contents of a retail package. This function was
selected because it does seem likely that children will expect the
contents of a retail package to correspond closely with any
picture(s) on the outside of the package. In the course of a
discussion on this topic MacDonald (personal communication, 1982)
recalled the true story of an Indian visitor to Britain who bought
a box of crackers and was disappointed to find that the box failed
to contain the cheese and salad which had been featured in the
pictorial illustration on the outside of the box. In a similar
vein, Donaldson (personal communication, 1981) related the story
(allegedly true) of a tribe of cannibals in some far away land who,
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not so many years ago were visited by some young missionaries and
their families. Not a little apprehensively the missionaries
sought gently to modify the cannibalistic habits of their adopted
flock, but having little success, they eventually decided to
confront the cannibals' chief directly. The chief however was
indignant, accused them of being hypocrites and then frog-marched
them to the tipwhere the everyday waste was dumped. There he
gesticulated to a number of food tins strewn around which had once
contained food for the infant members of the missionaries' families.
"So you're not cannibals then?" mocked the chief derisively,
pointing to the pictures of babies on the outside of the tins.
These anecdotes do tend to suggest that the function served by
pictures when illustrating the contents of retail packages does
provide a sound context in which to study the visual properties of
individual objects which are widely considered to be the most
important to reproduce in accurate pictures of those objects.
In the studies reported a teddy-bear was cast in the role of a
shop keeper. In the teddy's shop were several boxes, each identical
and each containing one object which was 'for sale'. One picture
could be placed onto each box in order to indicate its contents.
This set up provided the context in which the three issues for
investigation (cf., above) were examined. In relation to the first
issue subjects were asked to make a straightforward choice between
an absolute concordant, a colour-only discordant and a shape-only
discordant for each object. In relation to the other two issues a
substantial modification of the traditional choice-preference
procedure was made. Specifically, rather than forcing subjects to
choose whether colour-only discordants or shape-only discordants
are most acceptable the method adopted was to have the teddy
'choose' either colour-only discordants or shape-only discor¬
dants on a systematic basis. Subjects were then given the
opportunity to reject the teddy's erroneous choices. As Donaldson
and her colleagues have shown (Lloyd, 1975; Donaldson, 1978);
young children will readily pretend that a toy figure is capable
of independent decision making and will moreover happily correct
any errors which they recognise such figures to have made.
Consequently when piloting for the present studies revealed that
large numbers of children failed to protest at certain of the
teddy's erroneous choices it seemed reasonable to suppose that such
responses implied acceptance of the teddy's choices and could
therefore by legitimately scored as errors. This latter procedure
may be said then to be investigating the correspondences which
children require whereas the procedure used to test the first issue
investigates, by contrast, the correspondences which children
prefer.
2.2 Study One: A study of preshool children's judgements of
correspondence between objects and pictures of those objects
2.2.1 Introduction
As indicated in the previous section, the present study
compared the shape and colour correspondences which young children
prefer and require respectively. The two kinds of task each had
two sub-conditions; in the first of these the object models were
presented physically whilst in the second, the objects were
described at the level of the noun phrase but were not seen.
Figure 10 reproduces the materials presented on these tasks. On
Figure 10 The critical objects and pictures presented in the



























'N.B. Pictures discordant with regard to a type-defining value
(and concordant with regard to a type-modifying value) are marked
'T.D'. Pictures concordant with regard to a type-defining value
(but discordant with regard to a type-modifying value) are marked
'T.C'.
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both correspondence preference tasks and correspondence requirements
tasks, four model objects were presented; these presentations were,
as has been noted, either physical or verbal - cf., Figure 10,
columns one and two respectively. Each of the four model objects
chosen represented one of four kinds of object types. In the case
of the green ball (Figure 10, row one), shape but not colour is a
type-defining value (the type level being 'ball'). In the case of
the triangular sandwich on the other hand (Figure 10, row two),
colour but not shape is a type-defining value (the type level being
'sandwich'). The orange (Figure 10, row three) represents a case
where both shape and colour are type-defining values (the type
level being 'orange'). Finally, the blue square button (Figure 10,
row four) represents a case where neither shape nor colour is a
type-defining value (the type level being 'button').
Consider the correspondence preference tasks first. On these
tasks subjects were given three picture options for each object:
one shape discordant, one colour discordant and one absolute
correspondent (cf., Figure 10, columns three, four and five,
respectively). The present hypothesis is that, independently of
whether or not the object models are presented physically or
verbally, children will systematically prefer the absolute corres¬
pondent for each object presented. If however subjects' correspon¬
dence preferences are for something less than absolute correspondence,
the present materials permit it to be determined whether these
preferences are, although not absolute, nevertheless structured by
the systematic avoidance of particular kinds of discordance (ie.,
pictures discordant with regard to either shape or colour or with
regard to type-defining values or type-modifying values respect-
•
i ^ (8)lvely).
Consider next the correspondence requirements tasks. In these
tasks subjects were required to judge whether either of the two
discordant pictures of each object model (cf., Figure 10, columns three and
four), separately presented, were satisfactory correspondents. Assuming then
that (as piloting had strongly suggested) some of these discordants
are judged to be satisfactory, the present materials permit the
(8)
N.B. A more detailed account of these possible outcomes is
given in relation to the correspondence requirements task - see
next paragraph.
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distinction to be made empirically as to whether the shape
discordants are rejected more than the colour discordants per se
(as a number of literatures - summarised below in the present
section - tend to imply) or whether it is rather the case (as may
be inferred from the arguments presented in Section 2.1) that
rejections tend to occur for pictures which are discordant with
respect to type, independently of whether or not pictures are
discordant with respect to shape or colour. Specifically with
regard to Figure 10 then, what may be termed 'the shape hypothesis'
predicts that those discordant pictures accepted will tend to be
the colour discordants (column four) rather than the shape
discordants (column three). Comparatively, 'the type hypothesis'
predicts that the discordant pictures accepted will tend to be
those which remain concordant with respect to type (these pictures
are coded 'T.C') rather than those which are discordant with regard
to type (these pictures are coded 'T.D'). It should be noted at
this point that whereas in the case of the ball and the sandwich
respectively the type hypothesis clearly indicates that one of the
pair of discordant pictures will be much more acceptable than the
other (ie., because only one discordant in each case is type-
concordant; that is, the colour discordant and the shape discordant
respectively) this is not the case for the two remaining models.
Thus in the case of the orange, both shape and colour are type-
defining values and consequently the type hypothesis predicts that
neither the shape nor the colour discordants will be very
acceptable whilst, in the case of the button, neither the shape nor
the colour dimensional value modified is type-defining and
consequently the type hypothesis predicts that both the shape and
the colour discordants will be widely accepted.
The present hypotheses (derived from pilot work) were that
when the object models were physically presented, preschool
children's correspondence requirements would accord with the type
hypothesis but that when object models were instead described at
the level of the noun phrase, preschoolers would not only reject
the type-discordant pictures but would also be much more likely to
reject the pictures discordant with regard to type-modifying values.
It was therefore hypothesised that children's correspondence
requirements will be more absolute when object models are
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described at the level of the noun phrase than when they are
physically presented.
The significance of the present study has previously been
indicated but should be summarised at this point. In the first
place, it is widely concluded from preschool children's performance
on a variety of tasks (including tasks examining correspondence
judgements) that young children are very limited in their ability
to co-ordinate diverse sources of information (cf., especially,
Sections 1.2 and 1.3). This conclusion may however be incorrect
and in Chapter One the suggestion was made that young children may
perform poorly on these tasks for a number of reasons other than a
lack of co-ordinative skill per se. In particular, in considering
the choice-preference literature in Section 2.1 it was noted that
very little experimental effort has actually been directed to
confirming the widely held assumption that young children cannot
simultaneously judge shape and colour correspondence correctly.
The present correspondence preference tasks examine whether this
assumption in the choice-preference literature is a valid one.
It is often concluded from the choice-preference literature
that young children are far more likely to attend to shape
correspondence than to colour correspondence (cf., Sections 1.3 and
2.1 respectively). The relative importance of shape is also
stressed in the literature on language acquisition and in Rosch's
criteria for the internal representation of her 'basic level'
objects (cf., Section 1.3). One of the possibilities examined by
the present correspondence requirements tasks however is whether,
when objects are presented physically, young children systematically
judge the relative importance of shape and colour correspondence
respectively to vary according to the type of object serving as
model. The particular significance of this investigation is that
if, as hypothesised, the correspondences which children require
when object models are physically presented are indeed less than
those correspondences which are required when objects are verbally
described as well as being less than those correspondences which
are preferred but are, nevertheless, based systematically upon type,
this would suggest that these correspondence judgements do not
arise from involuntary centring upon single dimensions of corres¬
pondence but are rather based upon ordered and chosen modes of
operating. Such a finding would confirm the suggestion made in
Chapter One (Section 1.2 et passim) that children who centre on




Eighty children (40 boys and 40 girls) participated in the
study. These children were each in attendance at one of three
Edinburgh nursery schools and had a wide variety of social back-
(9) (10)
grounds. The children's mean age was 4:1 and the age range
was 2:8 - 5:3.
2.2.2 (b) Materials
2.2.2 (b) i Correspondence preference tasks
The 4 objects and 12 pictures presented on these tasks (both
physically and verbally) have already been described in Section 2.2.1
and illustrated in Figure 10 (p.53). It is evident from Figure 10
that most of the pictures presented had some shading to give an
indication of the texture of the object surface. These pictures
were horizontally mounted with blu-tack in four sets of 3 pictures
each (ie.. each picture set comprised the shape discordant, the
colour discordant and the absolute concordant for one of the object
models) under 4 identical white flaps on a white board.
Each object was presented in one of 4 white cardboard boxes.
(Each box measured 7.5cms x 7.5cms x 9.5 cms.) In the verbal
presentation condition the boxes were sealed and the description
to be used to refer to the contents of each box was written (fairly
inconspicuously) on one of the box sides. In the physical present¬
ation condition the boxes were unsealed and unmarked.
The experimental set up was as follows. The E^^ sat
opposite each S at a child-sized table which was covered with plain
white paper. The teddy was seated in a high chair which was
Jg)
N.B. The children participating in each of the child studies
reported in this thesis were from a wide variety of social backgrounds.
That is, 4 years and 1 month (not 4.1 years). This method of
age notation is used throughout this thesis.
In this thesis, 'E' denotes 'experimenter' and 'S' denotes
'subject'.
positioned next to the E and had a toy cash-register within easy
'reach'. At the outset of the session, the picture board was
placed directly in front of the teddy such that the flaps, although
facing the teddy, could be reached by the E as well as, ostensibly,
by the teddy itself.
2.2.2 (b) ii Correspondence requirements tasks
The 4 critical objects presented in the correspondence
preference tasks and illustrated in Figure 10 were also presented
for the correspondence requirements tasks. Three further objects
were additionally presented on the requirements tasks; these were,
a cube of cheese wrapped in cling-film, a toy Christmas tree and a
toy brown table. These additional objects were however not critical
because for these objects it was determined that the teddy would
always 'choose' the absolute concordants; however, the procedure
followed still required (cf., Section 2.2.2 (d) i) that, as for the
critical objects, shape and colour discordants, respectively, be
drawn as well. The non-critical objects and their associated
pictures are illustrated in Figure 11.

















(1), 'T.D' indicates type-discordant;
concordant.
'T.C' indicates type-
There were thus 7 objects, 7 boxes and 21 pictures altogether.
The pictures were mounted as in the correspondence preference tasks
though under seven flaps rather than four.
The experimental set up on the correspondence requirements
tasks was as that described for the correspondence preference tasks;
however, in the physical presentation condition the objects were
initially contained in a plain white bag (cf., Section 2.2.2 (d) i
for details of the transfer of the objects to the boxes) and in both
presentation conditions the picture board was not shifted from its
starting position during the testing session.
2.2.2 (b) iii Knowledge tests
In addition to receiving correspondence requirements and
correspondence preference tasks, each S participating in the study
additionally received two knowledge tests (details of which are
given in Sections 2.2.2 (c) iv and 2.2.2 (d) iii). The first of
these tests was a type knowledge test; the only materials used by
this test were the 12 pictures of the 4 critical objects (cf.,
Figure 10) each mounted unsystematically under a separate flap on
a new picture board. The second test was a verbal knowledge test
which used these same 12 pictures plus the picture board used on
the correspondence preference tasks.
2.2.2 (c) Design
2.2.2 (c) i General features
The 80 Ss were divided into two groups of 40 children each;
for the subjects in One of these groups the objects were always
physically presented whilst for the Ss in the other group the
objects were instead verbally described. The allocation of Ss to
these groups was constrained by the requirement that the groups be
(12)
balanced for mean age, age range and sex. The overall design
of the study is illustrated in Figure 12. It is evident from this
figure that each S participated in two sessions; in the first
session a correspondence requirements task was presented and, in the
second session, a correspondence preference task followed by the
N.B. The full details of the characteristics of the various
conditions and sub-conditions of this study are given in Appendix A.
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Figure 12 Schematic illustration of the experimental design of
Study One.
" 80Ss
40 Ss receive physical
correspondence
SESSION 1 requirements task
40 Ss receive verbal
correspondence
requirements task
these same Ss receive
physical correspondence
SESSION 2 preference task
these same Ss receive
verbal correspondence
preference task
all Ss finally receive a
type and then a verbal
knowledge test
type and verbal knowledge tests respectively were presented. The
mean interval between sessions was 18 days (range 10-32 days). The
reasons for presenting the tasks in the order they were are discussed
in Section 2.2.2 (c) v. What should be noted at this point however
is that the reason why all Ss were presented with a correspondence
requirements and a correspondence preference task with the same mode
of object presentation (ie., physical or verbal) was that such a
design made it possible to make within-group comparisons between
correspondence requirements and preferences for each presentation
mode. Admittedly this feature of the design does have the consequence
that the physical and verbal correspondence preference conditions
cannot strictly be treated as independent groups (ie., because they
have received different earlier treatments); however the within-
groups comparisons between correspondence requirements and preferences
were considered to be more important (cf., Section 2.2.2 (c) iii).
The following three sections describe the design of the
individual tasks.
object (and for both physical and verbal object presentations), the
relative proportion of Ss who reject the shape and colour discordant
pictures respectively. In order to achieve this, it was decided
2.2.2 (c)ii Correspondence requirements tasks
The purpose of these tasks was to determine for each critical
that for each of the critical objects, 20 Ss in each of the two
groups of 40 Ss (cf., Section 2.2.2 (c) i) would be presented with
the shape discordants and that the remaining 40 Ss would be presented
with the colour discordants. However, it was further decided that
individual Ss should not be offered just shape discordants or just
colour discordants. In order to satisfy these conditions, each
group of 40 Ss was subdivided into four groups of 10 Ss each (these
subgroups were balanced for mean age, age range and sex) and the ten
members of each subcondition were then presented with one of four
sets of discordant pictures (details of the composition of these
sets are given in Appendix A, Table A).
It was noted in. Section 2.2.2 (b) ii that, in addition to the
four critical objects, three other objects were presented on the
correspondence requirements tasks for which the teddy always 'chose'
the absolute correspondent. The reason for presenting these
additional objects was to ensure that the teddy was seen to select
the absolute correspondent for some objects and to thereby avoid
the possibility of Ss realising that every picttire the teddy chose
was likely to be erroneous.
2.2.2 (c) iii Correspondence preference tasks
The intention in presenting the correspondence preference
tasks was to discover whether the correspondences which children
prefer are more absolute than the correspondences which they
require - especially when objects are physically presented but also
when objects are described at the level of the noun phrase. Apart
from the critical difference as to whether subjects chose or were
offered correspondents the procedures followed in the correspondence
preference tasks were therefore directly comparable to those
followed in the respective correspondence requirements tasks. It
should be noted however, that the position of the three pictures of
each object (ie., as to whether in the middle or on the left or
right relative to the other pictures under the picture board flap)
from which Ss selected their choice on the preference tasks (cf.,
Figure 10) was varied unsystematically. The only other difference
between the respective correspondence requirements and preference
tasks was that the presentation of distractor objects was omitted
on the correspondence preference tasks.
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2.2.2 (c) iv Knowledge tests
It is evident that if Ss are to judge correspondence satis¬
factorily in the verbal presentation conditions, they must
necessarily appreciate both the range of type-defining values
implicit in each type name and the meaning of any modifiers
given. To give an example, a S who has been told that there is 'a
triangular sandwich' in a box cannot be expected to reject a picture
of a pink triangular sandwich unless he knows that sandwiches are
not customarily pink; similarly, this same S cannot be expected to
reject a picture of a square sandwich unless he knows that a square
is not a triangle. It was therefore decided to make some attempt to
assess the extent to which Ss were aware of the particular inade¬
quacies of the discordant pictures presented. Two tests were
devised; one to tap type knowledge and one to tap verbal knowledge.
It should be noted however that in addition to assessing Ss' knowledge
of the type-modifying values, the verbal knowledge test also
permitted an assessment of whether Ss possessed the co-ordinative
skills required on the verbal correspondence preference task for
exclusive identifications of the absolute concordants. Some Ss
for example may not be able to identify the 'blue, square button'
despite being fully able to understand both 'blue' and 'square'
individually. Similarly, some Ss may not be able to identify the
'triangular sandwich' despite being fully aware of the difference
between 'square' and 'triangle' and of the fact that sandwiches are
never (or at least rarely) pink.
The knowledge (and co-ordination) tests were presented then
in order to assist the interpretation of the data obtained on the
correspondence tasks. Details of the tests are given in Section
2.2.2 (d) iii. It should be observed here though that Ss who
receive physical object presentations do not necessarily require
either any type or any verbal knowledge in order to reject picture
discordants. Both type and verbal knowledge tests were given to
these Ss however for comparative purposes.
2.2.2 (c)v Rationale for the task sequence chosen
It was decided to present Ss with the correspondence require¬
ments and correspondence preference tasks and with the type and
verbal knowledge tests respectively in the invariant order they were
DO
because it was judged that this sequence would minimise between—task
order effects. The reason therefore for presenting the correspon¬
dence preference tasks after the correspondence requirements tasks
was that it was hypothesised that correspondence preferences would
be more absolute than correspondence requirements; specifically, if
the preference tasks had been presented before the requirements
tasks, Ss might have been more inclined than otherwise to demand the
absolute correspondent on the correspondence requirements tasks. The
main reason for presenting the type and verbal knowledge tests last
was that it was considered desirable (if not essential) in deter¬
mining the adequacy of Ss' knowledge, to use precisely the same
materials as those that were actually used on the main experimental
tasks. Given this requirement it seems very likely that if the
present type and verbal knowledge tests - which did use the same
materials (cf., Sections 2.2.2 (b) iii and 2.2.2 (d) iii) - had
been presented before the main tasks, they would have influenced the
results gained on these tasks. The reason for invariably presenting
Ss with the type knowledge test before the verbal knowledge test was
that there was a marked similarity between the correspondence
preference tasks and the verbal knowledge test and it was therefore
considered to be more satisfactory from the Ss' point of view if
these very similar presentations were separated.
2.2.2 (d) Procedures ^^^
2.2.2 (d)i Correspondence requirements tasks
All Ss were first introduced to the teddy bear and shown the
teddy's cash-register (which was called 'a shopping till'). It was
then explained that the reason why the teddy had a shopping till was
that he wanted to 'have a little shop'. At this point Ss were
presented with the seven objects which, they were told, were the
'things that teddy wants to sell in his shop'. Ss for whom the objects
were to be physically presented were given the bag containing them
and were encouraged to take them out of the bag one at a time, naming
them as they did so. These Ss were then shown the seven boxes and
asked to place one object inside each box and to then close the lid
(13)
The procedures given in this section for the correspondence
requirements and the correspondence preference tasks are in an annotated
format. Verbatim accounts of these procedures are reproduced in
Appendix B.
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of each box. Those Ss for whom the objects were to be described
were merely presented with the boxes, one object being sealed inside
each; the contents of each box was then named by the E using the
descriptions given in Figures 10 and 11, respectively.
All Ss were next asked to state what was in the boxes and it
was demonstrated that in the case of most if not all of the boxes,
Ss could not correctly recall the contents. (Ss in the verbal
presentation condition generally required little convincing.) Ss
were then asked how they thought the teddy might be assisted to
remember the contents of each box. Typically, Ss could not, or at
least did not, volunteer a suggestion and the E then proposed that
just as boxes in shops often have pictures on the outside to show
what is inside, so one idea would be to stick a picture on the top
of each box in order to illustrate their contents.:it was then
explained that the teddy possessed a number of pictures and the
picture board was repositioned so as to allow Ss to view the three
distractor picture sets for a few seconds each. Following this, the
suggestion was made that the teddy could perhaps be asked to choose
one picture to stick onto each box. The possibility was then raised
that the teddy might sometimes choose a picture which failed to show
what was inside a box and each child was asked if he would help the
teddy by telling him whenever he chose the wrong picture.
The procedure proper then began. Ss in the physical
presentation condition were given the first box and asked to name
the contents for the teddy so that he (ie., the teddy) could find
an appropriate picture. The E then opened the relevant picture
flap, pointed to one of the pictures and 'asked' the teddy whether
this was the picture he wanted to choose. This process was often
repeated for either or both of the remaining pictures (the number of
pictures pointed to - one, two or three - was varied unsystematically
by the E). The process was only stopped when, ostensibly, the teddy
responded affirmatively -the E would lean over to the teddy so that
it was plausible that he but not the S could hear the teddy's
(14) ~
responses . The predesignated picture (cf., Section 2.2.2 (c)ii)
Ss could not of course from their position see the pictures at
this point - cf., Section 2.2.2 (b)ii-and had, in some cases, to be
restrained from shifting their position so as to take personal charge
of proceedings.
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was then removed from the picture board by the E and proffered to
the S.. The critical question asked of Ss at this stage was whether
they thought the teddy had chosen the right picture or the wrong
picture. If a picture was accepted,Ss were permitted to stick it
onto the box; if on the other hand a picture was rejected, Ss were
asked the grounds of their rejection and the teddy was then
requested to choose another picture. Once an errant picture had
been rejected, teddy's next picture choice was always the absolute
concordant.
For Ss in the verbal presentation condition the E read the
verbal label on the box (Ss having been told that the teddy, like
them, could not read the words) and the teddy then made 'his'
picture choices as in the physical presentation condition.
In both presentation conditions, the first box was always
selected by the E and this box always contained the Christmas tree
(for which of course, the teddy always chose the absolute concordant
- cf., Section 2.2.2 (b)ii). Thereafter the Ss chose which box to
illustrate next. When all the boxes had thus been illustrated, Ss
were asked to name (with the aid of the pictorial illustrations) the
contents of each of the boxes. The order in which Ss were asked to
name the box contents corresponded to the order in which the boxes
had been illustrated.
2.2.2 (d)ii Correspondence preference tasks
As indicated in Section 2.2.2 (c) iii, the procedures followed
in the physical and verbal correspondence preference tasks were very
similar to those followed in the physical and verbal correspondence
requirements tasks, respectively. Clearly, the main differences in
procedure arose-because, on the preference tasks, the Ss were
required to choose pictures themselves rather than decide upon the
adequacy of the teddy's picture choices. To save time however, the
objects were always presented in the boxes. Once having named these
objects or (in the verbal condition) having had the objects named by
the E, Ss were given the picture board. The board was placed on the
table with the flaps facing the S. The Ss then chose the object
with which they proposed to begin, the appropriate flap was opened
by the E and Ss were then asked the critical question -
" So which picture do you want to choose to show what's
inside the box?"
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This process was repeated for the three remaining objects.
2.2.2 (d) iii Knowledge tests
When the correspondence preference task had been completed,
each S was given the toy cash-register to play with whilst the E
prepared the picture board for the type knowledge test (cf., Section
2.2.2 (b) iii). When this had been done the E recovered and removed
the cash-register and, having explained that one picture was now
hidden under each flap of the new picture board, asked the S to
choose one of the pictures. For the first picture chosen, Ss were
then asked a question of the form:
"So what do you think this one is? Can (ie., plural
form of the type of object illustrated - or ostensibly
illustrated - by the picture eg., 'balls') look like
this?"
Ss were then asked to choose each of the remaining pictures in turn;
for each of these pictures they were asked:
"Can (ie., plural form of the appropriate type
name) look like this?"
Upon completion of the type knowledge test the E removed
the pictures from the type test picture board and repositioned them
(unsystematically) into their respective sets on the picture board
formerly used on the preference task. These sets were then re¬
presented to each S in the order in which they had been received in
the preference task. Before each picture set was exposed, Ss were
asked:
"Would you show me please the picture of the (ie.,
description given to the appropriate object in the verbal
presentation condition eg., 'green ball')?"
Having made their choice, Ss were then asked for the two remaining
pictures in turn:
"Is this one a (ie., description given to the
appropriate object in the verbal presentation condition)?"
If Ss correctly answered each of the three questions asked with
regard to any one picture set,they were scored as possessing both
adequate verbal knowledge and adequate co-ordinative skill. If
however, Ss performed inadequately, they were asked to state the
value of the three pictures with regard to the dimension coded by
the modifier (eg., "What colour is this?"). To be scored as
succeeding on the verbal knowledge test, these Ss were required both
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to name correctly the type-modifying value of the absolute concordant
(15)
and type-discordant and to indicate with reasonable accuracy the
type-modifying value of the modifier-discordant.
2.2.3 Analysis of results
2.2.3 (a) Preliminary remarks
Due to constraints upon space the only resultsreported below are
■those which are directly relevant to an assessment of the correspond¬
ences which subjects required and preferred respectively. In
relation to the statistical tests used, it should be noted that the
nature of the allocation of Ss to experimental groups (cf., Appendix
A for details) determined that a variety of between-and within-group
tests be applied. The use of these tests was governed strictly by
the criteria for test use given by Siegel (1956). The main effects
evident in the data are discriminable independently of whether or
not particular groups of relatively incompetent Ss - identified by
the knowledge tests - are excluded from the analyses. The information
yielded by the knowledge tests will however be noted where it is
suggestive as to how the main effects should be interpreted.
2.2.3 (b) Correspondence requirements tasks
2.2.3 (b)i Physical object presentations
The names which Ss volunteered for the model objects were,
overwhelmingly, type-level names (ie., 'ball', 'sandwich' (or 'bread'),
'orange' and 'button', respectively). In only three cases -(out of
(16)160) was an object described at any level other than that of type.
The first data column in Table 1 indicates the numbers of Ss
rejecting each of the discordant pictures offered (out of a maximum
possible of 20). The finding that none of the type-concordant
pictures (ie., pictures which are discordant with regard to a type-
modifying value) are rejected by more than one S each indicates
that, as anticipated, neither shape nor colour discordance per se is
sufficient to elicit widespread rejections. The findings concerning
the type-discordant pictures are however more unexpected, Specifically,
(15)
eg., 'square' was adjudged to be sufficiently accurate for
diamond and similarly 'red' for pink, etc.
(16)
These three cases each occurred in relation to the ball - the names
given were 'beachball', 'rubber ball' and 'football' respectively.
whilst both of the shape-type discordants (ie., those pictures which
are discordant with regard to both shape and type; that is, the
diamond-shaped 'ball' and the triangular-shaped 'orange', respect¬
ively) are widely rejected, of the two colour-type discordants
(that is, the pink and blue 'sandwich' and the purple 'orange'
respectively), only the purple orange is rejected to any extent and,
moreover, the number of rejections occurring for the purple 'orange'
is not as many as that occurring for the shape-type discordants.
Thus, taken as a whole, the results appear to show that whilst there
Table 1 Numbers of children rejecting the discordants on the
correspondence requirements tasks and preferring the

































































N.B. 'P.O.P.' and 'V.O.P.' - ie., physical and verbal object
presentations respectively.
d)
'T.D' and 'T.C' indicate type-discordant and type-concordant
pictures respectively.
CD
Significance levels given in parentheses indicate the degree to
which the correspondence preferences of each group of Ss were more
absolute than their correspondence requirements (sign test
comparisons; two-tailed).
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is some variance in the rejection rates for each picture which can
be systematiseh in terms of the types of the object referents, these
effects do not appear to be thoroughly independent of shape and
colour correspondence respectively. Statistical analyses confirm
this conclusion. One method of analysing the data is to compare the
numbers of rejections for the shape-and colour-discordants respect¬
ively of each object model. Such an analysis indicates that the red
ball is accepted significantly more than the diamond-shaped 'ball'
' (17)
(applying yC , p 4. 0.001 ) but that the purple 'orange' is not
accepted significantly more than the triangular shaped 'orange'
(applying x » p^ 0.2 only). Thus whereas a shape-type discordant
(ie., the diamond-shaped ball) is rejected significantly more than a
colour discordant (the red ball), a shape-type discordant (the
triangular orange) is not rejected significantly more than a colour-
type discordant (the purple orange). This result does (by implication)
lend some statistical weight to the view that children are more
inclined to reject colour-type discordants than colour-discordants
per se (just as they are, without doubt, more inclined to reject
(18)
shape-type discordants than to reject shape-discordants per se).
There is however a second, more direct means of making such compar¬
isons and, most importantly, the outcome of this second set of
comparisons does not point to the conclusion which the first set
does. Specifically, this second analysis involves comparing the
rejection rates for the three stimuli which are fairly widely
rejected (ie., the diamond-shaped 'ball', the triangular-shaped
'orange' and the purple 'orange') with the rejection rates obtained
for those pictures which are discordant with regard to the same
dimension but which are not type-discordants. Thus, Ss rejected
the diamond-shaped 'ball' significantly more than the square
sandwich and significantly more than the round button (applying, for
(17)
All applications of -£ reported in this thesis for frequency data
in 2 x 2 contingency tables employed the continuity correction given
by Siegel (1956). All p-values given in this thesis are for two-
tailed tests unless indicated otherwise.
(18)
Nevertheless, when the data for the two orange discordants
obtained in both the physical object presentation and the verbal
object presentation are combined (ie., to produce a total of 40 Ss
receiving each discordant) the number of rejections for the
triangular 'orange' i_s found to be significantly more than that
occurring for the purple orange (applying x2 , p^-0.05).
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(19)
both comparisons, Fisher's method for sign test plus Fisher's
exact probability test, p L 0.01 - in each case). Similarly, Ss
rejected the triangular 'orange' significantly more than both the
square sandwich and the round button (applying, for both comparisons,
Fisher's method for sign test plus Fisher's exact probability test,
p Z.0.02 and p 0.05 just, respectively). However, the purple
orange was not rejected significantly more than either the red ball
(applying x? , p 0.5) or the orange button (applying Fisher's
method for sign test plus Fisher's exact probability test, p Z.0.7).
It is apparent that this second set of comparisons indicates
that whilst shape-type discordants were rejected significantly more
than shape-discordants per se, colour-type discordants were not
rejected significantly more than colour-discordants per se. One
important question which arises is whether there is any evidence
that the greater number of rejections which occurred for the shape-
type discordants relative to the colour-type discordants is in some
way attributable to the children having differing knowledge of these
two kinds of object type. In this regard, Table 2 presents some
revealing information concerning the children's performance on the
type knowledge test. This table shows that although the great
Table 2 The proportion of children making errant judgements about
the type of each discordant picture presented.
A. Ss judging type-concordants
as type-discordants.
Stimulus Nos. Percents.




























For each data column the unbracketed numbers indicate the numbers
(or percentages) of pertinent Ss in the physical presentation condition.
The bracketed numbers indicate the corresponding Ss in the verbal
presentation condition and are included for comparative purposes - cf. ,
Section 2.2.3 (c).
N.B. It is evident from a consideration of Appendix A (see,
especially, Table B) that the majority of this second set of comparisons
require that, if all the relevant data are to be used, then data obtained
from both within-and between-subject groups must be combined. The
statistical procedure used to do this was Fisher's method. A detailed
account of this procedure is given by Kendall and Stuart (1976). A
worked example is included in Appendix A.
majority of Ss accurately identified the type-concordants as type-
concordants (Section A), a surprisingly high proportion of Ss failed
to recognise the type-discordants to be type-discordant (Section B).
In particular, more errors were made for each of the two colour-type
discordants than were made for either of the two shape-type discor¬
dants. The relative ignorance of Ss as to the type status of
colour-type discordants relative to shape-type discordants may then
to some extent explain why the rejection rate was lower for colour-
type discordants than for shape-type discordants on the correspondence
requirements tasks. Nevertheless however, this type knowledge data
does not account for why those Ss who were knowledgeable about the
type status of the colour-type discordants failed to reject them.
The number of cases in this category is considerably larger for the
pink and blue 'sandwich' than for the purple 'orange'. Thus, whereas
in the case of the purple orange, 5 of the 9 children presented with
the stimulus who were type knowledgeable, rejected it; in the case
of the pink and blue 'sandwich', only 1 child out of the 8 children
who were type knowledgeable rejected it. Some light is shed on the
answer to this question by the results presented in Table 3. This
table reports the numbers of Ss who performed adequately on the type
and verbal knowledge tests (data column one); the percentage of these
Ss who accepted either of the discordants on the co-ordination
component of the verbal knowledge task (data column two) and the
percentage of these latter Ss who accepted the colour-discordants
(data column three). What is most striking in this table is that
a very much larger proportion of Ss accepted either (or both) of the
discordants occurring in the sandwich set (cf., data column two)
than accepted either (or both) of the discordants occurring in any
of the other sets. Moreover, of the very large majority of Ss who
did accept sandwich discordants, each S failed to reject the pink
Specifically, combining the data for physical and verbal
presentation conditions, the type-errancy of the diamond-shaped 'ball'
was better known than that of the pink and blue 'sandwich' and the
purple 'orange' respectively (applying sign test, p=0.002 in both
cases) but was not comparably better known than that of the triangular
'orange' (sign test, p=0.078); similarly the type-errancy of the
triangular 'orange' was better known than that of the pink and blue
'sandwich' and the purple 'orange' (applying sign test, p=0.002 and
0.05, respectively).
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Table 3 Breakdown of the erroneous acceptances of discordants on
the co-ordination task by children who succeeded on the













Ball 27 (21)® 26 (19) 29 (0)
Sandwich 15 (16) 93 (81) 100 (100)
Orange 15 (21) 27 (24) 50 (80)
Button 25 (17) 36 (24) 67 (50)
N.B. For each data column the unbracketed numbers indicate the
numbers (or percentages) of Ss in the physical presentation condition.
The bracketed numbers indicate the corresponding Ss in the verbal
presentation condition and are included for comparative purposes -
cf., Section 2.2.3 (b) ii.
and blue 'sandwich' (cf., data column three). This effect is
considerably less marked in the case of the purple 'orange' discordant.
The findings identified in relation to the sandwich stimulus set
in Table 3 may, to some extent, reflect simply a general inclination
on the part of young children to accept on the co-ordination task,
type-discordants which are concordant with regard to a single
articulated modifier more than type-concordants which are discordant
with regard to a single articulated modifier; thus this effect is
evident similarly in relation to the ball stimulus set (cf., Table 3;
data column three). Nevertheless the strength of the effect occurring
with regard to the sandwich set relative to that occurring for the
ball set does suggest that Ss found it especially difficult to reject
the pink and blue sandwich.
The question as to how these and the other findings reported
should be interpreted will be considered in Sections 2.2.4 and
2.3.3.
2.2.3. (b) ii Verbal object presentations
Consider next the picture discordants which Ss rejected when
objects were described at the level of the noun phrase rather than
presented physically (cf., Table 1; section A). It is evident that
the Ss who received the verbal presentations rejected the type-
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discordants in comparable numbers to the Ss who received the
physical presentations but also, in addition, rejected the pictures
discordant with regard to the type-modifying values to a greater
extent. The latter effect is only a pronounced one however for the
red ball and square sandwich picture stimuli respectively. Thus the
red ball was rejected significantly more when the model object was
presented verbally than when the model was presented physically
(applying Fisher's exact probability test, p = 0.0196). The compar¬
able comparison for the square sandwich is also significant (applying
Fisher's exact probability test, p = 0.0083): none however of the
other discordants elicited significantly different rejection rates
between physical and verbal object presentations. No modifier
effects were possible of course with regard to the orange model (for
which no modifiers were given); what was unexpected however was that
no significant modifier effects were observed in relation to the two
button discordants. It may well be significant in this regard that
whereas, in the case of the ball and sandwich models, a single
modifier was given in each verbal presentation, in the case of the
button model, two modifiers were given in the verbal presentations
and the picture discordants were only discordant with regard to one
of these modifiers. Certainly, the impotency of the modifiers given
in relation to the button stimuli cannot be readily understood in
terms either of Ss being markedly less knowledgeable as to the
deviancy of the button discordants or less able to co-ordinate this
knowledge than they were for the other modifier discordants (some
indication of this is given in Table 3; data columns one and two,
respectively).
2.2.3 (c) Correspondence preference tasks
Table 1, Section B (p.68) shows the number of Ss receiving each
discordant on the correspondence requirements tasks who chose the
absolute correspondents on the correspondence preference tasks. It
is evident from the probability values plotted in data column three
that, for those Ss for whom the objects were physically presented,
only one comparison - that for the diamond-shaped 'ball' - fails to
indicate that Ss were more likely to prefer the absolute correspondent
than they were to require it. The reason why the comparison for the
diamond-shaped 'ball' is insignificant appears to be that there is
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something of a ceiling effect for this stimulus.
By contrast, the comparable comparisons for those Ss for whom
the model objects were verbally described (cf., Table 1; data column
four) attain statistical significance less frequently. One important
reason for this is probably that there are more ceiling effects (cf.,
the diamond-shaped 'ball' and the triangular 'orange', respectively).
It is evident however that on the sandwich and button sets, Ss are
not responding at ceiling levels of performance. It should be noted
too in relation to these performances that there is a possibility
that some Ss may have selected the absolute correspondents on the
preference tasks as a consequence of chance responding rather than
specific preference.
At this point a consideration of the non-absolute correspondence
preferences which Ss made is illuminating. It is evident from Table
4 that, with the exception of the button stimulus set, the non-absolute
choices made tend, overwhelmingly, to be for the colour-discordants.
In the case of the colour-type discordants this trend may be due in
Table 4 Numerical breakdown of non-absolute preferences as a function of
























diamond 'ball' 3 0 4 1
red ball 2 0 4 0
Sandwich
square sandwich 4 0 . 9 1
pLnk and blue
'sandwich'




1 0 5 0
purple 'orange' 3 2 3 0
Button
round button 0 6 2 8
orange button 8 2 6 5
part to a marked lack of knowledge of the type deviancy of these
stimuli (cf., Table 2). In the case of the sandwich stimulus set
however there also appears to be a weak memorial effect operative
whereby Ss are more likely to select the colour-type discordant if
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they were offered this stimulus on the correspondence requirements
task. A similar memorial effect is also evident in the case of the
button stimulus set.
2.2.4 Discussion of implications and formulation of some
further questions
Study One raises a number of important questions which formed
the basis of a follow-up study. Because these first two studies are
genuinely sequential, only the immediate questions raised by Study
One will be discussed in the present section. The results of both
studies will then be considered together in a joint discussion (cf.,
Section 2.3.3).
The present study found that when suitable objects were
described by a type name plus a single modifier, preschool children
were more likely to require correspondence with regard to the type-
modifying values than when objects were physically presented. It
also found that the correspondences which the children preferred did
tend, especially when objects were physically presented, to be more
absolute than the correspondences which were required. The most
fundamental question raised by Study One concerns how the results
obtained for the physical presentation condition of the correspon¬
dence requirements task should be interpreted. Specifically, it was
found that whilst the discordants which the children in this
condition rejected tended, overwhelmingly, to be those which were
discordant with regard to a type-defining value, it was not the case
that all such discordants were rejected. In particular, it was found
that whilst the two shape-type discordants were widely rejected, the
two colour-type discordants were not so widely rejected and indeed,
for one of these stimuli (the pink and blue 'sandwich') the rejection
rate was negligible. There are several possible explanations for
this result. The first of these is that the result should be regarded
as confirmation of the traditional view (cf., Section 2.2.1) that
young children do, for all kinds of object, attend more to shape than
to colour. The adoption of this view does not necessarily require
an explanation for the finding that the purple orange stimulus was
quite often rejected (ie., because it was rejected less than were
shape-type discordants); however, it could be argued in this regard
that rejections occurred for the purple orange not because it was a
type-discordant stimulus but rather because the type name 'orange' -
corresponding as it does to the appropriate colour modifier for this
object - tended, in some cases, to function as a modifier rather than
as a type name per se.
The main objection to a traditional interpretation of the
correspondence requirements which subjects made when objects were
physically presented is that subjects quite happily accepted shape-
discordants so long as they were not type-discordants. There are
however at least two alternative explanations for this result. Both
these explanations focus attention upon the nature of the type-
discordant stimuli which were presented. The first possibility is
that children may require, independently of shape or colour corres¬
pondence per se, only that picture correspondents should accord with
regard to dimensional values which are invariant between type
members. This suggestion arises from the consideration that whereas
(21)balls are always (or nearly always ) round and oranges are both
always more or less round and always coloured orange, sandwiches can
be made with bread of a considerable variety of brown and white
(22)
tones and the fillings (if not the bread itself ) may moreover
(eg., in the case of open sandwiches) be very variously coloured.
One possibility which arises from these considerations then is that
young children will tolerate discordants with regard to type-defining
values which in everyday life exhibit a range of values. In this
view then, the purple 'orange' would be expected to elicit more
rejections than the pink and blue 'sandwich'. There is however an
alternative possibility. This alternative is that young children
may require only that pictures of physically presented objects
should not be misleading with regard to the type of the model; that
is, it may be that a picture such as the pink and blue 'sandwich' is
accepted on the basis that it cannot really be portraying anything
else; anything other, that is, than a sandwich. In considering the
likelihood of this view being correct it should be noted that it
does seem reasonable to suggest that the diamond-shaped 'ball', the
It seems reasonable to suppose that preschool children are not
familiar with rugger balls.
(22)
Bread can of course be coloured artificially but again preschool
children seem unlikely to be aware of this.
triangular 'orange' and to a lesser extent, the purple 'orange' are
rather more misleading as to the type of their respective models
than is the pink and blue 'sandwich'; consequently the present
suggestion is consistent with the number of rejections made for each
of these stimuli on the physical correspondence requirements task
in Study One.
The first issue investigated in Study Two then, concerned which
of these three possible interpretations of young children's corres¬
pondence requirements for physically presented objects, seems most
likely to be correct. The second question examined in Study Two is
closely related to the first question. Specifically the second
question concerns whether young children accept or reject a picture
which corresponds to a physically presented model on neither shape
nor colour but yet portrays an object of the same type. It is
evident that both of the two type-based explanations (outlined
immediately above) of the children's correspondence requirements in
Study One do predict that young children will accept such 'corres¬
pondents ' .
The third question examined is whether the type-discordants
rejected in the physical presentation condition in Study One were
only rejected as a consequence of subjects having been required to
name the model objects - a naming process which (as was noted in
Section 2.2.3 (b) i) almost universally elicited an appropriate type
name. This investigation then is concerned with whether or not the
rejection of type-discordants under these conditions is dependent
upon overt type-naming.
The fourth (and the final) question examined concerns whether
young children's correspondence requirements are more absolute in
the verbal presentation condition because of the presence of the
modifier merely or both because of the presence of the modifier and
the absence of the physical presentation of the object. This latter
alternative is not so unreasonable as might first appear. If it is
the case, as Aristotle observed all those years ago, that we do see
in the particular kinds of thing, general qualities rather than
uniqueness, then it may be that viewing objects directly actually
inhibits children (and adults) from attending the type-modifying
values. In this view, the more absolute correspondence requirements
gained in the verbal presentation condition may stem as much from the
absence of this visual set as from the presence of the modifiers.
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2.3 Study Two: A further study of the correspondences which




One hundred and twenty children (61 boys and 59 girls) of mean
age 3:9 years (range 3:0 - 4:7 years) took part in the study. All
these children were in attendance at one of three nursery schools or
nursery classes in Edinburgh.
2.3.1 (b) Materials
The experimental set up used in the study was precisely the same
as that which was employed in the correspondence requirements tasks
on Study One; the materials used - excepting the critical objects
and pictures presented - were also as those described for the first
study (cf., Section 2.2.2 (b) ii). The critical objects and pictures
used in the present study are illustrated in Table 5 (p.86). The
first four objects featured in this table were each models of real-
life objects; these objects comprised a yellow knife taken from a
toy cutlery set, a brown horse in a standing posture, a red teapot
and a giraffe - also in a standing position. The fifth critical
object was a blue spherical candle with a white wick. The rationale
behind the selection of these objects (and pictures) is explained in
the next section (cf., 2.3.1 (c)).
In addition to the five critical objects, one distractor object
was presented to each S. This object was the toy Christmas tree
used as a distractor object on Study One; the pictures used of this
object were also the same as those used in the previous study (cf.,
Figure 11). Altogether therefore, 6 objects, 6 boxes and 19
(23)
pictures were used in the present study.
2.3.1 (c) Design
2.3.1 (c) i General features
A schematic representation of the design of the study is shown
in Figure 13. The 120 Ss were divided into three groups of 40
children each. For Ss in the first condition the objects were
physically presented but the E did not name them nor were the Ss
(23)
N.B. The absolute-concordants are not illustrated in Table 5.
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asked to do so; in the second condition Ss were also shown the
objects but in addition the E named each object with the appropriate
type name - these type names are indicated in the first column of
Table 5 (cf. , p. 86, - the type names are unbracketed); finally, Ss in
the third condition were also shown the objects but the E named each
object at the level of the noun phrase. (These labels corresponded
to the full descriptions indicated in the first column of Table 5.)
The allocation of Ss to these three conditions was constrained by
the stipulation that the conditions be balanced with regard to mean
, (24)
age, age range and sex.





40 Ss receive corres¬
pondence requirements
task in which they are
merely shown each
object. (This present¬
ation condition will be
abbreviated 'P'. )
40 Ss receive corres¬
pondence requirements
task in which, for each
object, they are both





40 Ss receive corres¬
pondence requirements
task in which, for each
object, they are both




1P-T-M' . ) /
Finally, each S receives> in the same
experimental session, a verbal and
then a type knowledge test.
It is evident from Figure 13 that, immediately following the
appropriate correspondence requirements task, each S was presented
with a type and then a verbal knowledge test.
2.3.1 (c) ii Manner of investigating the questions to be
examined
The study was designed to tackle the four issues raised above
(cf., Section 2.2.4) in the following manner.
1. Question One: What is the basis of preschool children's corres¬
pondence requirements when object models are physically presented?
This question was concerned with how the findings of Study One
N.B. Full details of the characteristics of the various condit¬
ions and sub-conditions of this study are given in Appendix C.
80
with regard to the rejection of the type-discordants on the physical
correspondence requirement task should be interpreted. Three
possibilities have been previously identified (cf., Section 2.2.4).
Specifically, it may be the case that young children reject type-
discordants which are discordant with regard to dimensions that are
invariant between type members but accept type-discordants which are
discordant with regard to a dimensional value which shows any
variation between type members; alternatively, it may be that young
children reject type-discordants which are misleading with regard to
the portrayal of type but accept type-discordants which nevertheless
convey the correct type unambiguously. The third possibility is
that young children may simply tend to reject shape-type discordants but
accept colour-type discordants.
The condition in the present study which was primarily designed
to investigate this question was the condition in which children were
(25)
shown the objects and given the type names. Children's responses
to four of the eleven pictures illustrated in Table 5 (p.86) were
critical in relation to this question. Of these four pictures, two
pictures are colour-type discordant with regard to their respective
object models (ie., the zebra and the blue giraffe) and two pictures
are shape-type discordants (ie., the spoon and the teapot with a
spoon bowl inserted where the spout would normally be). In each of
these picture pairs, one picture (the teapot-spoon and the blue
giraffe, respectively) was considered to be discordant with respect
to an invariant property but nevertheless not misleading with regard
to type whilst the other picture (ie., the spoon and the zebra,
respectively) was judged to be discordant in respect of a dimension
with a restricted range of values between type members but to be, in-
spite of this, misleading as to type.
The assumptions and rationales underlying the selection of these
materials should next be outlined. Consider first the pair of colour-
type discordants. The assumption made was that horses evidence a
limited variation in colouring whereas giraffes exhibit virtually no
That is, this condition effectively corresponds to the
physical presentation condition in Study One; because, in Study One,
Ss almost universally named every object at the type level.
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variation in their colouring. In addition it was assumed that
whereas the picture of a zebra would be misleading as to the type of
the model horse (ie., because it differs in type from the model),
the picture of a blue giraffe is not misleading as to the type of
the model giraffe (ie., because since giraffes have such a distinct¬
ive shape, the picture of a blue giraffe could not be identified as
anything other than a picture of a giraffe). The rationale then was
that if it is the case that children require that pictures should
correspond only on dimensions which are invariant between type
members, then the zebra should be accepted and the blue giraffe
rejected. Alternatively, if it is the case that children require
only that a picture should not be misleading with regard to type,
then the zebra should be rejected and the giraffe accepted. If
instead, it emerges that neither of the colour-type discordants are
widely rejected then this would tend to support the traditionalist view
that young children do not pay very much attention to colour corres¬
pondence under any circumstances.
Consider next the pair of shape-type discordants. In the course
of deciding upon the objects and pictures to be used for these
comparisons it had become clear that any shape-type discordance
between object and picture which is produced by changing the shape
of the picture completely makes that picture thoroughly misleading
as to type. Since, by contrast, many, many pictured objects will
remain non-misleading as to type if only the colour of the object
represented is made type-discordant, it becomes evident that shape
discordances, far more often than colour discordances, will involve
a change in the identity status of a picture. Having recognised
this 'eternal truth' it becomes clear that it is not possible to
have shape-type discordants which directly parallel the colour-type
discordants chosen. If then it transpires that Ss do appear to
require only that a picture should be non-misleading as to type it
seems only reasonable to suppose that children will, of necessity,
be predisposed to make more requirements for shape correspondence
than for colour correspondence for most kinds of object.
It has been noted above however that a shape-type discordant
was used in the present study which was judged to be non-misleading
as to type. As previously indicated this discordant is the teapot-
spoon picture. The choice of this picture was based upon the
thinking that only such an unobtrusive discordant would be likely to
leave a shape-type discordant picture non-misleading as to type. It
is evident that the teapot-spoon picture is not completely but only
partially discordant with regard to the shape of its respective
model. This feature of partial shape discordance only is also a
characteristic of the shape-type discordant picture which is mis¬
leading as to the type of its model (that is, the picture of the
spoon and the model knife). It was assumed in relation to these
stimuli that different knives are more variant in respect of their
shape than teapots are. The rationale then was that if young
children do require only that a picture should be non-misleading
with regard to type, then Ss should reject the spoon but accept the
teapot-spoon. This result would indicate that some shape-type
discordance is tolerated by Ss (there would, of course, if such a
result were gained, be no doubt that, were complete shape-type
discordants to be offered as pictures of shape-type objects, such
pictures would always be rejected by children knowledgeable as to
type). A second result which is possible with these materials is
that both shape-type discordants may be rejected. Such a finding
would probably indicate (depending upon the children's responses to
the colour-type discordants) that there is a shape bias whereby, for
shape but not for colour, young children reject pictures which,
though discordant, are not misleading as to type. The third and (on
the basis of the piloting which was conducted) the least likely
result is that Ss may accept the spoon and reject the teapot-spoon.
If such a finding were to be obtained this would suggest that young
children require that pictures should accord completely with regard
to shape when shape is invariant between type members (ie., because
Ss reject the teapot-spoon) but that they do not require complete
shape correspondence when the precise shape varies between type
members (ie., because Ss accept the spoon).
2. Question Two: What correspondences are required in pictures of
objects for which neither shape nor colour is a type-defining
value?
This question has particular relevance for the physical
presentation condition in Study One (cf., Section 2.2.4) and there-
(26)
fore the critical presentation condition is again the P-T
N.B. This abbreviation has been explained in Figure 13 (p.79).
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condition. The primary focus of the present question constitutes
then a particular case of question one. A single object was chosen
for the examination of this question; this was a blue, spherical
candle with a white wick (cf., Table 5). The method followed was to
offer 20 Ss in each condition the picture of the purple, narrow
tapered candle and to offer 10 Ss in each condition the picture of
the purple round candle and the remaining 10 Ss in each condition
the picture of the blue narrow tapered candle. This permits the
rejection rate for the shape- and colour—discordant picture to be
compared with a base-line rejection level established jointly by shape-
and colour-only discordants (cf., Appendix C for details of the groups).
3. Question Three: Is the rejection of type-discordants dependent
upon the overt naming of object types?
This issue was investigated by comparing children's performance
when model objects are simply physically presented (ie., condition P)
with that arising when the objects are both physically presented and
also described with an appropriate type name (ie., condition P-T).
If it is the case that type effects are contingent upon explicit
mention of the type name then the rate of rejection of type-discor-
dants in condition P-T should be more marked than that in condition
P; if, on the other hand, overt type naming is irrelevant, the
results elicited by these two conditions should be indistinguishable.
4. Question Four: Are the effects of modifiers on correspondence
requirements dependent upon the absence of physical object
presentations?
This question was investigated by comparing children's corres¬
pondence requirements when they are both shown the objects and given
a description of the objects at the level of the noun phrase (ie.,
condition P-T-M) with those requirements made when children are
shown the objects but given only type names (ie., condition P-T).
If it is the case that the giving of modifiers is alone sufficient
to make correspondence requirements more absolute than otherwise
then the correspondence requirements made by Ss in condition P-T-M
should be more absolute than those made by Ss in condition P-T.
Alternatively, if the absence of a physical object presentation is
necessary for the modifiers to exert an effect then the correspondence
requirements made in the two conditions will not differ.
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2.3.1 (c) iii Further design features
The design aspects of the present correspondence requirements
tasks and knowledge tests were very similar to those of the corres¬
ponding tasks used in Study One. However one difference was that
there was only a single distractor item in the present correspondence
requirements task. The sessions in Study Two were always begun
though with the presentation of the distractor.
With regard to the pictures offered to individual Ss on the
present correspondence requirements task, the 40 Ss in each of the
three presentation conditions were subdivided into two groups of 20
Ss each. These groups were each presented with a different set of
four discordant pictures (each set comprising two colour discordants
and two shape discordants) plus one of the discordant candle
pictures. As has already been indicated (cf., previous section), a
further sub-division was made to one of the groups of 20 Ss in each
presentation condition for the purposes of the candle presentations.
Details of the composition of the picture sets which Ss received are
given in Appendix C.
Each of the S groups was balanced for mean age, age range, sex
and nursery (or nursery class); see Appendix C for details.
2.3.1 (d) Procedures
The correspondence requirements task procedures followed in the
present study were virtually identical to the procedures followed in
the physical requirements task in Study One. The only modifications
concerned the critical differences arising from whether, and if so
how, the objects were named. In the two conditions in which the
objects were named, each object was named at the same points as in
Study One (ie., when objects were taken out of the bag and when the
child selected objects for the teddy to 'choose' the pictures). In
the remaining presentation condition Ss were neither asked for nor
given any object names; and at the point when the teddy was asked to
choose the pictures, Ss were merely asked to show the objects to the
teddy.
The procedure followed for the verbal knowledge test (including
the co-ordination component) was identical to that used in Study One.
In the case of the type knowledge test however the critical question
was altered to:-
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"Can real (ie., pleural form of type name, eg.,
'balls') look like this?"
In addition, before the critical questions were asked, Ss were asked
the following rhetorical questions
"Now some of the pictures are just pretend pictures
aren't they? You might see pictures like them but
you never see real things like them do you?"
These changes were made because it was suspected that some Ss may
have indulged in fantasies on this test in Study One and because it
was considered that the alterations might reduce the likelihood of
such fantasies occurring.
2.3.2 Analysis of results
2.3.2 (a) Preliminary remarks
The analyses reported are confined to those which are directly
relevant to the four questions identified in Section 2.2.4. The
presentation of these analyses will be structured in terms of the
relevant object presentation conditions. As was the case in Study
One (cf., Section 2.2.3 (a)) the main effects are fairly clear,
independently of whether or not particular groups of relatively
incompetent Ss are omitted from the analyses; some consideration
will however be given to the knowledge test data where it is
illuminating.
2.3.2 (b) Performance of children in the P-T presentation
condition
2.3.2 (b) i Question 1: Correspondence requirements for the
knife, horse, teapot and giraffe models
It is evident from Table 5 (data column two) that only two
pictures (both type-discordants) are widely rejected (ie., the
yellow spoon when offered as a picture of the yellow knife and the
zebra in a standing posture when offered as a picture of a horse in
a standing position). The rejection rates occurring for each of
these two pictures are significantly greater than those for the
respective pictures offered of the same object and also significantly
greater than those for each of the pictures that are discordant with
regard to the same dimension but are not discordant with regard to
type. Thus, the yellow spoon is rejected more than the pink knife
(applying x2 , p <^_0.05) and also more than the teapot-spoon (applying
X2 , p 410.01), the kneeling giraffe (x2 , p Z.0.02; 1^0.01 just) and
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(27)
the horse lying down (sign test, p = 0.002). Similarly, the
zebra is rejected more than the horse lying down (x2 , p L 0.001) and
also more than the blue giraffe (x2 , p 41 0.05; 0.02 just), the
green teapot (x2 , p 4l 0.01) and, less significantly, the pink knife
, . . . . (28)
(sign test, p = 0.07).
Table 5 Numbers of children rejecting the picture discordants in
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There were three presentation conditions. In the first (abbrev¬
iated ' P' ), Ss were merely shown the objects. In the second (abbrev¬
iated ' P—T' ), Ss were shown the objects and given the type name (ie.,
the unbracketed name in column one). In the third (abbreviated
'P-T-M'), Ss were shown the objects and given the type name plus one
or two relevant modifiers (these modifiers are bracketed in column
one). There are thirty main data cells in the table. In each of
these cells (ie., those with a continuous border-line) the maximum
number of possible rejections is twenty. The maximum number of
possible rejections in each of the six sub-cells (ie., cells with a
partially discontinuous border-line) is ten.
(27) N.B. The nature of the allocation of Ss to experimental groups (cf.,
Appendix C) necessitates the use of both between-and within-group tests.
(28) A reason is suggested in Section 2.3.2 (c) as to why a relatively
high number of rejections occurred for the pink knife.
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The finding that the only pictures to be widely rejected were
the spoon and the zebra suggests (cf., Section 2.3.1 (c) ii) that,
independently of shape or colour correspondence per se, Ss tend to
reject only the type-discordants which portray the type of the model
misleadingly. In particular it is noteworthy that the rejection
rates for the remaining two type-discordants (ie., the teapot-spoon
and the blue giraffe) are markedly low. Interesting confirmation of
the acceptability of the latter two type-discordants relative to the
spoon and zebra discordants is provided by the performance on the
co-ordination component of the verbal knowledge task of those children
who are fully knowledgeable as to the type-discordance of each type-
discordant. Table 6 presents this data.
Table 6 Proportion of type-knowledgeable children who rejected each
type-discordant on the co-ordination task.(l)
Type-knowl edgeable
Type discordants No. of type- Ss rejecting discordants
offered knowledgeable Ss Nos. Percents.
Spoon 17 17 100
Zebra 11 11 100
Teapot-Spoon 8 1 12.5
Blue-Giraffe 14 1 7.1
(1)
Data shown are for those Ss presented with each discordant on the
requirements task in condition P-T (the performance of other Ss was
virtually identical). In the case of the teapot-spoon stimulus the
number of Ss who are type-knowledgeable (cf., data column one) is
rather small.
2.3.2 (b) ii Question 2: Correspondence requirements for the
candle model
Table 5 (data column two; bottom row) presents the pertinent
data. It is evident that the number of rejections occurring for the
picture discordant with regard to both shape and colour was the
same as that elicited by the base-line condition - which
comprised an equal number of presentations of the colour-only
discordant and the shape-only discordant. Moreover these rejection
rates are very low.
When the number of rejections occurring for the candle discord¬
ant with regard both to colour and shape is compared with that for
each of the other discordants presented it is found that the candle
88
stimulus is not significantly rejected any more or less than any of
the stimuli with the exception of those two discordants which are
misleading as to the type of their respective models - that is, the
spoon (sign test, p = 0.008) and the zebra (x2 , p ^ 0.05; p 0.02
just).
2.3.2 (c) Question 3: Relative performance of children in the
P and P-T presentation conditions
It is apparent from data columns one and two of Table 5 that
the pattern of responding in the P and P-T object presentation
conditions is generally very similar. Indeed, when the number of
rejections occurring for each picture discordant in the two
conditions is compared, only one of these comparisons attains a
two-tailed significance level of 0.05 or better; this significant
result occurs for the pink knife (Fisher's exact probability test,
(29)
p = 0.047). That this comparison attains significance however
may merely be a spurious consequence of having made ten comparisons
with a null hypothesis in each case. There is however some evidence
in the data of a trend whereby pictures discordant with regard to
type-modifying values are generally more likely to be rejected in
condition P-T than in condition P.
2.3.2 (d) Question 4: Relative performance of children in the
P-T (and P) and P-T-M presentation conditions
It is evident from Table 5 that there is a tendency for the
pictures which are discordant with regard to type-modifying values
to be rejected more in the P-T-M presentation condition than in the
P-T and P conditions, respectively. These effects are not however
widespread; specifically, no type-modifying value discordant is
rejected significantly more in the P-T-M condition than in both the
P and P-T presentation conditions respectively. There are only two
instances of significant differences; the pink knife is rejected
more in the P-T-M condition than in the P condition (Fisher's exact
probability test, p = 0.047) and the horse lying down is rejected
more in the P-T-M condition than in the P-T condition (Fisher's
exact probability test, p = 0.008). This pattern of results is
(29)
N.B. Applying Fisher's exact probability test, the comparable
comparison for the kneeling giraffe picture yields a p-value of only
0.106.
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little changed when those Ss who were found on the verbal knowledge
test to be unfamiliar with the meaning of the modifiers given are
excluded from the analyses. As Table 7 indicates, there were only
three cases in which P-T- M condition Ss lacked this knowledge.
Table 7 Numbers of children in each presentation condition who
failed the verbal knowledge tests.d)
Modifiers Presentation conditions
P P-T P-T-M
Yellow/pink (knife) 2(2) 4 1
Standing up/lying down (horse) 0 0 0
Red/green (teapot) 4 4 2
Standing up/kneeling down (giraffe) 0 0 0
In one cell only does the number of rejections on the require¬
ments task fall if the Ss failing the verbal knowledge test are
excluded. This cell is for the pink knife, condition P-T. The fall
- see Table 5 - is from five to four.
(2)
Almost all the Ss who passed the verbal knowledge tests co¬
ordinated this knowledge successfully on the relevant co-ordination
task. The only exceptions were two Ss in condition P for the pink
knife.
2.3.3 Discussion of the results of Studies One and Two
The major findings of these studies should first be summarised.
To begin with, Study One demonstrated that when considering preschool
children's judgements of correspondence between objects and pictures,
a clear distinction should be made between those correspondences
which are required and those correspondences which are preferred.
In particular, it was consistently found that whilst often, few
requirements are made for either shape or colour correspondence
respectively, correspondence with regard to both these dimensions is
generally preferred. Study One identified two factors which
influence the correspondences which young children require. The
first of these concerns the relationship between the object and
picture; more particularly, it was found that many young children
reliably reject certain pictures which are discordant with regard to
type-defining values. The second factor which was found to influence
correspondence requirements is the manner of presenting the object;
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specifically, if instead of being physically presented objects are
described with a type name plus a single modifier, a large number of
children require (in addition to the constraints of the first factor)
that pictures should not be discordant with regard to the property
cited by the modifier.
Study Two examined the influence of these two factors upon
children's correspondence requirements more precisely. In relation
to the type-discordant pictures which are rejected (factor one) this
study gained evidence which suggests that those type-discordant
pictures which are most likely to be rejected are those which are
misleading with regard to the type of the object; most importantly,
this effect was found to be independent of shape and/or colour
correspondence per se. Thus it was even found that the great
majority of young children do not reject a picture which is discor¬
dant with regard to both the shape and the colour of the model so
long as the type of the model is portrayed unambiguously. Study Two
also confirmed that the systematic rejection of discordants which are
misleading as to type is independent of the manner of presenting the
object. In relation to the influence of the giving of modifiers
upon correspondence requirements (ie., factor two), Study Two showed
that when modifiers are given in association with a physical object
presentation they only have a marginal effect upon correspondence
requirements. This result suggests (cf., Section 2.3.1 (c) ii) that
the absence of a physical presentation of objects in the verbal
presentation condition of Study One did facilitate the modifier
effects obtained by that study.
These results have some significant implications. Consider
first the finding that preschool children generally prefer absolute
correspondents to partial correspondents. It follows from this
finding that young children can perceive more than one dimension of
correspondence simultaneously. Such a conclusion is not however
consistent with traditional assumptions concerning young children's
ability to co-ordinate information. In particular, the present
finding severely undermines the rationale of the choice-preference
studies-which have been based implicitly, if not explicitly, upon
the assumption (cf., Section 2.1) that young children cannot perceive
more than one dimension of correspondence simultaneously. It is
evident that there are no grounds for adopting Corah's suggestion
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(cf., Section 1.3) that young children's performance on such tasks
should be understood in terms of centring upon one or another
dimension (such centring necessarily being an involuntary focussing
of attention on the part of the child). The finding that preschool
children often prefer absolute concordants indicates then that at
least insofar as simple two-dimensional comparisons are concerned,
young children may make satisfactory judgements of logical identity.
Some consideration has previously been given (cf., Section 1.2) to
Vurpillot's suggestions that logical identity is not correctly
judged until six years of age. One reason for the present success
may be that preschool children tend to grasp the desirability of
correspondence between an object and a picture of that object
whereas they may not so readily grasp the requirement for logical
identity when judging picture pairs as 'the same' (cf., Section
1.4.2). It is evident however that Vurpillot's studies require more
rigorous comparisons than the present studies and it may indeed be
that children are unable to make such detailed comparisons until six
years or so. Clearly, however, the level of co-ordination exposed
by the present findings is greater than Vurpillot's conclusions
would lead one to suppose.
Consider next the present findings concerning preschool child¬
ren's correspondence requirements when objects are physically
presented. It is evident from the readiness with which subjects
tolerated discordants which failed to correspond to the models on
shape or colour or even both shape and colour that young children do
not in fact have a very satisfactory understanding of the correspon¬
dences which are demanded in valid pictures of specific objects. The
case of the widespread acceptance of the picture of a purple narrow
tapered candle as a valid picture of a blue spherical candle merits
particular mention; here the perceptual correspondence between
object and picture is minimal and instead, those correspondences
which there are, are primarily nominal and functional.Young
children would seem then, on the present correspondence task at
least, to place little value on having an accurate pictorial
illustration of the model object (even though - as the preference
data indicates - they have the potential to demand perceptual
Correspondences that is, between object and pictured object.
correspondence). It cannot be over-stressed however that despite the
laxity of the correspondence requirements made, there is neverthe¬
less, a very clear and systematic pattern to these requirements.
Specifically a majority of subjects did not accept pictures which
were misleading as to the type of the relevant model; thus for
example, whilst a blue giraffe was frequently judged to be an
acceptable picture of a giraffe, a zebra was not generally judged to
be an acceptable picture of a horse. The requirement made then
appears to be for a kind of symbol; that is, for any unambiguous
representation of the object's generic type. Now whilst such symbol
based correspondence requirements are by no means equivalent to
mature perceptually-based correspondence requirements, there can be
no doubt that the symbolic requirements do make very sound inform-
ational sense. By this it is meant that the correspondence require¬
ments which were made were precisely those (and no more) which
ensured that the pictures were spontaneously nameable with the same
type name as the model object. When it is remembered that subjects
were asked to ensure that the teddy could use the pictures to
remember what was in the boxes it becomes apparent that, in the
language of information theory, they can be said to have been
following what has been described as the 'minimum redundancy
hypothesis' (cf., Freedle, 1972); that is, subjects systematically
provided only the information which was absolutely necessary. In
the light of these considerations it seems highly inappropriate to
describe subjects' toleration of discordants in terms either of
erratic 'centring' on perceptually salient features or of relatively
persistent centring on a requirement for shape correspondence.
Rather, the dimensions of correspondence upon which children are
prepared to base an acceptance of a picture are limited systematic¬
ally to those upon which an unambiguous communication of the correct
type depends. If such behaviour is however to be described in terms
of centring, it is evident that at the very least, the centring
patterns are characterised by a considerable but ordered flexibility
Consider next the results obtained for the correspondence
requirements tasks when objects were described at the level of the
noun phrase. A critical question which arises is why the pictures
discordant with regard to the type-modifying values tend to be
widely rejected only when the object descriptions are given in the
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absence of the additional physical presentation of these objects.
The most likely explanation for this rests on the Study Two finding
that when objects are physically presented (with no verbal labels)
preschool children spontaneously require only that pictures be non-
misleading as to type. This finding suggests that straightforward
physical object presentations set up type levels of responding in
young children (much as Aristotle described - cf., Section 2.2.4).
This consideration therefore implies that when the giving of an
appropriate modifier accompanies a physical presentation of an object,
a conflict is set up; that is,subjects about to make a type-based
correspondence judgement are referred to more specific object
information to which they would not normally attend. Such subjects
are then required (according to this argument) either to ignore the
modifier given and respond at the type level or to transcend the
limitations of the type set so as to take account of the modifier
given. In the event, most young children faced with these alter¬
natives fail to transcend the limitations of the type set. There is
some circumstantial evidence which supports the legitimacy of this
interpretation. Specifically, informal observation did indicate
that of those subjects who were presented with objects and given in
addition, descriptions of these objects at the level of the noun
(31)
phrase, a large number re-named the objects at the type level.
Furthermore, the present view also accords with Luria's (1961)
description of the development of verbal controls on behaviour (cf.,
Section 2.1). Specifically, Luria (op. cit.) reports that when
children first become responsive to adults' speech, there is an
initial stage in which overt verbal instructions are unable to alter
an action once it is begun. Thus given that physical object
presentations do elicit type-based responses, the finding that young
children's responsiveness to modifiers is increased by the omission
of physical object presentations is consistent with Luria's account.
It should be emphasised that the instability of the effects of
the modifiers according to the conditions of object presentation
does not indicate that the majority of children participating in the
(31)
Interestingly, it was also observed informally that many of the
subjects who were presented with objects and given no accompanying
descriptions, tended to name the objects themselves at the type
level.
present studies were only just beginning to respond to verbal
controls. In particular it should be re-iterated (cf., above, this
section) that there is no sound reason - in informational terms -
why subjects should have required correspondence with regard to type-
modifying values. The modifiers did not function as specific
instructions nor did they reinforce specific instructions; rather
they merely carried an oblique hint that the dimensional values
which they coded could (and perhaps should) be attended to. It is
these hints which elicited diverse effects according to the circum¬
stances of the object presentations. One factor which may have
contributed to the modifier effects obtained when objects were not
physically presented is that, with the objects sealed in boxes, the
children may have treated the correspondence task as a game in which
they were to demonstrate their memorial power.
There is some evidence in the present studies however that the
effects of the modifiers upon correspondence judgements were strictly
limited. Specifically, it is apparent from Study One (cf., p. 68
Table 1, object row four, data column two), that when two relevant
modifiers are given in the absence of a physical object presentation,
most preschoolers do not reject pictures which are discordant with
regard to just one of the two dimensions coded. It is important to
notice that these discordants were nevertheless concordant with
regard to the other modifier; however clearly, subjects'responsive¬
ness to modifiers was, even in the absence of physical object
(32)
presentations, incomplete. This consideration does suggest that
young children's sensitivity to verbal controls is less developed
at the level of the noun phrase than it is at the type level; indeed
the type level responding has all the appearances of being a purely
self-regulated verbal control on correspondence judgements.
At this point, the wider implications of the present findings
should be reviewed. It is clear that the level of cue co-ordination
exhibited by the preschoolers tested was considerable. It is evident
from the preference data that many of them typically (and spontan¬
eously) encoded both the shape and the colour of the referent
(32)
In addition Study Two showed that when noun-phrase level
descriptions accompany physical object presentations, even a picture
discordant with regard to both modifiers given (ie., the purple
tapered candle) is not rejected very often.
objects (for both physical and verbal object presentations). It is
also apparent that the toleration of discordants found on the
correspondence requirements tasks was systematised and was system-
atised moreover in terms other than an attentional bias for shape
correspondence relative to colour correspondence. These results are
clearly not consistent with the widespread view (cf., Section 2.2.1)
that young children, in attending to objects in the world, always
attend more to the shapes than to the colours. Nevertheless, in
terms of correspondence requirements at least, there does seem
likely to be an effective attentional shape bias arising from the
fact that shape discordances, more often than colour discordances,
are likely to involve a change in the type-identity of a picture
(cf., Section 2.3.1 (c) ii).
It was suggested above (Section 1.1) that children's judgements
of correspondence between objects and pictures of those objects
might reveal something about the kind of concepts of these objects
which children have. In Section 2.1 it was suggested that these
concepts might be type-based. It is clear from the requirements
data however that whilst young children do indeed place a special
emphasis upon the dimensions of correspondence upon which an
unambiguous communication of type depends, they do not spontaneously
place a corresponding emphasis upon all type-defining values. Now,
this finding does not necessarily indicate that young children's
concepts are not fully and comprehensively based upon object types;
it may merely be - as has been noted above - that the present
subjects adopted a minimum redundancy approach for the correspondence
requirements tasks. A critical question which therefore arises is
whether, when given traditional classification tasks, preschool
children's spontaneous categorisations are, for all kinds of object,
groupings which are based upon type (as defined in Section 2.1)
independently of shape or colour correspondence per se. The studies
reported in Chapter Three tackle this issue.
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CHAPTER THREE: CLASSIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIONAL MATERIALS BY
PRESCHOOL CHILDREN AND ADULTS
3.1 Statement of the issues to be investigated
Two studies are reported in the present chapter. The first
(reported in Section 3.2) investigated whether preschool children's
spontaneous categorisations indicate that they judge pictures
discordant with regard to type-modifying values to be more alike
than pictures discordant with regard to type-defining values (indep¬
endently of whether or not the type-discordant pictures are misleading
as to type). If it is found that children's spontaneous groupings
are based upon type-correspondence independently of shape or colour
correspondence per se then this would disconfirm some
contemporary views concerning the kinds of concepts which young
children acquire (cf., Section 3.2.1).
The second study reported in the present chapter (Section 3.3)
examined whether adults' concepts are organised in terms of type.
Additionally however, this study investigated whether type effects
are detectable when the relative salience of the colour and shape
discordances is controlled. The effects of changes in salience
patterns upon preferences for colour versus shape correspondence has
(as has been noted in Section 2.1) been documented in the choice-
preference literature. It might therefore be suggested that any
type effects which are gained in the present studies (ie., any
systematic rejection or avoidance of type-discordances independently
of shape or colour correspondence per se) may be due not to subjects'
sensitivity to type-discordances and to their conscious efforts to
avoid such discordances but rather simply to the fact that the type-
discordances happen to be the most salient differences and that
these salient discordances are systematically avoided.^^^ The study
reported in Section 3.3 constituted then an investigation of whether
^^^
This salience argument can be made in relation to the results of
the Study Two correspondence requirements tasks. Thus it could be
contended for example that subjects did not reject the colour discor¬
dant which was misleading as to type (the zebra that is) because it
was type-misleading but simply because it was a particularly striking
discordance. Such an argument does not in this case appear to be
particularly forceful however since it is apparent that the same
subjects failed to reject, to any significant extent, a number of
other fairly striking colour discordants (most notably, the pink and
blue 'sandwich' and the blue 'giraffe').
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there is any evidence that adults prefer to group by type indepen¬
dently of shape or colour respectively when the relative salience of
the dimensional discordances is controlled.
The two studies reported below each employed hybrid versions of
standard choice-preference methods. Such methods do have classical
status as conceptual tasks (see, for example, Werner, 1948).
3.2 Study Three: A study of preschool children's spontaneous
categorisations
3.2.1 Introduction
There is a long tradition of research into young children's
performance on classification tasks. This research has found that
young children's first-choice groupings are typically based upon a
series of changing criteria with no overall systematic basis.
Traditionally, these findings are held to support the classical view
that the young child is, in some way, 'pre-logical' (cf., Section
1.3). Recently, however, it has been demonstrated by Rosch and some
of her associates (Rosch et al., 1976) that most young children will
make systematic taxonomic groupings of representational material if
it is possible to make such groupings at her basic-level of
abstraction.
It has already been observed (cf., Section 1.3) both that Rosch
assumes that shape correspondence is necessarily implicit at the
basic level of abstraction and that this assumption would appear to
be untenable for certain kinds of object. Additionally, it has been
noted, Rosch fails to recognise that colour correspondence may be
implicit at the level of abstraction which she calls basic. Rosch
is not alone in emphasising the role of shape relative to that of
colour in concept development. Thus, for example, in the literature
on concept acquisition in the literature on language acquisition,
Nelson, citing Clark's conclusion (eg., 1973; 1974; see also Clark
and Clark, 1977) that children never classify on the basis of colour
in their over-extensions observes:
"Color .... is a highly salient dimension for young
children although it is rarely useful for the
purposes of identifying concept members and is, in
fact, seldom used for category generalization by
young children (1974; p. 278)."
The present study is primarily concerned with exploring whether,
when preschool children are given the opportunity to make spontaneous
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taxonomic categorisations of representational materials on the basis
of shape or colour respectively, their groupings are indeed always
based upon shape or whether rather, their groupings are based
(wherever possible) upon whichever of these dimensions is a type-
defining value. It has been previously noted however (cf., Section
1.3) that the exhibition of systematised first-choice groupings is
not sufficient to satisfy the classical criteria for a demonstration
of genuine classificatory skill. Traditionally, children are
required also to reclassify the materials, by a deliberate act of
decision, on a completely different basis. This second requirement
is made on the basis that natural concepts are arbitrary. Now it
has already been noted (Section 1.3) that there are considerable
grounds for supposing that natural concepts are not arbitrary and
that young children may therefore possess mature natural concepts
even if they are unable to treat representational material arbit¬
rarily. Nevertheless, in view of the stress that has been laid upon
this ability in the past - and in view of its evident importance for
the more symbolic (or less concrete) forms of thought - the present
study will also investigate children's ability to reclassify the
materials presented.
The method employed in the present study was based upon a
variant of the standard choice-preference procedure which has often
been used in the past (eg., Descoeudres, 1914). Specifically,
children were presented with a series of sets of three pictures each
and were required to select, for each set, the pair of pictures which
they judged to be most similar. Five picture sets were presented to
each child; these sets are reproduced in Table 8 (p.101). The picture
sets were selected so as to be directly comparable to the materials
used on Study Two (cf., Section 2.3).
Each picture set (cf., Table 8) was devised so that the three
picture pairings it permitted comprised one pair with the same
colour, one pair with the same shape and a third pair with neither
the same colour nor the same shape. In four of the five picture
sets only one picture pair portrayed the same type; in two of these
sets (that is, the cutlery and teapot sets) the type correspondence
was mediated by shape and in the remaining two sets (that is, the
horse-zebra and giraffe sets) the type correspondence was mediated
by colour. In the fifth picture set (ie., the balloons) the three
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pictures were all of the same type.
In relation to these materials it was predicted that first-
choice groupings would be by type independently of shape or colour
correspondence per se. It was therefore expected (cf., Table 8)
that subjects would choose the two horses on Set One, the two
giraffes on Set Two, the two forks on Set Three, the two teapots on
Set Four and finally, any two of the three balloons on Set Five. No
comparably specific hypotheses were made concerning the likelihood
of subjects being able to make reclassifications; it was anticipated
however that the likelihood of regrouping would be at a maximum in
the case of the balloon set - in which a second classification may
be made on the basis of type - and that, of the remaining sets,
subjects would (this expectation being based on the results of Study
Two) be more likely to reclassify the sets in which each picture
unambiguously represented the same type (ie., the giraffe and teapot
sets) than to reclassify the sets in which one picture was of a




Twenty-four children, 13 boys and 11 girls (mean age 3:9 years;
age range 3:1 - 5:0) attending a single nursery class in Edinburgh
participated in the study.
3.2.2 (b) Materials
The materials used were the 5 sets of 3 pictures each
previously described (cf., Section 3.2.1). Each picture set was
mounted horizontally on a separate card under a single flap.
3.2.2 (c) Design and procedure
The 24 Ss each received the same choice-preference task followed
by a type knowledge test in a single session.
The procedure followed in the choice-preference task was begun
by asking each S to choose one of the five picture cards; the card
flaps were all closed and consequently each S was unaware of the
contents of the card chosen. It was then explained that under the
flap on each card were some pictures and that, for each card, he (or
she) would be asked to:
"Show me (ie., the E) two pictures that are the
same in some way."
The pictures under the flap of the chosen card were then exposed and
the critical request (using the wording given previously) was made.
If a S made a first grouping he was then asked:
"Can you do it another way now? Are there two
others that are the same in some way?"
When this procedure had been completed for the first picture card it
was then repeated for each of the remaining cards in turn. For
these subsequent cards however, the request for first-choice
groupings was only made after the pictures had been exposed.
The rationale for presenting the type knowledge test was (as
in the case of Studies One and Two) that the exhibition of type-
groupings presupposes that Ss are aware of the type-status of the
items pictured. The procedure followed was virtually identical to
that employed for Study Two (cf., Section 2.3.1 (d)). The differ¬
ences were that in the present test, the pictures remained mounted
in their sets and the E pointed to each picture in turn. The
picture sets were presented in the same order as that in which they
were received for the choice-preference task.
The relative positions in which the three pictures in each
picture set appeared (ie., left, middle or right) were balanced
between Ss. (The six subgroups thus formed were balanced for mean
age. )
3.2.3 Analysis of results
3.2.3 (a) First-choice pairings
Table 8 indicates (cf., data columns one-to-five) the nature of
Ss'first-choice pairings for each picture set. It is evident from
the first column that, in the case of three of the sets, a number of
Ss made a second pairing simultaneously; that is, these Ss indicated
when asked for a single pairing that more than one pairing could be
made. These responses must, of necessity, be ignored in the
analyses of the relative preferences for shape versus colour pairings
within the relevant sets; additionally, these analyses must also
ignore the relatively few cases where Ss paired the two non-pivot
(2)
pictures or else made no pairing at all. In considering the
(2)


































































































































































remaining data (ie., data columns two and three respectively) it is
evident that with the exception of the pairings made with regard to
the teapot stimuli, the great majority of first-choice pairings were
based upon type independently of shape or colour correspondence per
se. Thus, in the case of both the horse-zebra and the giraffe sets,
Ss paired overwhelmingly by colour rather than by shape (applying
yd for 1-sample case, p Z. 0.001 for each comparison); on the other
hand, in the case of the fork-spoon set, Ss grouped by shape rather
than by colour (applying yd for 1-sample case,p zdO.Ol) whilst in
the case of the balloon set there is no significant difference
between the preferences for shape versus colour correspondence
(applying yd for 1-sample case, p / 0.5 only). Nevertheless, it
should additionally be noted with regard to the balloon pairings
that Ss almost universally made pairings based upon a dimensional
correspondence rather than selecting the two non-pivot pictures -
which in this case are type-concordant.
The first-choice pairings arising in relation to the teapot
stimuli are, as indicated above, not consistent with the type
hypothesis. Specifically of those Ss who made a clear and legitimate
first-choice grouping, the overwhelming majority of Ss preferred
to pair by colour rather than by shape (applying yd for 1-sample
case, p zd 0 .02). This result may be partially attributable to large
numbers of Ss having failed to notice that the type-discordant did
not have a proper spout. Table 9 shows that the number of Ss who
failed to reject the teapot-spoon stimulus on the type knowledge
test was more than that occurring for any other of the type-discord-
ants. Interestingly, when the 13 Ss who made type errors with
regard to this set are excluded from the comparison of the first-
choice pairings based on shape versus colour, the comparison becomes
insignificant (X2 , 1-sample case, p Zd0.2).
Table 9 Breakdown of performance on type knowledge test.
Stimulus Sets No. of Ss perfor¬
ming adequately
No, of Ss accep¬
ting type-
discordant




'Giraffes' 14 9 1
Forks-Spoon 22 2 2
'Teapots' 11 11 2
Balloons 24 - -
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3.2.3 (b) Second-choice pairings
As was noted in the previous section, a number of Ss made second
legitimate pairings spontaneously (cf., Table 8; data column one).
This effect was most pronounced on the fork-spoon set and this trend
is reflected in the total numbers of Ss who carried out successful
re-groupings (cf., Table 8; data column six). It is evident from the
latter figures that up to 62.5% of Ss regrouped; however it is also
clear that there is a considerable range between the various sets in
the numbers of second pairings occurring. In particular, the numbers
of second pairings occurring in relation to the cutlery and balloon
sets tended to be markedly higher than the rest. Specifically,
second pairings were more frequent in the case of the cutlery set
than the horse-zebra set (applying sign test, p = 0.022), than the
'giraffe' set (applying sign test, p = 0.002), and, to a lesser
(3)
extent than the 'teapot' set (applying sign test p = 0.11).
Similarly, second pairings were more frequent in the case of the
balloon set than the horse-zebra set (applying sign test, p = 0.016),
than the 'giraffe' set (applying sign test, p = 0.002) and, again,
much less markedly than the 'teapot' set (applying sign test, p =
0.218).
3.2.4 Discussion
The main finding of the present study was that, with the
exception of the results concerning the 'teapot' picture set,
preschool children's first-choice taxonomic groupings were, when a
legitimate preference was expressed, based upon type independently
of shape or colour correspondence. Thus, in the case of the horse-
zebra and 'giraffe' sets, subjects paired spontaneously by colour;
alternatively, in the case of the fork-spoon set subjects paired by
shape whilst, with regard to the balloon set, subjects paired either
by shape or by colour. The results obtained in relation to the
'teapot' set would appear to be partially explainable in terms of a
failure on the part of many subjects to spot the spout error in the
(3)
It should be remembered in interpreting these figures that the
number of regroupings occurring in relation to the 'teapot' set
seems likely to have been inflated by the relatively high number of
Ss who evidently did not notice the type errancy of the type-
discordant (cf., Section 3.2.3 (a)).
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type-discordant stimulus; because however even those subjects who
did spot this discordance did not group systematically by type it
may also be that subjects did not consider such a minor shape-type
discordance (cf., Section 2.3.1 (c) ii) to warrant the ignoring of
the stimulus. Nevertheless, since it may be too that some subjects
only recognised this stimulus to be type-discordant when they were
(4)
asked to examine it individually on the type knowledge test , firm
conclusions regarding the explanation for the non-type based results
(5)
obtained for the 'teapot' picture set cannot be drawn. What does
seem evident however is that young children, in making spontaneous
groupings, systematically avoided using stimuli which were clearly
type-deviant when type-concordants were freely available. This
finding has several important implications. The first of these
relate to theories of the nature of children's concepts of everyday
objects. Specifically, the present results suggest that young
children possess taxonomic concepts of such objects in which the
relative dominance of shape and colour information varies strictly
according to whether correspondence with regard to these dimensions
is assumed by the type name. These results clearly add credence to
the present view (cf., Section 1.3) that children learn very swiftly
to organise their concepts of everyday objects in terms of the names
by which objects are commonly called. In addition the present
results provide interesting contextual information concerning the
interpretation of one of the results of Study Two; in particular,
whilst young children were found in Study Two to tolerate non-type
misleading type-discordants (eg., blue giraffes) as 'correspondents'
of the appropriate objects, it is evident from the present findings
that young children generally prefer correspondences to be based
upon type-defining values rather than upon type-modifying values
even if the modifier-concordants (that is the type-discordants) are
not misleading as to type.
The present findings of type-based groupings suggest that a
This effect might be expected to be more marked for this
relatively obscure discordance than for each of the other type-
discordants .
(5)
A very much more thorough examination of young children's
judgements as to the adequacy of partial shape-type discordants is
reported in Section 5.2.
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number of previous accounts of the nature of young children's
concepts of objects (eg., those of Clark and Nelson respectively -
cf., Section 3.2.1), have attributed to shape too prominent a role
relative to colour. In addition, the present finding confirms the
view expressed previously (cf., Section 1.3) that Rosch and her
associates have over-estimated the degree of correlational structure
in the world. The present findings also have important implications
for the methods which should be used to investigate people's
concepts of everyday objects. Specifically, these findings indicate
that the appropriate methods to use must be sensitive to the variety
of bases upon which concepts may be grounded and must assess these
bases systematically as a function of the particular kind of repres¬
entational material used. Unless this is done it is apparent that
groupings which are systematically co-ordinated in terms of type
information may appear either to be dimensionally biased or else
erratic. Thus, one reason why the importance of colour relative to
shape has been downgraded in the past would seem to be that insuff¬
icient attention has been paid to the kinds of object for which
colour plays an important role. The present studies have focussed
on shape and colour bases but clearly a number of other correspon¬
dence bases (eg., auditory, functional and textual) seem likely to
be critical for the acquisition of other kinds of concept and
children's sensitivity to all these other bases warrants future
investigation.
A second finding of the present study was that, in the case of
the fork-spoon and balloon picture sets, a majority of the children
regrouped the stimuli either spontaneously or upon being asked to do
so. This result is significant because the ability to reclassify
stimuli by a second grouping criterion is traditionally regarded as
a fundamental requirement for the demonstration of genuine class-
ificatory skill and because there is a consensus of opinion (cf.,
Section 1.3) that there is little or no freedom of choice in any of
the grouping criteria which young children adopt. Thus, according
to Reichard et al., (1944), whilst shifts in grouping principles
have not generally been detected until about five-years, only at
around seven-to eight-years can the majority of children evidence
this ability and only beyond eight-years do 75 per cent of children
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( 0 )
achieve it. The question arises then as to why, in the present
study, 54 per cent of subjects regrouped the balloon set and 62.5
(7)
per cent of subjects regrouped the fork-spoon set. It had been
expected, on the basis of the type hypothesis, that a relatively high
proportion of the children would regroup the balloon set (cf.,
Section 3.2.1); that, however, a stronger or even comparable effect
would be gained with the fork-spoon set had not been anticipated.
An important part of the explanation for the regrouping effect found
for the cutlery set would seem to lie in the nature of the functional
cues which reinforced the colour-based, cross-type grouping (ie.,
the pairing of the blue fork and blue spoon and the ignoring of the
orange fork). A fork and spoon constitutes a legitimate table
setting and whilst roost of the children tested were perhaps unaware of
this, it does nevertheless seem reasonable to suppose that even for
young children, these items of cutlery possess considerable intrinsic
and extrinsic functional significance. In fact the widespread
regroupings which occur in relation to the balloon set would also
appear to be largely functionally mediated; whereas however the
functional cues operate at a type level of abstraction in the case
of the balloons, they operate at a higher level of classification in
the case of the cutlery. The explanation then for why regroupings
occur for these two sets would appear to be that there are sound
reasons for making them which accord with children's experience of
object groupings in the world. By contrast, in traditional studies,
children have not generally been given the opportunity of making
groupings which accord with their experience of the world; rather,
children have been required to make arbitrary groupings which
transcend the classificatory structure in the world. It is note¬
worthy in considering the significance of the present findings that
Fodor (1972) has argued that functional groupings are no less
abstract than more traditional grouping criteria:
"What knives, spoons and forks have in common is not
that they look, feel etc. alike but that they are
used for analogous purposes ... you will hardly say
The figure of 75 per cent is significant because it is the
criterion set by Piaget (1928) for success on a classification task.
(7)
N.B. The mean age of the children who regrouped these stimuli
was 4:2 and 4:0, respectively.
that this defining property (being used for eating)
is less abstractly related to sensory data than the
defining concept (tableware) (p.90)."^®^
3.3 Study Four: A study of adults' spontaneous categorisations
3.3.1 Introduction
The general significance of this study has already been outlined
(cf., Section 3.1). In addition it should be noted that if it is the
case that adults evidence a preference for correspondence with
regard to type-defining values rather than correspondence with
regard to type-modifying values independently of shape or colour
correspondence per se when the relative salience of the shape and
colour differences is controlled for, then this will demonstrate
unequivocally that the possession of type-based categorisation
preferences is not a characteristic of young children merely but is
a hallmark of mature conceptual judgements.
The choice-preference procedure chosen for the study was the
standard format (described in Section 1.3). The materials used were
exclusively pictorial since it was considered that pictorial
materials would provide the most adequate means of controlling
salience patterns. A single critical array was used; this array has
already been presented (cf., Figure 8, p.45). The model stimulus
featured in Figure 8 was presented to the subjects in association
with four separate type labels and for each presentation subjects
were required to choose between the same two choice-stimuli the
choice stimulus which they judged to be most similar to the model.
The four type labels given were 'SMARTIE', 'CHOCOLATE', 'MALTESER'
and 'WINEGUM', respectively. It is evident that these four types
represent the four kinds of type investigated in Study One (cf.,
It should be noted however that the classification task used in
the present study does fail to fulfill two conditions which are often
made in classification tasks. Firstly, because there were only three
items in each picture set it was not possible for subjects to
demonstrate that they could hold fast to a single criterion of
grouping over multiple groupings (cf., Section 1.3 for a discussion
of this requirement). Secondly, it is sometimes stressed that
conceptualisation requires the isolation of the defining criteria
(eg., Vygotsky, 1962) and it has therefore been customary in the
past to use objects which vary not only with regard to those
properties which are systematically varied but which also vary
randomly with regard to a number of other properties (such as size,
weight and texture).
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Section 2.2); that is, smarties occur 'in' different colours but are
always round; chocolates comparatively are almost always brown but
occur in different shapes; maltesers are always both spherical and
brown whilst winegums can be a variety of shapes and colours (cf.,
Figure 6, p. 31). Assuming then that subjects are familiar with
each of these types; it will be expected that if they do value
correspondence on type-defining values more highly than correspon¬
dence on type-modifying values independently of shape or colour
correspondence per se, then they will select the shape correspondent
when the label 'SMARTIE' is given and the colour correspondent when
the label 'CHOCOLATE' is given. By contrast, the results which the
type hypothesis would predict for the 'MALTESER' and 'WINEGUM'
labels are much more problematic to determine; for each of these
labels however the choices for the shape versus the colour corres¬
pondents would be expected to be more evenly distributed.
One inference which can be drawn from several of the findings
reported in Chapter Two is that if, instead of being described
merely with a type name, models are also described with appropriate
modifiers, the effect resulting tends to be a reduction in children's
preferences for the pictures corresponding to the type-defining
values relative to the pictures corresponding to the type-modifying
values. The strength of these effects would appear for preschool
children at least, however, to vary a great deal according to the
number of modifiers given and according to whether or not the models
are also presented physically. One question which therefore arises
is how the giving of relevant modifiers in addition to type names
influences the relative preference exhibited by adults for type-
defining value and type-modifying value concordants respectively.
Clearly the degree to which any adult type effects are susceptible
to such verbal influences might be expected to have considerable
implications for how the verbal effects obtained with children
should be interpreted. This question was therefore examined in the
present study. Specifically, an additional group of adult subjects
were each presented with the array illustrated in Figure 8, four
times; the labels given to these subjects were, 'BROWN SMARTIE',





Thirty-two first-year psychology students (8 men and 24 women)
studying at the University of Edinburgh took part in the study.
3.3.2 (b) Materials
Each S was given 2 instruction/response sheets, one at a time,
in a fixed order. Each sheet contained an invariant series of
horizontal arrays; each array comprised 3 pictures: a model picture
in the left hand column and two 'choice pictures' in the second and
third columns. Four arrays - in which the models were unlabelled -
appeared on the first sheet. The second sheet contained 7 arrays in
each of which the model pictures were labelled; these labels were
either at the type level or at the level of the noun phrase depending
on the presentation condition to which a S had been assigned.
Samples of the two kinds of instruction sheet are reproduced in Figure
14. It should be noted in relation to these sheets that although
the array sequences were invariant the relative position of the
choice-pictures (ie., whether immediately next to the model or not)
was balanced in each of the two presentation groups.
3.3.2 (c) Design and remaining procedural aspects
All Ss received the same sheet 1; then in the same session, 16
of them (randomly determined) were presented with a second sheet in
which the model pictures were labelled with type names and the
remaining 16 Ss received the sheets with labels at the level of the
noun phrase. The median age of both conditions was 18 years and of
the 8 male Ss, 3 were in the type presentation condition and the
remaining 5 were in the noun phrase presentation condition.
The rationale for presenting the unlabelled arrays first (sheet
1) was that each student's baseline correspondence preference
according to the natural salience patterns of each array could then
be established; the precise influence of each label upon this
natural preference could then be determined for each of the 4
critical arrays on sheet 2. The 3 non-critical arrays (ie., of the
'banana', 'table' and 'cheese' respectively) - each presented on
both sheets 1 and 2 - were presented as distractors; the intended

















































































































































































































































from the logical identity of the critical arrays on sheet 2.
Ss were tested in groups of about 8 Ss each; when each S had
completed sheet l, he or she was given the appropriate second sheet
(each S had a sheet number code).
3.3.3 Analysis of results
Table ID indicates how the students' preferences for the shape
versus the colour concordant for the critical array shifted according
to how, if at all, the model picture was described. The first point
to be observed is that in both presentation groups (see the first
data columns in Table 3D, parts A and B, respectively) the baseline
correspondence preferences for the unlabelled model were equally
Table P Number of students choosing the shape and colour concordants
respectively as a function of presentation condition.










concordant 7 16 1 4 16
colour
concordant 9 0 15 12 0














concordant 9 13 4 9 13
colour
concordant 7 3 12 7 3
distributed between the shape and colour concordants. Consider next
the effect of the type labels upon the students' correspondence
preferences. It is apparent (cf., Table 10; part A) that these
labels had marked effects. Thus, when the label 'SMARTIE' was given,
all the pertinent students then preferred the shape concordant. The
shift from these students' baseline performance is significant
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(applying sign test, p = 0.004). When however the label 'CHOCOLATE'
was given, the shift from the students' baseline choices was for a
greater preference for the colour concordant. This shift is also
significant (applying sign test p = 0.032). When the label
'MALTESER' was given there was a slight shift from the baseline
responses to a greater preference for the colour concordant; this
shift however is insignificant (sign test, p = 0.376). The result
obtained with the label 'WINEGUM' was unexpected; specifically,
there was a significant shift from baseline responding to a greater
preference for the shape concordant (sign test, p = 0.004).
Consider finally, the effect of the noun phrase labels upon
correspondence preferences (cf., Table 30; part B). It is evident
that the effect of the modifiers is to disrupt the pattern of the
correspondence preferences obtained with the type labels alone.
Indeed, with the noun phrase labels there are no significant shifts
in responding from the baseline preferences (the strongest shift is
for the 'BROWN CHOCOLATE' label which attains a p-value - sign test
- of 0.18). Although, however, the modifiers clearly disrupted the
pattern of responding obtained in the type presentation condition it
is nevertheless apparent that when both type names and modifiers
were given, the type names were the primary influence in determining
correspondence preferences. That this is so is evident from the
direction of the preferences in the noun phrase presentation
condition which, although weaker than the preferences in the type
presentation condition are nevertheless in the same direction for
(9)
each of the corresponding labels. This effect can be supported
statistically. Thus, performance with the labels 'BROWN SMARTIE'
and 'BROWN ROUND WINEGUM', respectively, is significantly different
from that occurring with the label 'ROUND CHOCOLATE' (applying sign
test, p = 0.012 in each case).
3.3.4 Discussion
The present study indicated clearly that adults' correspondence
preferences are very much influenced by how models are described.
The main influence upon adults' preferences appears to be the type
_
This discussion does not of course apply to the 'MALTESER' label
which was constant in both presentation conditions. There was, in
any case, no significant correspondence preference evidenced for
this label in either condition.
name which is given; however, the articulation of relevant modifiers
does also influence adults' correspondence judgements. Concerning
the influence of the type names the study indicated that adult
subjects do prefer correspondence with regard to a type-defining
value to correspondence with regard to a type-modifying value
independently of shape or colour correspondence per se (cf., the
results for the 'smartie' and 'chocolate' labels respectively).
Additionally, for an object type where both shape and colour are
type-defining values (cf., the results for the label 'malteser')
there was no significant preference for either shape or colour
correspondence. There was however one result which was not anticip¬
ated. Specifically, rather than producing roughly equal preferences
for the shape and colour concordants respectively, the winegum
labels generally elicited the choice of the shape concordant. This
result is, however, not necessarily inconsistent with the type
hypothesis. Specifically it would seem that whilst winegums are
rarely either brown or square they are often green and/or roundish
. do)
in shape.
It would appear then from the present findings that the type of
object serving as model is a fundamental basis of the natural
correspondence preferences expressed by adults for representational
materials. Clearly the present subjects were not responding merely
to variations in the relative salience of shape and colour differ¬
ences because these differences were fully controlled for. The
implication of these results is then that adults' internal represent¬
ations of many specific objects are organised in terms of type. In
particular, the present findings illustrate the fallacy of the
influential view expressed by Rosch and her colleagues (cf., Section
1.3) that human attention to everyday objects is necessarily governed
by a psychologically defined correlational structure in which shape
cues play a dominant role and colour cues play little if any role at all.
The finding of type-based categorisations in adults also has
considerable relevance for the type effects found with preschool
children in earlier studies reported here. In particular it is
N.B. Support for this suggestion may be derived from those
justifications which subjects offered (informally) for their choice
of the shape concordant when the winegum labels were given.
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evident that type-based categorisations - for which the grouping
criteria vary systematically as a function of the kind of material
being categorised - do not reflect an immature approach to class¬
ification but indicate rather, a mature, adult-like strategy.
Because, however, the relative salience of shape and colour differ¬
ences were not controlled for in the studies with young children it
is of course possible that the 'type' effects obtained with these
children were in fact underwritten by salience effects rather than
conscious type-based strategies. The salience argument seems likely
to be invalid in the case of the results of Study Two (cf., footnote
no. 1 p.96) but it does perhaps have some credibility as an explan¬
ation for the results of the first-choice groupings obtained on
Study Three. The question of the degree to which young children are
conscious of the groupings they select is paid some attention by a
study reported below (cf., Section 4.3). It should be noted at this
point, however, that the sweet materials used in the present study
were piloted with preschool children but it became evident -
surprisingly perhaps! - that insufficient numbers of them were
sufficiently knowledgeable as to the pertinent type-defining values
to provide an adequate test of the type hypothesis. This latter
finding does emphasise that although young children do clearly
possess many type-based categories, the incidence of type effects is
likely to be considerably lower in the case of children than adults
because of children's relative lack of type knowledge. This point
is reinforced by the large numbers of subjects who did not judge the
type discordants to be type discordant on the type knowledge tests
in Studies One, Two and Three. Young children seem to be particu¬
larly lacking in knowledge about the discrepancy of colour-type
discordants (cf. , especially, Table 2, p 70). One factor which may
be relevant here is that whereas the type status of shape-type
discordants can often be deduced from subjects'knowledge of the
functions of objects, this is very unlikely to be the case with
colour-type discordants.
There is some evidence for this distinction in the justifications
given by subjects for their correspondence requirements in the perti¬
nent studies. Thus whereas the diamond-shaped 'ball' for example, was
often rejected by explanations such as,"'cause it won't bounce" or
"because it might break, might burst ',' the acceptance of the colour-
type discordants was often justified in fantastical terms, thus, for
example, acceptance of the purple 'orange' was justified with explan¬
ations such as: "apples change colour when they get old, aye" or "in
Spain you do,'cause the sun's hot makes them go bad."
Some consideration should finally be given to the finding in
the present study that type names were more influential in deter¬
mining adults' correspondence preferences than relevant modifiers
were. This finding has certain implications for the previous finding
(cf., Section 2.3) that children who received physical model present¬
ations with accompanying noun phrase descriptions generally rejected
type-but not modifier-discordants. Specifically, it is now apparent
that these children,whilst clearly not behaving in a thoroughly
mature fashion were nevertheless making mature judgements to the
extent that correspondence with regard to type-defining values was
generally adjudged to be more important than correspondence with
regard to the type-modifying values.
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CHAPTER 4: FURTHER STUDIES OF PRESCHOOL CHILDREN'S CORRESPONDENCE
JUDGEMENTS - WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE INFLUENCE OF LINGUISTIC
FACTORS
4.1 Introduction to the issues to be investigated
It has been previously reported that whilst preschool children
prefer to base spontaneous groupings of representational material
upon type-defining values rather than type-modifying values (cf.,
Section 3.2), comparable preschoolers will, when judging the
adequacy of pictures on correspondence tasks cast in the form of
shopping games, tolerate certain type-discordant pairings (cf. eg.,
Section 2.3). One explanation for the readiness with which these
type-discordances were tolerated is that subjects were responding
as a function of the informational constraints of the task;
specifically, there was evidence that young children require only
that the correspondents should not be misleading as to the type of
the model (cf., Section 2.3.3). The present chapter reports two
studies, each of which was in some way concerned with preschool
children's sensitivity to some of the informational constraints
which may be placed upon correspondence judgements when the shopping
format is employed. Each of these studies used a choice-preference
procedure; these procedures were similar to those utilised in
Studies Three and Four (cf., Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively).
The first of the present studies (reported in Section 4.2) is
concerned with the importance which young children attach to
correspondence with regard to type name relative to visual-perceptual
and functional correspondence, respectively. The method adopted
was to present a series of model objects in which function and
appearance are separable and to require subjects to choose, for
each model, between a perceptual correspondent which was function¬
ally discordant and a functional correspondent which was perceptually
discordant. The object and picture sets were selected so that the
type names by which the members of each pair of 'correspondents'
offered could be legitimately called, varied systematically for
each model object. By using such a method it was possible to
examine the extent to which children prefer type-name correspondence
to perceptual or functional correspondence per se. This issue is
significant in a number of respects. In particular, the relative
prominence of perceptual and functional factors in childrens'
concepts has been much debated in the last decade, most notably by
Eve Clark on the one hand and by Katherine Nelson and Jeremy Anglin
respectively, on the other (cf., Section 1.3). In the present
view, however, it is emphasised that names are of greater informat¬
ional significance than either perceptual or functional cues
because only they encompass the various bases (perceptual and/or
functional) inherent in different concepts (see also, Section 1.3).
The second of the present studies (reported in Section 4.3) is
concerned with how the context in which mftdel objects appear,
influences the dimensional correspondences which preschool children
prefer. Consider, by way of example, the two sets of model objects
and the choice pictures (two for each model) featured in Figure 15.
It is evident that if subjects were to be given the task of choosing,
for each set of models, the choice stimuli which will permit the
set members to be accurately distinguished then the appropriate
choices would be stimuli (i), (iv) and (vi) respectively for the
Figure 15 Illustration of how, for a given model stimulus, the
informational value of correspondence with regard to
colour and shape respectively depends on the stimulus
context in which the model appears (see text for details).
three models in Set A and stimuli (ii), (iv) and (vi) respectively
for the model stimuli in Set B. In other words, subjects
who are sensitive to the informational constraints of the task
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should judge it to be more important to maintain correspondence for
dimensional values with respect to which the set members vary than
to maintain correspondence with regard to a dimensional value which
is possessed by all the set members. It is apparent that there is a
sense in which this kind of task requires that the properties of the
models be treated rather more arbitrarily than is necessary in the
relatively straightforward correspondence tasks previously presented
(cf., Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively). That is, in the present
task, subjects are required - even for the same model - to value
shape and colour correspondence differentially according to the
composition of the object set in which the model appears; notice in
this regard that in Figure 15, although the first model stimulus in
Set A is the same as the first model in Set B, a different choice
stimulus should be chosen for each. The kind of ability tapped by
the present task has, potentially, a considerable bearing on the
issue as to whether preschool children can reclassify a set of
objects by a second grouping criterion. As has previously been
noted (cf., Section 1.3) it is traditionally assumed that young
children cannot perform such reclassifications. Of considerable
relevance to this study is the suggestion made in relation to the
findings of Study Three (cf., Section 3.2) that young children will
reclassify material when they are provided with a sound reason for
so doing. It is a characteristic of traditional classification tasks
that genuine reasons for making reclassifications are rarely, if
ever, provided. By casting the present task in the form of the
shopping game however, subjects are provided with a genuine motive
for making reclassifications.
One variable which may have an important influence upon young
children's ability to reclassify material of the kind illustrated in
Figure 15 is whether or not the modifying values distinguishing the
set members are articulated. In this regard, one point which arises
from the work of Olson (1970; cf., Section 2.3.3) is that the
modifiers given in Studies One and Two (reported in Sections 2.2 and
2.3, respectively) were to a large degree superfluous given the
contexts in which the objects appeared. That is, for subjects to
have required correspondence with regard to the modifying values in
these studies would not have in any way aided the differential
coding of the objects since unambiguity as to type was all that was
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required for this. It may be then that there is an informationally-
based reason why subjects did not always respond to the modifiers
when they were given in these experiments. On sets such as those
shown in Figure 15 however, the appropriate modifiers (ie., 'red1,
'green' and 'yellow' and 'round', 'long' and 'squiggly' respectively)
refer to values which are of critical importance so far as the
differential coding of the objects is concerned. Study Six therefore
investigates whether or not the giving of appropriate modifiers does
influence young children's correspondence preferences for this kind
of object set.
4.2 Study Five: A study of the relative value placed by preschool
children upon nominal correspondence and upon perceptual and
functional correspondence respectively
4.2.1 Introduction
One contrast which is often made in the literature on concept
acquisition within the literature on language acquisition (cf., eg.,
Bowerman, 1977) is between the 'Semantic Feature' theory of Eve
Clark - which stresses the role that the perceptual characteristics
of objects play in concept formation - and the 'Relational Concept'
theory which has been most recently propounded by Katherine Nelson
(see also, Anglin, 1977) and which emphasises the role of functional
cues in concept formation. It should be stressed that the present
study is not so much concerned with the psychological bases involved
in the process of concept acquisition as with the bases of concepts
which young children have already acquired. However, it does seem
likely that these theorists' different emphases upon the relative
importance of perceptual and functional cues in concept acquisition
are reflected, to some extent at least, in these theorists' views of
the bases of established concepts. Thus, although Nelson (eg., 1974)
suggests that concepts are generalised on the basis of perceptual
cues, she does contend that the critical core of concepts remains
the functional component. It should be noted however that Clark
does recognise that functional properties may dominate perceptual
properties later on in development. Thus she observes:
"Later on, obviously, the function of an object may prove
to be as important (or even more important than) its
perceptual characteristics in deciding what it should be
called in a particular situation in a particular culture
(Clark, 1974 p. 109)."
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Concerning the role of language in conceptual development,
Clark has always stressed the important role played by linguistic
factors but Nelson has been reluctant to do so (cf., Section 1.3).
Interestingly, however, more recently Nelson (eg., Nelson, Rescorla,
Gruendel and Benedict, 1978) has admitted that her earlier assumption
that words are matched to pre-formed concepts requires modification;
moreover she has noted that,
"in certain cases, the process of conceptualisation can
be viewed directly by tracing the labeling progression
(Nelson et al., op. cit. p. 962)."' '
These more recent remarks by Nelson et al. are significant because
they indicate that Nelson does now emphasise that young children may
attach considerable importance to what an object is called. It is
unclear however whether Nelson would suppose young children to
attach more importance to nominal correspondence than to functional
correspondence. Similarly, it is unclear whether Clark would suppose
young children to attach more importance to nominal correspondence
than to perceptual correspondence. In the present view (cf., Section
1.3) it is held that the relative primacy of perceptual and
functional elements in people's concepts of objects, varies greatly
according to the kind of object, and it is contended that children
will therefore soon learn to value the names by which objects are
called as of even greater categorial significance (although in
practice, concepts of objects will always, of course, be underwritten
by perceptual and/or functional features). Specifically then, the
present hypothesis is that young children will, in an object-coding
task, attach more importance to the type-name by which an object is
called than to what the object looks like or to what the object does
(2)
and how it is customarily acted upon.
It should be noted that in the same article, Nelson et al- go
out of their way to stress that 'their' view had always been that
from about 1:6 or so, children may begin to form concepts directly
from words.
(2)
N.B. The hypothesis that young children will value type-name
correspondence more than intrinsic perceptual correspondence is
consistent with the finding of Study Two (cf., Section 2.3) that
preschoolers did not tolerate pictures of models which could not
reasonably be given the same type-name as the models but did tolerate
pictures which could legitimately be given the same type-name as the





Twenty-four preschoolers participated in the study. These were
the same children as took part in Study Three (cf., Section 3.2.2
(a)). Each S participated in Study Three before the present study.
The mean interval between the two sessions was 6.7 days (range 4-13
days).
4.2.2 (b) Materials
These were 3 model objects and 6 choice objects plus 3 boxes, a
teddy bear in a high-chair and a toy cash-register. The boxes,
teddy and cash-register were identical to those used in Studies One
and Two. The model objects (cf., Table 11 column one) were an
orange, a candle,which looked like an apple and a pen disguised as a
lollipop in which the lolly 'head' functioned as the pen cap. There
were 2 choice-objects for each model object. For the orange (cf.,
Table 11; row one-p.124) the choice-objects were a plastic orange
and a sandwich (wrapped in cling film); for the apple-like candle
(cf., Table 11; row two) the choice-objects were a real apple and an
ordinary candle; and for the pen disguised as a lollipop (cf., Table
11; row three) the choice-objects were a real lollipop and a normal
pen. For each model object then, Ss were offered a choice between
an object which was in visual-perceptual terms virtually identical
(corresponding with regard to colour, shape, size and texture) and
an object which was functionally very similar but visually-percep-
tually very different.
4.2.2 (c) Design and procedure
Table 11; column one indicates the names by which the model
objects were described. It is apparent that the linguistic corres¬
pondence of the choice-objects varies systematically between the
different models. Thus, in the case of the model orange, the
perceptual but not the functional correspondent may be legitimately
described with the same type name. In the case of the model candle,
the functional but not the perceptual correspondent may be referred
to with the same type name. Whilst, in the case of the 'lollipop-
pen ' the perceptual and the functional correspondents may each be
legitimately referred to by one only of the two components of the
name given (ie., 'lollipop' and 'pen' respectively). The rationale
then was that if Ss do judge linguistic correspondence to be more
important than either perceptual or functional correspondence per se
then, in the case of the model orange their preference should be for
the perceptual correspondent; in the case of the model candle their
preference should be for the functional correspondent whilst, in the
case of the model 'lollipop-pen' their choices should be split more or
less equally between the perceptual and the functional correspondents
Alternatively, if Ss consider that either perceptual or functional
correspondence is more important than linguistic correspondence then
they will opt to maintain perceptual or functional correspondence
independently of the other correspondence bases.
It is evident from the previous section that the choice-stimuli
were objects rather than pictures. Choice-objects were preferred to
choice-pictures because objects permit the full force of functional
cues to be operative whereas pictures do not.
There were no experimental subconditions in the study. Each S
therefore received the same procedure. This procedure resembled
that used for Studies One and Two. Ss were first shown the shopping
till and the teddy and it was then explained that the teddy was
going to 'run a little shop'. The 3 model objects were then
presented; the order in which these objects were presented was
counterbalanced between Ss. It was explained that these objects
were to be sold in the shop and as each one was introduced it was
named as an 'orange', a 'candle' or a 'lollipop-pen' (as appropriate)
After each model was named, Ss were asked:
"What do you do with a (ie., the
appropriate type name) like this?"
This question was asked to help ensure that each child was aware
that the orange was a real orange, that the candle could actually
burn and that the lollipop-pen could be used to write with. To make
quite certain that these functions were fully understood, the E
actually lit the candle for a few seconds and used the lollipop-pen
to draw some lines with. The 3 boxes were then introduced with the
same routine as that employed in Studies One and Two for the physical
object presentations (cf., Section 2.2.2 (d) i) and similarly, the
suggestion was made that,
"We could put something onto the boxes to help the teddy
remember what's inside the boxes."
The E then selected the box containing the object which the S was to
be presented with first and, opening it up, asked the S "What's in
here?" If a S failed to use the correct name (that is, the name
given previously to that object by the E), the E corrected the
mistake. For example, if the S named the model candle as an apple,
the E said:
"Actually it's not an apple is it? Because,do you remember
- it burns doesn't it? So really it's a candle."
The 2 choice-objects for the model object being presented were then
placed, simultaneously, in front of the S, side-by-side (the relative
position of the members of each pair of choice-objects - ie., left
or right - was counterbalanced between Ss). The E then said:
"Well, we have two things we could put on the box" and the 2 choice-
(3)
objects were named. The names used were: 'a plastic orange' and
'a sandwich' or 'an apple' and 'a candle' or 'a lollipop' and 'a pen'.
The critical question then asked was:
"So which one (the E indicating the 2 choice-objects)
should we put on to show that there's a
(ie., predesignated name for the model) inside the
box?"
After the choices for each of the 3 models had been made,Ss
were asked to justify the first of the choices they had made. The
question used was: "Why did you choose that one to go on the box?"
Ss were then asked whether the choice-object which had not been
selected could have been legitimately used. The words used here
were :
"Could we have put that one on (ie., indicating the
choice-object which was not chosen)? Would this
have shown what is inside?"
These two sets of questions were then repeated in relation to the second and
third object choices respectively. It should be noted that these
questions were not asked until this late stage because it was
considered that if they had been asked directly after the relevant
object choices then the process of answering them might have .
influenced the children's subsequent object selections.
N.B. Ss were encouraged to handle and, in particular to depress
this choice-object.
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4.2.3 Analysis of results
The main question of interest concerns the number of choices
that were made for the perceptual and functional correspondents
respectively, for each of the model objects. Table 11 (cf., data
columns one and three) gives the pertinent figures. It is apparent
that the pattern of correspondence preferences varies considerably
Table 11 Breakdown of the proportion of children choosing and
accepting respectively the perceptual and functional




























orange sandwich 21 14% 100%
candle apple candle 33.3% 20 50%
lollipop-pen lollipop pen 16 75% 86%
One S has been omitted from these analyses on the grounds that she
changed her object-choices repeatedly.
between the different models; more importantly however, these
variations are mainly in accordance with the preference shifts
anticipated. Specifically, for the model orange, the preference is
for the perceptual correspondent rather than the functional corres¬
pondent (applying x2 for 1-sample case, p L 0.001); for the model
candle on the other hand, the preference is for the functional
correspondent rather than the perceptual correspondent (applying x
for 1-sample case, p Z 0.001); whilst, for the model lollipop-pen,
although there is a preference for the perceptual correspondent
relative to the functional correspondent this preference is not as
strong as those arising in relation to the other models (applying x2
for 1-sample case, p £0.1; approaching 0.05). Taken together,
these results do tend to suggest that the main influence upon the
children's correspondence preferences was the names by which the
stimuli can be legitimately called rather than perceptual or
functional correspondences per se. However, the results for the
'lollipop-pen' model do imply that Ss nevertheless had a slight
general tendency to prefer perceptual correspondents to functional
correspondents. One possible explanation for this latter finding is
that the perceptual correspondent may be preferred in this case
merely because the 'lollipop' component of the model name is, by
virtue of its greater number of syllables, more prominent than the
'pen' component. There is however, another line of evidence which
does suggest that Ss did indeed find the perceptual correspondents
to be slightly more generally acceptable than the functional
correspondents. This second line of evidence derives from the
children's judgements as to whether the correspondents which they
did not actually choose were, nevertheless, acceptable correspondents
As Table 11 shows (cf., data columns two and four), for each model,
those Ss who selected the functional correspondents were more likely
to accept the perceptual correspondents than those Ss who chose the
perceptual correspondents were to accept the functional correspon¬
dents .
It should nevertheless be emphasised that, so far as corres¬
pondence preferences were concerned, the results suggest that the
primary influence upon the children's judgements was whether or not
the correspondents could be legitimately called by the same name as
the model. Specifically, when offered the choice between a full
(4)
linguistic correspondent and a perceptual correspondent merely
or else a choice between a full linguistic correspondent and a
functional correspondent merely, Ss tended to opt, in each case, for
the linguistic correspondent. The view that linguistic correspon¬
dence was the primary factor determining the children's correspon¬
dence preferences is confirmed by the justifications which Ss gave
N.B. In the case of the 'lollipop-pen' model, neither choice-
object had a name which corresponded in full to the name of the model
for their choices. Thus, of those 21 Ss who chose the plastic
orange for the orange model, 19 Ss justified this choice explicitly
in terms of the linguistic correspondence - for example:
" 1 cause they 're both oranges. 1 cause they're both
the same."
Similarly, of those 20 Ss who chose the candle for the candle model,
13 Ss justified their choice explicitly in linguistic terms - for
(5)
example.: cause that's a candle too."
4.2.4 Discussion
This study found that subjects preferred the correspondents
with the same type name independently of visual- perceptual or
functional correspondence per se. It should be emphasised, however,
that this study did not investigate whether subjects' preference
for the linguistic correspondents was independent of both perceptual
( g )
and functional correspondence simultaneously (since the linguistic
correspondents offered always corresponded to the model, either
perceptually or functionally). What this study shows, then, is that
linguistic correspondence underwritten by either perceptual or
functional correspondence is systematically preferred by young
children to either perceptual or functional correspondence alone.
It should be noted however that the study did not take account of
extrinsic perceptual cues. Specifically, the perceptual correspon¬
dences operative were invariably intrinsic only whilst the functional
correspondences were both intrinsic and extrinsic (cf., Section 1.3
for definitions of these terms). There was one additional finding.
Specifically, there was some limited evidence that overall, subjects
marginally preferred perceptual correspondence to functional
correspondence. The most suggestive evidence in this regard was
that subjects were generally more willing to accept perceptual
Ts)
'
Interestingly, there was also some limited evidence that the
younger the child the more likely it is that the functional
correspondent will be chosen in preference to the perceptual corres¬
pondent. Specifically, whereas the mean age of children choosing
the pen, the sandwich and the candle options was 3:10, 3:8 and 3:10
years respectively, the mean age of the children choosing the
lollipop, orange and apple options was 4:0, 4:0 and 4:7 years
respectively.
( 0 )
Indeed to carry out such a comparison for natural objects would
appear to be impossible though it would of course be possible to use
perceptual correspondences other than visual ones.
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correspondents which they had not chosen than they were to accept
functional correspondents which they had not chosen. This effect
was most pronounced in respect of the orange model, concerning which,
very few of the large number of subjects who chose the perceptual
correspondent considered that the functional correspondent was also
acceptable. One point which should be borne in mind when reflecting
upon this latter finding is that the functional correspondence
between orange and sandwich (a sandwich being the functional
correspondent) occurs at a higher level of nominal abstraction -
that is, 'food' - than the functional correspondences operative in
the cases of the model candle and the choice-candle, and the model
lollipop-pen and the choice-pen. It may be then that the strong
preference displayed by subjects for the perceptual correspondent
relative to the functional correspondent for the orange model was
partially elicited by the functional correspondence having occurred
(7)
at a higher level of nominal abstraction than that of type.
Because, however, there was also some limited evidence that subjects
preferred the perceptual correspondent to the functional correspon¬
dent for the lollipop-pen model (cf., Section 4.2.3) it does seem
likely that there was a slight tendency for subjects to find the
perceptual correspondents more generally acceptable than the
functional correspondents.
One critical issue in interpreting the main result that subjects
preferred the linguistic correspondents, independently of perceptual
or functional correspondence per se concerns the extent to which
subjects' choices were made with a view to satisfying the informa¬
tional requirements of the task and the extent to which this result
has more general implications concerning the nature of young
children's concepts of everyday objects. It is apparent that the
finding itself is thoroughly consistent with the type hypothesis;
that is, for those two models for which they were given the choice,
subjects opted for the type-correspondents in preference to the
type-discordants. Whereas however, previous studies showed only
One method of avoiding this discrepancy would have been to have
presented, instead of a model orange, a further object with a disgu¬
ised functional identity and to call it by the type name of its
perceptual features (eg., present a chocolate 'motor-car' and call
it 'a car').
that preschool children prefer type-correspondents to type-discordants
independently of shape and/or colour correspondence per se, the
present study indicates that the relative preference for type-
correspondents may be independent of visual-perceptual or functional
correspondence per se. As intimated above, there are two levels at
which this finding may be explained. At the first level, it is
evident that, for the orange and candle models, subjects opted for
the choice-objects which represented the type of the model unambig¬
uously in preference to choice-objects which were clearly misleading
as to the type of their respective models (ie., the sandwich and
apple choice-objects). This finding directly parallels the conclusion
made in relation to the results obtained in Studies One and Two that,
young children will tolerate discordants which maintain type unambig¬
uously but will not tolerate discordants which are misleading as to
type. It may therefore be that, in the present study, subjects
deliberately chose the correspondents which ensured that the box
contents were accurately and differentially encoded at the type-
level. There is however, a second level at which the main finding
may be explained. Specifically, the results of Study Three (cf.,
Section 3.2) indicated clearly that, in circumstances where there
were no informational constraints at all, preschool children's
preferences were for type-based groupings rather than cross-type
groupings. It may be, therefore, that subjects' correspondence
preferences in the present task were not specifically elicited by
the informational constraints of the task but are rather, merely
reflective of subjects' spontaneous correspondence preferences.
Nevertheless, these two levels of explanation are not incompatible.
It is noteworthy in this regard that it is possible to argue that
the finding that preschool children prefer to make type-concordant
groupings rather than purely dimensional groupings on an unstructured
grouping task (cf., Section 3.2), suggests that those (comparable)
children who tolerated non-type-misleading type-discordants (such as
the blue giraffe) on correspondence requirements tasks (cf., Section
2.3) did so because they recognised that these correspondents were
informationally adequate. Thus, in the present task, subjects may
have been conscious of the informational advantages of choosing the
type-correspondents and may also have been choosing the correspon¬
dents which accord most closely with their conceptual representations
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of the model objects.
It cannot however be determined with any certainty whether
subjects in the present study were consciously sensitive to the
( 0 )informational constraints of the task. The present results do
though appear to have some implications concerning the nature of
children's concepts of objects. To be sure it may be that the
informational constraints of the shopping game did influence
subjects' choice of correspondents by causing them to place more
value on linguistic correspondence than they might have done in
other circumstances. Nevertheless, the present choice-preference
task would, even with this constraint, seem to have some status as
a conceptual task. The correspondence judgements were always made
between objects (ie., rather than between pictures and objects -
which may have a wholly different kind of relationship, cf., Section
1.4.2) and the informational constraints of the shopping format
would not seem to divert subjects overmuch from choosing the
choice-stimuli which they would, in informationally neutral circum¬
stances have judged to be 'most similar' (cf., Section 1.4.4). In
addition to this the range of possible conceptual tasks similar to
the present one is wide and since it seems likely that the relative
importance of linguistic, perceptual and functional elements will
show some variation as a function of the particular circumstances of
the correspondence judgements it would seem to make little sense to
think of these elements as being in a fixed hierarchy of importance
independently of these circumstances. Thus the main significance of
the present study is that it demonstrates that, in the present task
at least, linguistic correspondences determine whether perceptual or
functional correspondents are most valued by young children. This
conclusion emphasises that an adequate theory of conceptual develop¬
ment must allow for the rapid development of attention to linguistic
factors and highlights the weakness of accounts of conceptual
-p——
It had been hoped that the justifications subjects gave for their
choices would have been rather more revealing as to the degree to which
subjects were conscious of these constraints than they were. Specifically,
although justifying the choice of type-discordants predominantly in
linguistic terms (ie., rather than in terms of the underlying perceptual
or functional correspondence) subjects' justifications disclosed
virtually nothing about their consciousness of informational constraints.
The justifications obtained in the following study (cf., Section 4.3)
are rather more revealing in this respect.
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development which put too much stress on either perceptual or
functional elements alone. The present findings would seem also to
add some empirical weight to the arguments made previously (cf.,
Section 1.3) that the correlational structure in natural categories
(9)
between perceptual and functional bases is less than Rosch suggests.
This study supports then the present emphasis that young children
are sensitive to a variety of different psychological bases in which
natural concepts would appear to be grounded and indicates, in
particular, that these bases may include functional bases. Interest-
ingly, these conclusions accord with Bowerman's (1977) conclusion -
based upon the spontaneous speech of her own children - that young
children, from an early age, recognise constancies on the basis of a
wide variety of perceptual, functional and other similarities and
that an adequate theory of the acquisition of word meaning (and, it
might be added, conceptual development in general) must be flexible
enough to account for these diverse abilities.
4.3 Study Six: A study of the influence of the context in which
model objects appear upon preschool children's correspondence
preferences
4.3.1 Introduction
It has been observed above in relation to the studies using
object coding tasks that the performance of the children tested does
indicate that young children display a preference for preserving
unambiguity as to type name in the model correspondents. The
pertinent results concern the correspondence requirements preschoolers
made for shape and/or colour correspondence respectively (cf., Section
2.3) and the correspondence preference judgements preschoolers made
between perceptual and functional correspondents (cf., Section 4.2).
One interpretation of these correspondence judgements is that
subjects consciously responded as a function of the informational
constraints of the task, that is, subjects required or preferred the
correspondents which permitted the objects to be differentially
encoded, unambiguously, at the type level. Alternatively however,
It should be remembered though that because Rosch describes
functional cues exclusively in terms of motor movements (cf.,
Section 1.3), she omits to consider the role of intrinsic functional
cues.
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it may be that subjects were not actually aware of the informational
consequences of their choices but that their requirements or prefer¬
ences for the non-type-misleading correspondents simply reflected
their spontaneous correspondence judgements.
The present study is expressly concerned with whether preschool
children are sensitive to the informational requirements of object
coding tasks, independently of their evident spontaneous preference
for type-correspondents (for evidence of the latter, see Section
3.2). The basic method which it is proposed to use to do this has
been previously introduced. Specifically, if children are given the
task of differentially encoding sets of models such as those shown
in Figure 15 (p.117) then they should, if they are genuinely
sensitive to the informational demands of the task, systematically
prefer correspondence with regard to the dimensional values disting¬
uishing the set members to correspondence with regard to the fixed
dimensional value characterising each of the set members. It is
apparent however, that the arrays shown in Figure 15 do not permit
subjects' sensitivity to the informational requirements of object
coding tasks to be determined independently of their preference for
type-correspondents relative to type-discordants. To achieve this
it is necessary to use sets of models such as those shown in Figure
16; specifically, with sets of models such as these, systematic
sensitivity to the informational demands of the task would be
evidenced by the choice of correspondence with regard to the type-
modifying values in preference to correspondence with regard to the
(fixed) type-defining value (that is, in Figure 16, a preference for
shape correspondence in the case of Set A and a preference for
colour correspondence in the case of Set B).
It is apparent that the task presently being proposed requires
that the choice-stimuli (and in particular, the modifier-concordants)
be used much more in the role of symbols than of 'faithful' repres¬
entations of the models. It should however be emphasised in this
regard that, strictly speaking, none of the choice-stimuli illustrated
in Figure 16 are genuine symbols because they each bear some physical
relationship to the relevant referents (that is, they are not
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completely arbitrary).^ ^ Nevertheless the modifier-concordants in
particular, clearly possess certain symbolic qualities and although
Figure 16 Two sets of models in which the type-modifying values



















they are not genuine symbols it does seem that if young children
presented with sets such as those shown in Figure 16 were to evidence
a preference for the modifier-concordants relative to the type-
concordants, this result would have certain implications concerning
young children's ability to use more symbolic forms of external
representation. It is noteworthy in this regard that there is
little debate concerning young children's ability to use arbitrary
codes since children readily use words orally. Rather, a more
N.B. It should be noted that in Piagetian terminology, (cf.,
Berlyne 1964; Flavell 1963), symbols as so defined are called signs
whilst the term 'symbol' is used to refer to signifiers which are
adjudged to have some physical similarity to the referent (eg., the
image signifiers evoked in symbolic or fantasy play and deferred
imitation).
fundamental question would seem to be (cf., Section 1.3) whether
young children can use such codes in a conscious and deliberate
fashion whilst being fully aware of their arbitrary status. This
question is not easily researched but the present task does seem
likely to yield some pertinent results.
The proposal that more information is carried by the type-
modifying values than the type-defining values in object sets such
as those illustrated in Figure 16 is very much related to the use of
information concepts by information theorists. These theorists
(eg., Garner, 1962) emphasise that the amount of information
obtained from any event or act of communication is not so much a
function of what does happen but is rather a function of what could
have happened but didn't. In Garner's terms, information is
technically defined on the basis of the amount by which some a
priori uncertainty has been reduced. It is not difficult to see
that on object coding tasks requiring the differential encoding of
objects such as those shown in Figure 16, the dimensional values
which it is critical to communicate from an informational point of
view are the type-modifying values. The present task therefore
requires not only that subjects should consciously employ more
symbolic forms of thought (cf., above) but also that this thought
should be directed to satisfying an external informational constraint
It is interesting to consider at this point some of the features
of the approach to semantics outlined by Olson (1970). Olson rejects
purely linguistic theories of semantics which look at word meaning
in terms of other words and argues that a semantic theory requires
that the language user's non-linguistic knowledge be considered.
Olson's argument rests on showing that word choice is not merely a
function of either syntactic or semantic selection restrictions but
involves the speaker's knowledge of the referents (ie., the objects
and events which words refer to). Olson stresses that no single
description can describe facts as they really are and that therefore,
words always direct attention to specific meanings and, in particular
he emphasises, like Garner, that the informational value of a given
communication depends upon the nature of the alternatives being
compared or considered. One example Olson gives (op. cit.) concerns
the varying descriptions which people will use to refer to a round
white block, one inch in diameter. Thus, if this object has to be
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distinguished from an object identical in all respects except colour,
it is likely to be referred to as 'the white one', if instead, the
same object has to be distinguished from an object identical in all
respects except shape, it is likely to be referred to as 'the round
one' and so on. The relevance of Olson's remarks to the present
task is clear; thus, in the object sets in Figure 16, the critical
information is 'the one sitting down', 'the one standing still' etc.
The question arises as to the likelihood that young children's
correspondence choices for model objects will reflect a sensitivity
to the context of alternatives in which the models appear. It is
noteworthy in this regard that young children do not perform well on
referential communication tasks. In particular, Ford and Olson
(1975) varied the contexts in which model stimuli appeared and
studied how, if at all, young children given the task of describing
the models, elaborated the noun phrase according to the contexts
presented. Ford and Olson found that a group of children of mean
age 5:5 years named object pairs differentially when they varied
with regard to one feature. When however comparable children
received larger object sets requiring more features to be mentioned,
no differential labelling occurred, either for the large sets or for
the single pair sets. Ford and Olson advance the explanation that
the disappearance of the effect in such circumstances occurs because
young children's descriptions -
"reflect the contrasting alternatives in the situation
as a whole, not the immediate context of alternatives
(p.380)."
Furthermore, more generally, they postulate that-
"from the outset, children's utterances reflect the
descriptive function of differentiating an event from
a set of perceived alternatives (p. 381)"
- but that because, to begin with, inferred alternatives are borne
in mind as well as perceived alternatives, descriptions initially
become increasingly independent of context and only come into line
(11)
with the minimum redundancy hypothesis at approximately fourteen-
years of age.
Ford and Olson's study suggests then that young children are
unable to describe model objects in such a way as to enable them to
be discriminated from the immediate object context, unless only one
differentiating value requires to be attended to. Now, in the kind
^
That is, the hypothesis that the noun phrase is only elaborated to
the point at which the referent object can be differentiated from the
alternatives immediately available (cf., Section 2.3.3).
of objects sets proposed for the present study (cf., Figure 16 for
examples), subjects are only required to attend to differentiating
values on a single dimension. It is apparent however, that the
fundamental requirement of the present task is not the differential
naming of the objects but rather the systematic selection of picture
concordant with regard to the type-modifying values and the
systematic ignoring of pictures concordant with regard to the type-
defining values. These picture selections require considerable
skill in co-ordinating the shape and colour discordants. More
importantly though, it has been previously demonstrated that, in
circumstances where there are no informational constraints upon
performance, both children and adults prefer correspondence with
regard to type-defining values to correspondence with regard to
type-modifying values (cf., Sections 3.2 and 3.3, respectively).
Subjects might therefore be expected to find the ignoring of the
type-defining value correspondents especially difficult. It may
seem unlikely then that young children will perform well on the
proposed task. Nevertheless, it may be significant that the present
tasks do not place so much of a requirement upon subjects for the
production of appropriate responses as the task studied by Ford and
Olson (op. cit.). Specifically, whereas in Ford and Olson's task,
subjects were required to produce the appropriate description them¬
selves, in the present tasks the proposal is to present subjects
with picture options from which they have only to recognise the
informationally critical correspondents. This distinction between
the two tasks may be significant since it has been reported by
Chalmers and McGonigle (1979) that the main basis for young children
poor performance on referential communication tasks is their failure
(12)
to generate satisfactory descriptions.
The present study should at this point be outlined more
precisely. The main question examined was whether preschool
children's preferences for correspondence, with regard to type-
defining and type-modifying values respectively, shifts for four
critical object models (these models are.illustrated in Figure 17,
(12)
N.B. Chalmers and McGonigle rule out the possibility that
children's poor performance is attributable either to a lack of
matching abilities or to a failure to comprehend specific verbal
references.
p.140, and discussed below) according to whether these models are
presented in a type-same context (ie., in which the objects presented
are all of the same type) or a type-different context (ie., in which
the objects presented are each of a different type). It was expected
that when each critical object was presented in a type-different
context, subjects would prefer the type-correspondents (these
correspondents providing sufficient information to code the objects
differentially). Concerning the presentation of each of the critical
objects in a type-same context, it was expected that, for each
critical object, subjects would be more likely than for the type-
different contexts to choose the type-modifier concordants; however,
as indicated above, the probable strength of these shifts was not at
all clear.
In considering the likelihood that children's preferences for
type-correspondents relative to modifier-correspondents will be
sensitive to the context in which the models appear, two factors
emerged which, it seemed possible, might have a bearing upon the
results obtained. The first of these is the manner in which members
of the object sets are presented. In this regard it has been
commented by Olson (1970) that pictures (or objects) are more
informationally ambiguous than words because whereas in the case of
physical stimuli,
"you don't know whether to attend its color, size,
style, state of repair and so on (p.265)," -
words possess a much more specific meaning. Olson then (like Luria -
cf., Section 2.1), considers that what is perceived may be restruc¬
tured by language. These remarks indicate then that in the present
task the description of the model objects with relevant modifiers
should increase the attention which subjects pay to correspondence
on the modifying values. It is however a fundamental requirement in
the present study that any description given to the critical objects
be used to describe these objects in both the type-same and the
type-different contexts since only if this is the case can any
shifts in correspondence preferences be reasonably attributed to
subjects' sensitivity to the informational demands of the task. It
is noteworthy in this regard that the citing of relevant modifiers
may cause subjects to prefer the modifier-concordants independently
of the context in which the objects occur. The present study was
therefore very much exploratory in character. Accordingly, subjects'
correspondence preferences were examined in relation to three object
presentation conditions. In the first presentation condition
(abbreviated 'P') the model objects were presented physically but
the experimenter did not describe them; in the second presentation
condition (abbreviated 'P-T-M') the objects were both presented
physically and described with a type name plus a relevant modifier
and; in the third condition (abbreviated 'T-M') the objects were
described with a type name plus a relevant modifier but were not
physically presented.
As previously indicated, no clear-cut predictions were made
concerning whether preschoolers' correspondence preferences would be
affected by the contexts in which the models appeared. It was
anticipated however that subjects' sensitivity to contextual factors
would be maximised in those conditions in which modifiers were
(13)
given. In particular it was considered that the P-T-M present¬
ation condition might provide the optimum conditions for enabling
young children to shift their correspondence preferences according
to object context. The reason for thinking this derives from the
finding of Study Two (cf., Section 2.3) that a P-T-M presentation
condition failed to deter preschoolers from accepting modifier-
discordants but did at least produce widespread rejections of the
type-misleading type-discordants. Since the objects presented
occurred in a type-different set, this finding clearly suggests that
in the present task, type-correspondents will be preferred to type-
misleading type-discordants so far as type-different sets are
concerned. The interpretation given to the Study Two finding was
that for a type-different set of objects, type differences were the
most salient differences and that since the modifiers were superfluous
in informational terms, the modifiers merely set up an attentional
conflict which most subjects eventually discounted (cf., Section
2.3.3). By contrast however, in the case of same-type object sets,
the salient differences between the stimuli are differences in
(13)
It might be thought that there is little reason to suppose that
shifts according to object context may be facilitated by giving labels
which refer to both the type-defining and the type-modifying values
(that is, on the basis that the effects of the two words will cancel
'each other' out). It should be noted however that since young
children spontaneously name objects at the type-level anyway (cf.,
Section 2.2.3 (b) i), the. net effect of noun phrase descriptions
will be to place a relative emphasis on the modifying-values.
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modifying-values and, most importantly, the modifiers reinforce
these differences.
Besides examining the effect upon subjects' correspondence
preferences of the manner of object presentation, a second potential
influence was investigated in the present study. This second
variable concerns the kind of type-discordant (and therefore
modifier-concordant) pictures offered. Specifically, the question
investigated concerns whether subjects' sensitivity to the compos¬
ition of the object sets is influenced by whether the type-discor-
dants represent identities of a clearly different type to the model
(eg., for a red toothbrush, a red jug) rather than less blatant type-
discordants (eg., for the red toothbrush, a red 'splash' of colour
instead). The view that this factor may be significant derives from
the previous finding (cf., Section 2.3.3) that preschool children
are particularly unwilling to accept pictures of objects which
represent identities of a different type (presumably because they
would then be giving blatantly misleading information). It was
considered therefore that young children might be more inclined to
choose the type-discordants on the type-same sets if the type-
discordants were relatively neutral as to type than if the type-
discordants were more blatantly type-misleading. Additionally (and
fundamentally) it was anticipated that young children would not
prefer the more neutral type-discordants to the type-concordants on
the type-different sets. Those type-same sets presented to subjects
in the present study in which the type-discordants represented
identities of a blatantly different type have already been illust¬
rated (cf., Figure 16). In one of these sets the type-defining
value is colour and in the other the type-defining value is shape.
The type-same sets presented in the study in which the type-discord¬
ants offered were considered to be type-neutral are reproduced
(together with all the other object sets presented) in Figure 17.
The pertinent sets are that of the three biscuits (for which colour
is the type-defining value) and that of the three combs (for which
shape is the type-defining value). Concerning the selection of the
biscuit set it should be noted that objects which occur in geometric
shapes would seem to be one of the few cases where the shape can
remain unchanged and yet the picture be neutral (ie., ambiguous) as
to type when the colour is changed. (The reason why such stimuli
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Seventy-two children, 36 boys and 36 girls (mean age 4:1 years;
age range 3:2 - 4:11 years) took part in the study. Each child was
in attendance at one of two nursery schools in Edinburgh.
4.3.2 (b) Materials
Fourteen objects were arranged into 6 sets of 3 objects each.
This arrangement was possible because 4 critical objects - the red
toothbrush, the round biscuit, the yellow comb and the horse 'sitting
down' - each occurred once in a type-same set and once in a type-
different set. Of the remaining objects, 8 occurred in the 4 type-
same sets (2 in each set) and another 2 objects were used to make
the total number of objects in each of the 2 type-different sets up
to 3. Details of the composition of the object sets and of the
visual features of each object are given in Figure 17.
Twenty-eight pictures were used - there were 2 pictures (one
shape discordant and one colour discordant) for each of the fourteen
objects. Each picture set was presented on a separate picture mount
(14)(see Figure 17 for a sample arrangement of each picture set).
(15)
The picture mounts had a separate, vertical flap (opaque ) for
each of the 3 picture pairs.
The E sat opposite each S at a child-sized table which was
covered with plain white paper. A large doll with a toy cash-
register 'to hand' sat next to the E. The only other materials used
were 9 white cardboard boxes (that is, 3 sets of 3 identical boxes
each) and a large toy lorry.
4.3.2 (c) Design
Figure 18 summarises the overall design of the study. The 72 Ss
were divided into 3 groups of 24 Ss each; each of these 3 groups
constituted one of the 3 object presentation conditions (ie., P,
(14)
Details of the constraints placed upon the picture positions are
given in Section 4.3.2 (c).
(15)
N.B. The picture flaps used in the studies reported in this
thesis were all opaque.
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The object and picture sets were presented in 2 separate collections
of 3 sets each.
(?)
One shape correspondent and one colour correspondent was offered for
each object. The 2 pictures offered for each object are those shown in
the corresponding column position (ie., left, centre or right respectively).
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Figure 18 Schematic representation of the design of Study Six.
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P-T-M or T-M). Each S participated in three sessions. In the first
two sessions, Ss received the choice-preference tasks for the 6
object sets. To achieve this, the 6 sets were grouped into 2
collections of 3 sets each and Ss received one collection in each
session. Each collection comprised one colour-type set, one shape-
type set and one type-different set. Of the 2 type-same sets in
each collection, one set had 'neutral' type-discordants and one set
had 'non-neutral' type-discordants. The composition of the 2
collections is indicated in Figure 17. In the third session, Ss
were presented with type and verbal knowledge tests.
In the choice-preference task sessions, the ordering of the two
object and picture collections was counterbalanced for the Ss in each
presentation condition. Thus, 12 Ss in each condition received the
collections in each order. Each of the sub-groups of 12 Ss was
balanced for mean age, age range and sex. The presentation order of
the object sets comprising each collection was balanced for each
sub-group of 12 Ss. Also balanced for each sub-group of 12 Ss was
the position of the pictures in each of the picture sets on the
picture mounts. In balancing the picture positions the provisos
were made however that the pictures should be arranged in 2 horizon¬
tal rows of 3 pictures each, that the members of each picture pair
(ie., the shape and colour discordants offered for each object)
should be in different rows but in the same position (ie., left,
centre or right) in their respective rows and that, for the type-
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same sets, the colour discordants should be presented in one row and
the shape discordants in the other row. Because neither shape nor
colour correspondence was consistently correlated with the type-
defining value for the members of the type-different sets (as was
the case for the type-same sets), it was further decided that, for
the type-different sets, each S should receive shape discordants and
colour discordants in separate rows in the first session and type-
discordants and modifier-discordants in separate rows in the second
(16)
session.
Consider finally, the type and verbal knowledge tests presented
in the third session. The present hypotheses presume that the Ss
will appreciate the type status of the various picture options and
that those Ss in the verbal presentation conditions will understand
the modifiers given. The information provided by each of the
knowledge tests was therefore potentially critical with regard to
the interpretation of the results if these results were not as
predicted. In the event however, it transpired that the modifiers
elicited strong effects (cf., Section 4.3.3) and consequently the
results of the verbal knowledge tests are not used in the results'
analyses. Since this is the case, only the details of the type
knowledge test will be reported below. Concerning this test, it
should be noted here that the pictures were presented for this test
on the cards upon which they were mounted in Sessions One and Two
respectively. These picture cards were presented to each S in
precisely the same order and, insofar as was possible, with the
pictures in the same position as that in which they were received in
Sessions One and Two. Because the 8 pictures of the 4 critical
objects were presented twice however, it was determined that these
pictures should be presented in the sets (and in the positions in
(17)
these sets) in which they appeared first. It should also be
noted in relation to the type knowledge test that the format was not
Having made these provisos, there were only 12 possible picture
arrangements for each picture set; thus 1 S in each sub-group
received each of these arrangements.
(17)
In practice, this meant that Ss received on this test, 3
picture sets with 3 picture pairs each, immediately followed by 3
picture sets of which two sets had 2 picture pairs each and one
'set' had a single picture pair.
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the same as that used in previous studies. Specifically, rather
than being asked to say whether members of a given type can look
like the relevant pictures, Ss were asked to name the pictures them¬
selves. The new format was chosen because it was considered that
there was a danger that, for the two trios of very similar pictures in
each of the type-same picture sets, a critical question which could
be answered simply by 'yes' or 'no' might have elicited automated
responding. Details of the type knowledge test are given in
Section 4.3.2 (d) ii.
4.3.2 (d) Procedures
4.3.2 (d) i Choice preference tasks
These tasks were cast, as in the main experimental tasks in
Studies One, Two and Five, respectively, in the form of a shopping
game, this time with a doll serving as the shopkeeper. Ss were
first 'introduced' to the doll and it was then explained that the
dolly "has a little shop", that she "sells things in her shop" and
that these things were contained inside boxes. At this point,
the boxes containing the 3 objects in the first set to be presented
were placed on the table. Those Ss in either of the two conditions
in which the objects were to be seen were then encouraged to open
the boxes, and, according to whether they were in the spontaneous
condition (P) or the description condition (P-T-M) were either asked
to name the objects themselves or were given a description of each
object by the E (the latter descriptions are given in Figure 17).
The lids of the boxes were then closed (with one object inside each
box). Those Ss for whom the objects were only to be described
(condition T-M) were told that because the boxes were 'stuck-up'
(which, for these Ss, they were), the E would tell them what was
inside each box. The descriptions of each object which were given
to these Ss were precisely the same as those descriptions given to
P-T-M condition Ss.
As in the previous studies employing the 'shopping paradigm',
it was then demonstrated to each S that if the boxes were rapidly
rearranged, then he (or she) could not accurately remember the
contents of each box. It was then suggested that a picture should
be stuck onto each box -
"to show the dolly what's inside - she can look at the
picture on the top of the box and then she will know
what's inside the box".
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The pictures on the card appropriate for the particular object set
were then presented. The 3 picture flaps were opened simultaneously
(18)
and Ss were given a short time (15 seconds or so) to study them.
(Ss in conditions P and P-T-M respectively, were able to compare the
pictures with the objects since the box lids were open at this
point.) Each S was then reminded of the names of the objects in the
set (for Ss in condition P, the name which they themselves had given
to each object was repeated whilst, for the other Ss, the names
given previously by the E were repeated). The children were then
asked to choose "the box we should do first". The 2 flaps positioned
over the 2 irrelevant picture pairs were then closed and Ss were
asked of the 2 pictures remaining the critical question -
"So, which of these pictures should we put on to help
the dolly remember that there's a (ie., name
given by S or predesignated name depending upon
presentation condition) inside the box?"( '
Immediately after making the picture selection, Ss were asked to
justify their choice. The question used was: "Why do you want to
choose that one?" Ss were then asked to choose a second box, the
object inside was named (by the S or the E depending upon condition)
and the critical question and the justification question respectively
were then repeated in relation to the relevant pictures. This
procedure was repeated for the third object in the set (although
clearly, the final object did not require to be selected). When
this had been done, Ss were asked to name the contents of each box.
Once the procedures in relation to the first object set had
been completed, Ss were told a story about what happened when people
(18)
Ss were given this opportunity to view the 6 pictures in each set
simultaneously so that it was possible for them to recognise that they
could adequately represent each of the objects in the type-same sets
by choosing the modifier-concordants. It was in order that this
recognition might be facilitated that the type-and modifier-concordants
respectively were presented in separate rows for these sets.
(19)
N.B. If Ss had had free access to all the pictures on the
picture card then, for the type-same object sets, the chances of a
type-concordant being selected as a consequence of random selection
would have been considerably greater than the chances of the
appropriate modifier-concordant being randomly selected. (By
contrast, for the type-different sets, the probabilities of the
chance selection of appropriate type-concordants and modifier-
concordants respectively would be equal).
came to buy the objects for sale in the dolly's shop. This story
lasted about 3 minutes and culminated in the dolly, having sold all
the items, arriving at the shop the next morning to find a lorry
parked outside which was loaded with more boxes containing things
for her to sell in the shop. When this point in the story was
reached the E 'wheeled in' a lorry loaded with the boxes containing
the second set of objects. The boxes were then unloaded, the
objects were named (by the S or the E as appropriate) and the
_
(21)
critical features of the procedure were then repeated. Once the
decisions relating to the second set of objects had been made, a
story was told in relation to the sale of these items which culmin¬
ated in the same fashion as the first story and the third set of
objects was then presented.
The procedures followed in Session Two were identical to those
followed in Session One.
4.3.2 (d) ii Knowledge tests
The procedure followed in Session Three was the same for all Ss.
Having been informed that they were to be shown the pictures which
they had seen when they had previously come to "play the games", Ss
were told that some of these pictures: "are pictures of real things"
but that others, "don't look like anything". Ss were then simply
shown all the pictures in the first picture set and asked, one-by-
one, to name all the pictures that they could. This process was then
repeated for the pictures on the 5 remaining picture cards. When
this had been done, Ss were presented with the verbal knowledge test.
The chief reason for telling this story was to emphasise that
only those objects in any one set were present in the shop at any
one time and thereby to reduce the likelihood of order effects
resulting from inter-set influences.
(21)
The procedures used were basically those used for the second and
third objects in the first object set; that is, these procedures were
used for all 3 objects in the second (and third) object set(s). In
addition however, for the first object presented, the complete
picture set was exposed for a short time just as it was for the first
object presented in the first object set.
(22)
The reasons for not giving the details of this test have been
given previously (cf., Section 4.3.2 (c)).
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4.3.3 Analysis of results
The main effect being tested for was whether there is any
evidence, in any of the object presentation conditions, that the
children's correspondence preferences for the four critical objects
shifted according to whether the objects occurred in type-same or
Table 12 Numerical breakdown for each presentation condition of the
picture choices made for each critical object in type-same






























































N.B. Pictures concordant with regard to a type-defining value (but
discordant with regard to a type-modifying value) are marked 'T.C'.
Pictures discordant with regard to a type-defining value (and concor¬
dant with regard to a type-modifying value) are marked 'T.D'.
type-different sets. Because of constraints upon space, only the
results which pertain directly to this question will be considered.
The basic findings are given in Table 12. If the picture choices
for the two kinds of object set in each presentation condition are
compared it becomes apparent that, in all but a few cases, Ss choose
the type-discordants rather more when the critical objects appear in
type-same sets than when these same objects appear in type-different
sets. Each of these comparisons may be assessed statistically by
applying the sign test to the number of choices made for the type-
concordants and the type-discordants respectively for each model
object and for each presentation condition. Those of these compari¬
sons which in this way attain statistical significance are, for the
model comb, conditions P-T-M and T-M (p = 0.016 and 0.022 respect¬
ively); for the model toothbrush, conditions P-T-M and T-M (p =
0.004 and 0.04 respectively); for the model biscuit,conditions P and
P-T-M (p = 0.022 and 0.008 respectively) and, for the model horse,
condition P-T-M (p = 0.002). It is apparent from these figures that
the only object presentation condition which reliably elicited
significant shifts in correspondence preferences as a function of
set composition was the P-T-M condition. In addition, the two shape-
type models elicited significant shifts for the T-M object present¬
ations (though these shifts were not as strong as those occurring
for the same stimuli in the P-T-M condition) whilst one model (the
biscuit) elicited significant shifts in the spontaneous object
(23)
presentation condition (P).
Consider next the results for those comparisons where corres¬
pondence preferences do not shift significantly according to set
composition. It is evident from Table 12 that there is a very
distinct variation between the two presentation conditions involved
- that is, conditions P and T-M respectively - in the correspondents
that are chosen. Specifically, whereas for condition P the pertinent
preferences (ie., for the comb, toothbrush and horse models respect¬
ively) are for the type-concordants, in condition T-M these prefer¬
ences (ie., for the biscuit and horse models respectively) are for
N.B. A clear majority of Ss in condition P named the objects at
the type-level for both the type-different and the type-same
presentations respectively. (See Appendix D for a breakdown of -these
results.)
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the modifier corresponding type-discordants.
There is little evidence in the present results of any general
effect whereby correspondence preference shifts are more likely to
occur when the type-discordant offered is type-neutral (as it is for
the comb and biscuit models) than when the type-discordant is openly
and explicitly misleading as to type (as it is for the toothbrush
and horse models). Thus, within the confines of the present variables,
the optimum conditions for the occurrence of informationally sensitive
shifts in the children's correspondence preferences are those
provided by the P-T-M presentation condition - which produced
significant shifts in correspondence preferences for each of the
four critical models. The remaining presentation conditions each
had some success in eliciting preference shifts but these shifts
were by no means widespread. Several reasons as to why these
isolated and irregular effects may have occurred arise from the
present data; these potential explanations will now be discussed.
Consider first why the biscuit model is the only model which
elicited significant shifts in correspondence preferences in
presentation condition P. It is interesting, in relation to this
question to consider the outcome of the type knowledge tests. Table
13 shows the numbers of erroneous identifications which Ss made with
regard to the type status of the type-discordants and type-concordants
offered for each of the critical models. It is apparent from this
table that Ss made many more errors with regard to the type status
of the biscuit choice-stimuli than they did with regard to the type
status of the other choice-stimulus pairs. Indeed what Table 13
does not show is that of the Ss in presentation conditions P, P-T-M
and T-M, only two, three and zero Ss respectively accurately differ¬
entiated the type status of both the biscuit choice-stimuli. The
frequency with which Ss on the one hand named the type-discordant
biscuit stimulus as a biscuit and on the other, omitted to name the
type-concordant biscuit stimulus as a biscuit would seem to indicate
that the salience of the type differences between these two choice-
stimuli are not nearly as great as the type differences which are
perceived between the choice-stimuli offered for the three other
critical models. This finding may potentially explain why, in the P
presentation condition, Ss were much more willing (cf., Table 12) to
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Table 13 Performance on the type knowledge test.
Model
Stimuli
No. of Ss erroneously
naming type-discordant
with type name of
model
No. of Ss failing to
name type-concordant
with type name of
model
P P-T-M T-M P P-T-M T-M
yellow comb 0 0 1 0 0 o(1)
red toothbrush 0 0 0 0 0 0
round biscuit 13 12 16 13 12 14
'sitting' horse 4 4 8 0 0 0
N.B. The response 'hairbrush' was scored as equivalent to that
of 'comb'.
select the type-discordant for the biscuit model than the type-
discordants for the other models. It should be emphasised however,
that the results of the spontaneous naming (or type knowledge) tests
do not explain how it was that so many P condition Ss actually
shifted their correspondence preferences for the biscuit model
from the type-concordant to the type-discordant according to the
composition of the set; presumably though, a reasonable number of
children did recognise the difference of type status between the two
biscuit choice-stimuli even if this recognition was not reflected in
these children's performance on the spontaneous naming test. This
question will be discussed further in Section 4.3.4.
A second anomalous feature of the results reported in Table 12
concerns why, in the T-M presentation condition, the comb and
toothbrush models elicited strong shifts in correspondence preferences
according to set composition whilst the biscuit and horse models
tended, overwhelmingly, to elicit the choice of the modifier-concor-
dants independently of set composition. It is evident that, in the
case of the two shape-type models, the results obtained in the T-M
condition largely reflect a continuation of the pattern of results
obtained for these stimuli in the P-T-M condition. Since neither of the
shape-type models elicited significant shifts in correspondence
preferences in the P condition it would seem to be apparent that the
shifts occurring for these models in the T-M condition derive
directly from the modifiers which were given. In the case of the
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two colour-type models, however, the widespread choice of the
modifier-concordants which occurred in the T-M condition stands in
marked contrast to the preference shifts obtained for these models
in the P-T-M condition and would seem therefore to be directly
attributable to the omission of the physical presentation of the
models. For these models then the omission of the physical present¬
ation of the models appears to lead to Ss placing more weight upon
correspondence with regard to type-modifying values than upon
correspondence with regard to the type-defining value for the type-
different sets. Of some relevance to the anomaly between the
correspondence preferences elicited by the colour-type and shape-
type models respectively in the T-M condition may be the type know¬
ledge data presented in Table 13. Specifically, this table indicates
that Ss erroneously gave the type-discordants the type name of the
model presented more often in the case of the colour-type models
than in the case of the shape-type models. This issue will be
discussed further in the next section.
One finding not yet noted but which warrants mention is that
the results were complicated by the appearance of a number of
asymmetric order effects. Specifically for some of the object
models, Ss were more likely to evidence a preference shift from the
type-concordant on the type-different object set to the modifier-
concordant on the type-same object set if the type-different set was
presented before the type-same set than if the sets were presented
in the reverse order. What happened in these cases was that
whilst preference shifts occurred when the type-different set was
presented first, when, instead, the type-same set was presented
first, Ss tended to choose the modifier-concordant for both type-
same and type-different sets. Thus, the experience of receiving
the type-same set first (and the ensuing choice of the modifier-
concordants) appears, for some Ss, to disrupt the preference which
they would otherwise have had for the type-concordant for an equiv¬
alent model occurring in a type-different set. The strongest of
these order effects are indicated in Table 14. Thus, taking the
most pronounced effect as an example, for the horse model (condition
P-T-M), of the 12 Ss who received the model in a type-different set
first, 10 of them chose the type-concordant but then subsequently
chose the modifier-concordant when the model was re-presented in a
type same set; whilst by contrast, of the 12 Ss who received the
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Table 14 Asymmetric effects resulting from presentation order of
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N.B. 'T.D' stands for type-different set and 'T.S' for type-same
set.
Picture choices are given as a function of presentation condition;
't.m' denotes type-concordant chosen for type-different set and
modifier-concordant chosen for type-same set whilst 'm.m' denotes
modifier-concordant chosen for both sets. Details of the numbers of
Ss making the remaining picture-choice combinations are given in
Appendix E.
same model in the type-same set first, 11 Ss chose the type-discordant
both for that set and for the type-different set presented subsequ¬
ently. The corresponding data for the conditions not featured in
Table 14 are included (for comparative purposes) in Appendix E.
Some consideration should finally be given to the justifications
given by Ss who changed their picture preferences in line with the
informational demands of the object sets. Table 15 presents an
analysis of these children's justifications for those stimulus
conditions in which the number of such shifts in correspondence
preferences was significant. Of particular interest is how the
justifications based upon type - for example, "because that's a comb
in there" - and the justifications based upon a dimensional corres¬
pondence - for example, "because it's the same colour" - are
distributed. It is apparent from Table 15 that, except for two
conditions (that is the biscuit P and the toothbrush T-M conditions
respectively), the type-different object sets elicited a majority of
type based justifications. By contrast, in each of the type-same
object set conditions (without exception), the majority of justifi¬
cations given were dimensionally based. A full verbatim report of

















































































































































































































The present study obtained some evidence that preschool children
do, on an object coding task, judge the relative importance of
correspondence with regard to shape and colour respectively, to vary
according to the composition of the set in which the model objects
occur. Specifically, whereas preschoolers typically prefer pictures
of objects which occur in type-different object sets to correspond
to their respective models with regard to a type-defining value
rather than a type-modifying value, when these same objects occur in
type-same sets the same preschoolers may then prefer pictures of the
models to correspond with regard to the type-modifying value rather
than the type-defining value. The occurrence of these shifts in
correspondence preferences - which permitted the objects in each
object set to be differentially coded - was found to be maximal when
the model objects were presented physically and the modifying values
were articulated (ie., in the object presentation condition P-T-M).
The study did not however, find any widespread evidence that the
nature of the type-discordant (that is, whether it is 'neutral'
rather than 'directly misleading' as to type) influenced subjects'
correspondence preferences systematically.
These general findings aside, there were a number of anomalies
in the study which require some explanation. The first of these was
that one critical model (the biscuit) elicited meaningful differen¬
tial correspondence preferences according to the composition of the
object sets when the modifying-values were not articulated (ie., in
object presentation condition P). It has previously been observed
(cf., Section 4.3.3) that subjects failed to distinguish adequately
the type status of the two picture options for this model. In
particular, many children accepted the type-discordant option as a
type-concordant. Thus, rather than treating this stimulus as being
neutral as to type (as they did for the type-discordant comb
picture) these children actually accepted it as a type-concordant.
This feature of subjects' identification of the biscuit materials
would seem likely to have facilitated their choice of the modifier-
concordants when the type-same biscuit set was presented. One other
feature of these materials which may be relevant is that the critical
modifying values were each geometric forms; this is significant.
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because Corah (1966) has argued that geometric forms are, (compared
with representational forms) especially salient for young children
relative to colours.
The second anomalous finding was that, when the objects were
not presented physically but only described (that is, in condition
T-M), the two shape-type models but not the two colour-type models
elicited significant numbers of changes in correspondence preferences
in an informationally meaningful fashion, according to the composition
of the object sets. It was noted in the previous section that this
anomalous result may have some basis in the relative inability (or
unwillingness) of subjects to detect the type status of the type-
discordants offered for the colour-type models (by contrast, the
type status of the type-discordants offered for the shape-type models
was readily identified). It has been argued above (cf., Section
2.3.3) that the physical presentation of a model directly elicits
type-based responding; it therefore seems likely that the omission
of a physical presentation of the objects in the present T-M
condition combined with the relatively poor type differentiation of
the colour-type options to produce the widespread choice of the
modifier-concordants which occurred for the colour-type models.
Finally, one other factor which may be relevant here is that it is
commonly believed that whilst shape is often used as a discriminator
at the generic level of abstraction, colour tends to be used as a
discriminator at lower levels of abstraction. Nelson, for example
(cf., also, Brian and Goodenough, 1929), having noted that roundness
is used by children to identify instances of the concept 'ball1,
observes that,
"Color .... is a highly salient dimension for young
children, although it is rarely useful for the
purpose of identifying concept members, and is, in
fact, seldom used for category generalization by
young children (Clark, 1973). However, color is
extremely relevant and useful in enabling the child
to distinguish between instances of the same category,
that is, for establishing the identity of single
objects (Nelson, 1974, p. 278; emphasis in original)."
Nelson's comments are, without doubt, an over-generalisation.
However, it does seem likely that young children will have had most
experience of using shape as a discriminator at generic levels of
abstraction and of using colour as a discriminator at lower
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abstraction levels. In relation to the latter, it is noteworthy
that it does seem likely that many of the subjects tested were - as
a consequence of their everyday experience - familiar with the
process of distinguishing individual toothbrushes on the basis of a
colour code. It does therefore seem feasible that, in the present
task, subjects may have found it more natural to change their
correspondence preferences from shape to colour for type-different
and type-same object sets respectively than to switch their
correspondence preferences from colour to shape for type-different
and type-same object sets, respectively.^4^
Concerning those subjects who changed their correspondence
preferences meaningfully according to the composition of the object
sets, one question of considerable importance is how (if at all)
conscious these subjects were of the informational consequences of
their picture choices. It is possible that rather than making these
picture choices deliberately so as to code the objects differentially,
subjects were in fact merely responding to some sort of summation of
cues which quasi-automatically forced them into making the choices
they did. Werner (1948) for example, in his discussion of perceptual
grouping (cf., Section 1.3 above) observes that objects or events
may be grouped together on the basis of a perceptual similarity with
very little in the way of 'conceptual-abstract support'. In
particular he observes that the kind of perceptual grouping made
will, in these circumstances, determine how the individual object is
conceived. To illustrate his point, Werner asks his readers to
consider two situations: first the vowels a-e-i-o-u sung one after
the other at a constant pitch and second, the vowel 'a' sung alone
to the tune of some melody. As Werner observes, whereas in the
first situation the vowel sound 'a' is expressed as a vowel, in the
second situation the same sound is expressed as a tone. Thus, the
subjects' perception of the figuration in which the individual
element stands, directly determines how the individual element is
conceived. The potential relevance of Werner's observations for the
present results is that it might be argued that the children's
choice of the modifier-concordant pictures for objects occurring in
(24)
N.B. For the type-different sets, coding was possible at a generic
level of abstraction whereas for the type-same sets, coding was
required to be at a lower level of abstraction.
type-same sets may actually demonstrate nothing more than that young
children possess patterns of sensory organisation whereby the
members of a set of objects varying only in respect of fixed values
on a single dimension are automatically conceived of in terms of
those varying dimensional values. Nevertheless, in considering how
exactly the present results might be accounted for in terms of
Werner's perceptual grouping effects, it is apparent that since the
present study found that subjects selected the modifier-concordants
for several of the type-same object sets even when the objects were
not physically presented but were only described, Werner's perceptual
grouping effects must, to be viable, be capable of being grounded
solely in the sounds of the various verbal labels which were given
to the objects in each of the sets. It is possible that some
perceptual grouping effects may be mediated solely by the sounds of
the verbal labels given to the objects. Consider, for example, the
red toothbrush model. The labels given to the objects in the type-
same and type-different sets respectively, in which this model was
presented were as follows.
1. red toothbrush 1. red toothbrush
2. orange toothbrush 2. round biscuit
3. green toothbrush 3. blue scissors
It would seem (subjectively) that, in the type-same set, the
colour names do acquire a certain salience as a consequence of the
constancy of the type name. In the type-different set, by contrast,
(25)
there does not appear to be a comparable effect. The possibility
cannot therefore be ruled out that the picture choices made for the
type-same sets (that is, the modifier-concordants) may have been
(26)
mediated by some kind of perceptual grouping effect ; it does
seem virtually certain however that the picture choices made for the
type-different sets are not attributable to a perceptual grouping
effect.
There is only one source of widespread evidence in the present
study which is relevant to the question as to the extent to which
(25)
Nevertheless, it might possibly be considered, even so, that
there is a tendency for the type names to predominate.
(26)
It should be emphasised though that Werner (op.cit.) does not
himself mention the possibility that perceptual grouping effects may
sometimes be grounded in the sounds of spoken words.
subjects were conscious of the informational consequences of their
picture choices. This evidence derives from the justifications
which subjects gave for their picture choices. The analysis made of
subjects' justifications (cf., Section 4.3.3) indicated that whereas
the justifications offered for the selection of type-concordant
pictures for model objects occurring in type-different sets were
mostly type-based, the justifications offered for the selection of
modifier-concordants for model objects occurring in type-same sets
were largely dimensionally-based. This shift in the bases of the
majority of justifications offered for the picture choices made with
regard to type-different and type-same object sets respectively is
suggestive since it does indicate that at the very least, subjects
were generally aware of the bases of correspondence which they chose;
nevertheless, however, the justification data does not prove that
the subjects involved in each comparison were fully aware of the infor¬
mational consequences of each of their picture choices. Additionally,
one general problem with justification data which should be noted is
that there is no guarantee that the justifications given indicate the
real reasons for the decisions that have been made; justifications
may merely be post-hoc rationalisations. Of particular interest
therefore are those comments which were not solicited but which some
subjects volunteered and which imply that picture choices - particu¬
larly in the case of the type-same object sets - were made with the
informational consequences "in mind". In several cases subjects
revealingly articulated the dilemma of the picture choice they were
faced with. One subject even went so far as to accuse the experi¬
menter of providing an inadequate selection of pictures; this state¬
ment, made in relation to the toothbrush type-same set was as
follows:
"You've got it wrong. The jugs are the right colours
but the toothbrushes are the wrong colours. You've
got it wrong!"
Another subject, on being shown the six picture options available
for the type-same comb object set, observed:
"'cause we'll have to use those (ie., the modifier-
concordants) won't we, instead of the combs (ie.,
the type-concordants). Because they're the right
colours. Hey what are those? (ie., the modifier-
concordants."
When it came to actually making the picture choices, several other
revealing comments were made. One child for example, selected the
red jug for the red toothbrush on the type-same object set and asked
"I can pretend this (ie., the jug) is a toothbrush can't I?"
Similarly, another child observed in relation to a member of the
same object set: "Green toothbrush. That's why, I'll use the green
jug." Comments such as these were made in only a minority of cases.
When however these comments are viewed within the context of the
justifications given by each of the subjects who shifted their
correspondence preferences according to set composition, it does
seem likely that it was in fact more than a small minority of
subjects who deliberately selected the modifier-concordants for the
objects occurring in type-same object sets in order to code the
objects differentially.
Several comments which were made spontaneously by subjects in
the present study do draw attention to an important feature of the
present task. Specifically, it would appear that several children
refrained from selecting the modifier-concordant picture options for
the objects In the type-same sets because they doubted that the
dolly would then be able to remember the type of the objects inside.
One child for example, having selected the modifier-concordant
pictures for the first two objects in the type-same horse set,
commented:
"but dolly will think zebras inside (ie., inside the
first two boxes)"-
(27)
and then chose the type-concordant, picture for the final object.
This comment does suggest then that in some cases subjects may have
chosen the type-concordants for objects occurring in type-same sets
not because they themselves were unaware of the informational
advantages of selecting the modifier-concordants but rather because
they recognised that if they chose the modifier-concordants there
would be no means of coding the type of the objects in such a way
that the dolly could be relied upon to remember the appropriate
type. It therefore seems likely that if subjects had not been
(27)
It should be emphasised however that most subjects who chose
the type-concordants for objects occurring in type-same sets
apparently did so because they simply considered the selection of a
type-discordant to be out of the question. Thus one subject
observed in relation to the orange toothbrush model:
"that's orange but we can't put that on can we?
because that's a milk. And that's a blue toothbrush.
I think that one's the best (ie., the type-concordant)
because that's a blue toothbrush."
required to demonstrate their sensitivity to the informational
demands set up by different object sets independently of correspon¬
dence on type-defining values (for example, by presenting type-same
arrays in which neither shape nor colour is a type-defining value -
cf., Figure 15 (p.117); or, alternatively by employing a correspon¬
dence requirements task rather than a choice-preference task), the
present study would have obtained greater evidence than it has done
that young children are sensitive to the informational demands set
up by the varying composition of different object sets. Nevertheless,
it must be emphasised that if subjects were not required to set
aside correspondence on type-defining values in order to satisfy
informational demands then they would not be required to treat the
(28)
stimulus materials as arbitrarily as the present task requires.
It was noted above (cf., Section 4.3.1) that the modifier-
concordants function on the type-same sets as virtual symbols. One
significant conclusion which therefore follows from the present
results is that young children would seem to be well on their way to
(29)
a proper understanding of the use of symbols. It has long been
apparent that young children use many common nouns to refer system¬
atically to certain kinds of objects. What has not been so clear
however is the extent to which young children are able to consciously
employ symbolic kinds of thinking for themselves. In the present
task the children were required to use representational material in
relatively arbitrary ways in order to satisfy an external informat¬
ional constraint. The present study found that children's picture
choices were most likely to reflect symbolic forms of thinking when
objects were both physically presented and also described. This
There is one method however which might possibly be used to
examine children's ability to use type-discordant stimuli as infor-
rnationally meaningful correspondents in conditions where the type of
the models need not remain ambiguous. Specifically, subjects could
be given the opportunity to classify model objects at two levels of
abstraction. In making provision for this possibility it could be
arranged firstly, for objects of the same type to be jointly codeable
under a type indicator and secondly, for individual objects to only
be differentially codeable with type-discordant stimuli.
(29)
It is noteworthy in this regard that 46 per cent of the children
in the P-T-M condition changed their picture preferences according
to set composition in an informationally appropriate fashion for two
or more of the four critical models.
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finding suggests then that language cues may assist the development
of children's ability to use symbolic forms of thought to satisfy
external informational constraints. Interestingly, this conclusion
is consistent with Luria's (1961) suggestions concerning the role of
speech in the development of self-regulatory mechanisms (cf., Section
2.1). The present results also add credence to the conclusion
reached by Chalmers and McGonigle (1979; cf. , Section 4.3.1) that
the nature of young children's difficulty with referential commun¬
ication tasks lies primarily in their relative inability to generate
adequate descriptions.
It should be emphasised that each of the descriptions given to
objects in the present study included a reference both to the type-
defining value (which was implicit in the type name) and (more
explicitly) to the type-modifying value. Moreover, the same object
descriptions were of course given to each critical object in both
type-different and type-same sets. Thus the finding that the giving
of these names had a differential effect upon subjects' picture
choices for objects in type-different and type-same sets respectively
(and that some proportion of these subjects appeared to be conscious
of the informational consequences of the picture choices) does tend
to suggest that subjects were already - at some level or other -
predisposed to respond differentially to objects in these two
different object contexts. It seems then that, in the case of the type-
same sets, the articulation of modifiers increased subjects' attention to
the importance of maintaining correspondence with regard to the values
marked. By contrast, in the case of the type-different sets, modifiers
seem to have generally been ignored. The present finding
that, in the verbal presentation conditions, receipt of the type-same
set before the type-different set tended, for some of the models,to
cause subjects to choose the modifier-concordant on both sets may be
taken as an additional indicator of the degree to which these subjects
were sensitive to the informational demands of the type-same sets.^^
This effect may, to some extent, be related to the more general
effect reported by Ford and Olson (1975) and discussed above (Section
4.3.1) whereby subjects' references (equivalent in the present study
to their picture choices) are a function of all the dimensions known
by the subject to have been varied rather than being merely a function
of the immediate context in which the model object appears. However,
to the extent that the present effect was order related rather than
generally confounded, it must be attributed to subjects actually
having learnt - through having received a type-same set - to value
the modifier-concordants more highly than they would otherwise have
done.
It should finally be stressed that the children taking part in
the present study were found to be generally insensitive to the
varying informational consequences of different set compositions
when descriptions of the objects at the level of the noun phrase
were not given. Specifically, in this condition, subjects widely
chose the type-concordants independently of set composition. It
therefore seems most reasonable to conclude that, whilst evidently
possessing some sensitivity to the differing informational demands
set up by variation in the composition of object sets, young
children are not generally adept on such tasks. Nevertheless, the
extent to which subjects demonstrated themselves to be capable of
performing satisfactorily when objects were verbally described does
suggest that young children are beginning to acquire a capacity for
classifying representational material as a function solely of
specific informational demands. It is noteworthy in this regard
that young children's widely reported failure to reclassify material
presented on classification tasks fails to give any indication that
young children will perform as well as they were found to on the
present tasks. One reason why the subjects in the present study
who were given verbal cues performed as competently as they did
seems likely to be that the varying informational demands of the
different object sets provided a sound reason for classifying the
materials in different ways.
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CHAPTER FIVE: PRESCHOOL CHILDREN'S DETECTION OF ANOMALIES
AND AMBIGUITIES IN REPRESENTATIONAL MATERIALS
Experimenter: And what do you think this one is?
Child (4:3 years) ... A sheepdog! (chortles).
5.1 Statement of the issues to be investigated
The question which has united each of the investigations which
have been reported in the previous experimental chapters has been
whether or not young children are as limited in their ability to
co-ordinate sources of perceptual information as has often been
supposed in the past (cf., Chapter One). The investigations so far
reported have each been interpreted as providing evidence that young
children can and often do co-ordinate perceptual information in
systematic ways. The present chapter reports a study which extends
the scope of the present investigations by examining children's
ability to make the perceptual co-ordinations required to detect
anomalies and ambiguities respectively. Previous investigators have
concluded that young children lack the co-ordinative skills required
for success on such tasks; however the tasks used seem to have been
unnecessarily complex (cf., Section 1.2). The present study was there¬
fore set up to examine children's performance with more straightforward
tasks.
The kind of co-ordinative skill which is required to spot
anomalies and ambiguities respectively would seem, subjectively at
least, to be quite distinct. Specifically, whereas the detection of
anomalies requires merely the recognition that two or more features
of a stimulus are not compatible, the detection of ambiguities
requires by contrast, that whole stimuli be perceptually reorganised,
each of the possible perceptual organisations being non-anomalous.
Upon reflection, it is also apparent that if all the elements in an
anomalous figure are perceived in a co-ordinated fashion then the
anomaly should normally be detected, whereas the systematic co¬
ordination of all the elements in an ambiguous figure will not
necessarily lead to the detection of the ambiguity therein.
Although none of the earlier studies reported in this thesis
have been concerned with investigating children's ability to detect
ambiguities it is evident that most of these studies have been in
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someway concerned with children's ability to detect anomalies. In
the past, the kinds of anomalies which have been used in developmental
research have been anomalies that occur at the type-level of abstrac¬
tion. It was this kind of anomaly which the current study presented.
Now the studies reported in earlier chapters have found that young
children do generally prefer, when judging correspondences between
objects and pictures, that pictures correspond to objects with
regard to type-defining values (as well as with regard to type-
modifying values) - cf., Section 2.2. There are, however, several
distinctions which should be drawn between the present investigation
and these previous studies. The first of these is that in the
current study, no model objects were presented for, for that matter described) and
consequently subjects were required to base their detection of
anomalies solely upon their knowledge of the object types depicted.
In this way, the anomalies presented each occurred at the type level
of abstraction. The most important characteristic of the present
study, however, is that it is concerned solely with partial shape-
type discordances. Now children's ability to detect a partial
shape-type discordance has already been given some (albeit rather
limited) empirical attention; significantly, however, it was found
in relation to the pertinent stimulus - that is a teapot with a
spoon bowl substituted for the spout (cf., Section 2.3) - that young
children were not very competent at detecting this anomaly. This
finding may be critical because it is precisely this kind of partial
shape-type discordance which was presented in the original anomaly
studies (cf., Section 1.2). It may be therefore that children
detect gross (or complete) shape-type discordances but not partial
shape-type discordances. It seems more likely, however, that
children will detect some partial shape-type discordants but not
notice the most subtle of such anomalies. One interesting question
which arises in this regard is the point at which adults begin to
start failing to detect the more subtle anomalies.^^ An additional
question concerns the extent to which failures to detect anomalies
arise from a lack of knowledge as to the particular type identity of
It should be noted that a study was conducted with adults for
comparative purposes. The results of this study will be cited at
appropriate points in the present chapter. The methodological
details of this study are given in Appendix G.
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the parts combined. These issues constitute the basis of the
current study of the detection of anomalies. It should be noted
that evidence has previously been reported (cf., Chapter Three)
which strongly suggests that children (and adults) naturally organise
their concepts of objects at the type level of abstraction. The
anomalies presented in the current study were anomalous drawings of
animals. It was therefore anticipated that the study would also
reveal something about children's shape-type knowledge of animal
types - how it is structured, how precise it is and so on. Piloting
for this study yielded the response featured at the head of the
title page of the present chapter. Such verbal humour was admittedly
exceptional; however, more generally the results of this pilot study
did suggest that studies by previous investigators (cf., Section 1.2)
have underestimated the ability of young children to detect partial
shape anomalies.
With regard to the current investigation of the extent to which
young children are able to detect ambiguities, it requires only to
be observed at this point that previous studies of this issue have a
number of shortcomings (concerning the presentation of highly
stylised figures; cf., Section 1.2) which the present study sought
to avoid. Because the intention in conducting the current study was
to discover the extent of young children's ability to detect
anomalies and ambiguities respectively, the children participating
were informed as to the special nature (or the potentially special
nature) of the materials they viewed. This feature of the study is
important because previous studies of children's performance with
anomalous and ambiguous materials have generally failed to provide
(2)
subjects with such information (cf., Section 1.2).
5.2 Study Seven: A study of preschool children's ability to detect
anomalies and ambiguities.
5.2.1 Introduction
Since the processes involved in spotting anomalies and ambiguities
respectively would seem to be relatively distinct (cf., Section 5.1)
12)
This feature of the study may be of special significance in
respect of the presentation of the ambiguous figures. It is note¬
worthy in this regard that, in the course of an informal pilot,
several adults who were presented with a series of ten ambiguous
figures (selected from those reproduced by Fisher 1968) and who were
asked merely to identify the 'drawings', failed to spot a single
ambiguity.
the relevant literatures will be reviewed separately below.
5.2.1 (a) Young children's detection of anomalies
Two studies of young children's ability to detect anomalies in
representational materials have been previously identified (in
Section 1.2). The relevant investigators (that is, Segers, 1926 a
and Vurpillot, 1962) each supposed their studies to have found that
young children do not identify pictures of objects on the basis of a
co-ordinated perception of the component parts. In particular,
Vurpillot (1976 b) regards her later study (op.cit.) as having
confirmed the validity of the early observations of Cramaussel
(1924) and Segers (op.cit.) that before seven-years or so -
"children have a tendency to identify an object or its
representation according to a single cue, neglecting
to verify the truth of the hypothesis by examining
other parts of the picture (p.214, 215)."
The present contention is however that these conclusions are not
warranted. Specifically, each of the two studies has a number of
limitations which should be noted. Consider first the study
conducted by Segers (op.cit.). Segers presented his subjects with
five monsters, each monster comprising a head and a body from two
different types of animal. (Segers provides no details concerning
the manner in which these monsters were presented; Segers' subjects
do not, however, appear to have been informed as to the possibility
of the stimuli being anomalous.) Segers' results are reproduced in
Table 16.
The first thing to notice is that none of the children in the
two younger age groups (that is, those aged three-to-seven years)
successfully identified a single monster as monstrous. The great
majority of these younger subjects identified the monsters on the
(3)
basis of either the head or the body part. Segers, however,
suggests that these results indicate that three-to-five year olds
base their identifications upon the body part and that, after five-
years, the identity of the head part tends to dominate the ident¬
ifications made until sometimes seven-years, but typically nine-
years when children begin to evidence appreciation of the anomalies
presented. It has previously been noted that Segers equates ident-
(3)
N.B. A negligible number of subjects named the monsters (in non-
anomalous terms) as portraying a different type altogether; these












































































































































































































































































ifications that are based exclusively upon a body part, with a
focusing of attention on the 'general look' of the monster; conse¬
quently, Segers concluded that these results are consistent with the
syncretist position concerning young children's limitations when
making identifications (cf.,Section 1.2). These conclusions appear,
however, to be wholly inconsistent with the results obtained. It is
evident, in particular, that there were in fact marginally more
subjects in the three-to-five year old group who named the monsters
on the basis of the head parts than who named the monsters on the
basis of the body parts. Segers would seem to have considered that
this discrepancy may be accounted for by rejecting the results
gained with the dog-cat monster on the grounds that,
"the dog's head adapted itself so well to the cat's
body that almost all the children said they saw a
dog."
This is a very odd kind of argument to make; for the subjects in
Segers' study must surely have based their identifications of the
dog-cat monster on the head part rather than upon the body part.
Consequently, it seems to be the case that rather than the head
being adapted to the body, the body part was in fact assimilated to
the head. Segers does not indicate the breed of dog portrayed in
the dog-cat monster, however, it does seem quite possible that a
cat's body will be sufficiently similar to the body of some breeds
of dog for a monster drawing made up of the head of such a dog and a
cat's body to be widely accepted as a dog.
There would seem though to be no reason for excluding from
consideration the results gained for the dog-cat monster that could
not also be invoked for each of the other monsters. What Segers'
results appear to show then is that young children base their
identifications of head-body monsters upon one of the component
parts and that they do not detect the anomalies. There are grounds
however, for reasoning that this is not the interpretation which
should be given to Segers' results. In particular, there are two
factors to which Segers' comments draw attention and which may,
potentially, be important. The first of these is that when the
In the original, 'la tete du chien s'adapte tellement bien au
corps du chat, que presque tous les eleves ont declare voir 'un
basset' (p. 749).'
anomalies are very subtle (as Segers' monsters appear to have been)
children may lack the detailed knowledge of the type-identity of one
or the other of the parts that is required to detect the anomaly.
The second possibility is that subjects do not actually lack know¬
ledge of the type-identity of the parts combined but rather they
simply fail to notice the most subtle of anomalies because the parts
combined are so compatible. It is evident in this regard that the
identities paired by Segers were clearly not as blantantly monstrous
as other pairings which may be imagined. Upon reflection, a number
of elements would seem to be involved in making one anomalous stimulus
more compatible than another. One factor involved for example is, in
the case of monsters, the posture of the body part. Specifically, a
body part is unlikely to be assimilated to a head part if it is in a
highly type-distinctive posture even if structurally it is similar to
the part which it has been substituted for. Something of this kind
of thinking may have underlain Segers' presentation (cf., above, this
section) of two horse bodies with the same cow's head. Consider in
this regard the two monsters illustrated in Figure 19; these monsters
share the same (fairly type-distinctive) cow's head but because cows
often stand in a posture roughly equivalent to that adopted by the
horse body in stimulus (a) but do not gallop (as in stimulus (b)),
the body part which would seem to be most easily assimilated to the
Figure 19 A cow head with posturally compatible and posturally
incompatible horse bodies.
head part is the body of stimulus (a). This supposition is supported
strongly by the ratings of a group of eighteen first-year psychology
students (cf., Appendix G for details); specifically, these students
judged unanimously that monster (a) is less bizarre than monster (b),
(applying x2 , P Z. 0.001). It is apparent then that if the subjects
in Segers' study lacked the knowledge necessary to spot the anomalies
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or if, alternatively, they possessed this knowledge but simply
failed to notice the anomalies,then children may actually be rather
better at detecting anomalies than the results of the study suggest.
Consider next the more recent study of children's ability to
detect anomalies which was conducted by Vurpillot (1962). What
Vurpillot did was to present each of her subjects with a series of
fifty-three cards; on each card was a drawing, either of a sheep or
a rabbit (of varying levels of completeness) or of a monster
(variously made up of both rabbit and sheep parts). Altogether
there were fourteen sheep and fourteen rabbits, more or less complete,
plus one further stimulus (the head part alone) which could be either
a sheep or a rabbit, plus twenty-four monsters. Each subject was
first shown two empty boxes and then given the following instruction:
"In the pack of cards, there are, mixed up, pictures
of sheep and pictures of rabbits. You have to put
all the sheep in one box and all the rabbits in the
other.11 (5)
As an example, subjects were then shown two drawings, one of the
fully complete (and non-anomalous) sheep (cf., Figure 20. a) and one
of the fully complete (and non-anomalous) rabbit (cf., Figure 20. b)
and each of these drawings was then put into one of the boxes. Each
Figure 20 The two complete and non-anomalous drawings presented by
Vurpillot, 1962 (from Vurpillot, 1976 b).
subject was then forced to choose for each of the remaining drawings
whether it should be categorised as a rabbit or as a sheep. In
treating the results she obtained, Vurpillot classified each picture
according to whether, typically, it had been identified as a sheep
or as a rabbit or else had not been differentiated as either a sheep
Literally, 'dans le paquet de cartes, il y a, melanges, des
dessins de moutons et des dessins de lapins. II faut mettre dans
une boTte tous les moutons et dans 1'autre tous les lapins (p.148).'
or a rabbit. (A stimulus was classified as having been different¬
iated as a picture of a sheep or a rabbit respectively, if more than
16 of the 25 subjects made the same categorisation.) Vurpillot
appears to have been primarily concerned with establishing the
different uses made by children of various ages, of particular
features in the identification of sheep and rabbits. What she found
was that from about four-years onwards, the rabbit's ears and, to a
lesser extent the sheep's wool, were strong cues in eliciting
categorisations based upon their respective identities but that more
features were taken note of by older children. Specifically,
Vurpillot observes:
"As he (that is the child) gets older, he takes into
consideration the existence of all the elements
which are at his disposal and this allows him ... to
establish a hierarchy among the monsters as more
rabbit or more sheep according to the number of
characteristics of each type that they have (1962,
p. 154)."
Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that throughout the age range
Vurpillot studied (that is, 4-11 years) a hard-core of
some 8-11 monsters remained undifferentiated. In relation to the
incomplete drawings, Vurpillot found that, in general, the older the
child, the fewer was the number of these drawings which remained
undifferentiated.
As previously noted (this section) Vurpillot (1976 b) regards
these findings as having confirmed previous observations by Segers
and others that young children tend to identify pictures on the
basis of single features only rather than upon a co-ordinated view
of all the parts. In particular, she argues that because her
younger subjects did not reliably categorise the less powerful
discriminatory features as either sheep or rabbit, these features
are not learnt until later years and that until then, identifications
are nearly exclusively based upon a characteristic detail; other
details not being taken into account. There are however several
grounds upon which it may be argued that these conclusions may be
suspect. To begin with it would seem that the characteristics of
Vurpillot's design are such that it was only possible to tell that a
child failed to identify a feature from whether or not this feature
was correctly identified on the incomplete figure in which it
appeared in isolation. (This is because it was surely impossible to
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determine with any certainty that a feature was not being taken into
account when the other stimuli in which the feature occurred were
categorised.) However, the finding that some of the younger children
identified or failed to correctly identify certain of the features
in the incomplete drawings does not really demonstrate that these
children would not pay any attention to these features in complete
pictures. For example, the finding that children do not identify
the legs of the sheep (cf., Figure 20.a) when they are presented
alone does not indicate that these children would not notice if the
legs were omitted in an otherwise complete picture of the sheep. In
addition to this, it is also likely that faced with the task of
identifying a series of fifty-three cards in a single session as
either simply 'a sheep' or else simply 'a rabbit', children would,
after a time, lose concentration (and presented with for example,
the 'sheep's' legs, there is in fact little reason why this feature
should not be identified as a rabbit rather than as a sheep). Thus,
rather than indicating how children normally go about identifying
objects and/or representations of objects, there is a strong element
in this task which taps instead children's ability to learn the
identity of certain rather obscure features. Most fundamental, is
that surely the best means of assessing whether children attend to
each of the various parts in a picture when identifying it is to see
if they - as individuals - detect anomalies in respect of each of
these parts; this however is precisely what Vurpillot failed to do
(since it is not possible to determine whether any of her subjects
recognised any of the monsters to be monstrous).
The basic question addressed by the present investigations
concerning children's ability to detect anomalies is that of the
kinds of head-body anomalies (as in Segers' study) which individual
children detect. Since, as has been previously noted, children's
knowledge of the type-identity of the parts combined may have a
considerable bearing upon their ability to detect monsters involving
combinations of these parts, the present investigations will, like
Vurpillot's study, involve an examination of children's ability to
name the parts separately. Nevertheless, however, it will not be
assumed that an inability to name the type-identity of component
parts will necessarily incapacitate subjects from being able to
detect anomalies associated with these parts; specifically, children
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may possess knowledge about animals which is at levels of abstraction
other than that of type and they may use this knowledge to detect
certain more bizarre anomalies. This latter observation relates to
what has already been said (this section) in relation to Segers'
study concerning the likelihood that the compatibility of the
parts combined may affect whether or not monsters are detected,
independently of subjects' knowledge of the type-identity of the
parts combined. Thus, whilst if the parts combined are highly
compatible, children may not notice an anomaly - even if they can
correctly identify the type of the component parts when these parts
are separately presented - it is also the case that, if the parts
combined are highly bizarre, then even children who do not know the
type of the component parts may detect the resulting anomalies. The
kind of compatibility which was of prime concern in the present
investigations was the kind of compatibility which is based upon a
structural similarity between different kinds of animals. These
similarities it would seem, tend to be based (though by no means
always) upon family resemblances; that is, other things being equal,
the closer animals are in a biological taxonomy,the more likely it
( 0 )is that equivalent parts will be similar and therefore compatible.
The design envisaged for the present investigations was to
compare the relative ease with which children detect a monster with
parts judged to be compatible and a monster with parts judged to be
relatively incompatible. To assist the clarity with which the
results obtained might be interpreted, it was envisaged that the two
members of the monster pair to be presented would each share one of the
two animal parts (that is either the head or the body). Also of interest
though was how the children's ability to detect each of these
monsters varies according to whether they know the type identity of
both the component parts, the type identity of one part only (that
is, the part shared by the two monsters) or whether indeed they know
the type identity of neither of the component parts. It is apparent
that in order to assign subjects to these various type-knowledge
conditions, subjects must first be screened to determine their
( 0 )
It should be emphasised that the present use of the words 'comp¬
atible' and 'incompatible' should not be taken to indicate that
these qualities are in any sense absolute; essentially these are
relative terms; relative, that is, to other combinations of parts
which might be made.
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ability to identify the type-identity of the component parts (that
is the heads and the bodies). This screening session was conducted before any
decisions were made as to the precise monsters to be presented. So
that as wide a variety of choice of monsters was available as was
possible, and, in particular, so as to maximise the probability that
reasonable proportions of subjects would be unable to correctly name
the type of animal from which some of the parts were derived, a
large number of head and body parts were presented in this session
(cf., Section 5.2.2 for details).
5.2.1 (b) Young children's performance with ambiguous figures
In Chapter One (cf., Section 1.2) an implicit distinction was
made between composite figures and ambiguous figures. It is evident
however that both of these kinds of figure require the recognition
of an ambiguity according to the manner in which the stimulus is
perceptually organised. Composite figures would therefore seem to
be best regarded as a particular kind of ambiguous figure in which
the ambiguity always rests in the perception of the discrete elements
as against the perception of these elements as an integrated whole.
The ambiguous figures with which the present investigations are
concerned are the kind of figures in which the ambiguity rests upon
two integrated views of the whole. The particular focus of interest
is a series of studies carried out by David Elkind and his associates
on young children's ability to spot such ambiguities. Examples of
the ambiguous figures used by Elkind have already been illustrated
in Figure 4 (p. 14). In the first of his studies, Elkind (Elkind
and Scott, 1962) found that the perception of ambiguities is more
(7)
likely the more the component identities are each articulated and
that the ability to perceive ambiguities increases with age and has a
(8)
low but positive correlation with intelligence. In a later study
Elkind (Elkind 1964) collected some normative developmental data for
six groups of children ranging in age from six-to-eleven years.
__
Though Elkind and Scott also conclude that when only one
component identity in the ambiguous figures was articulated, the
remaining identities were less frequently perceived than when both
identities were left unarticulated.
(8)
Elkind and Scott do not indicate which particular intelligence
test was used; however, Elkind (1964) reports that the test used was
the Kuhlmann-Anderson group test of general intelligence.
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Elkind found that his subjects did not generally begin to notice the
ambiguities (that is, in more than the odd figure) until about 8:6
years.
Elkind (1969; 1975) interprets these results in terms of Piaget's
theory of perceptual development. In the Piagetian view (Piaget 1969;
see also Section 1.2) perceptual development is chiefly described in
terms of a decline in the efficacy of the processes of primary
perception and a corresponding gain in the scope and importance of
perceptual activities. Perceptual activities are held to be less
passive than the processes of primary perception and Elkind argues
that it is the development of perceptual activities which makes
possible the spontaneous reorganisation of the visual field that is
(9)
required for the reversal of ambiguous figures. Thus he concludes
(as also does Vurpillot - eg., 1976 a) that young children are
lacking in their ability to co-ordinate perceptual information. Now,
Elkind's conclusion that the ability to spot ambiguities increases
with age (at least insofar as the transition from child to adult is
concerned) is probably correct so far as ambiguous figures with fixed
component identities are concerned. There would appear however, to
be at least two reasons why Elkind may have underestimated the ability
of young children to identify pre-set ambiguities in ambiguous
figures. The first of these is that, as a whole, the identities in
the figures Elkind presented were not very well articulated and that
typically, one of these identities tended to be very much more
articulated than the others. This is evident from the samples of
Elkind's figures which are illustrated in Figure 4 (p. 14 ). It is
especially noteworthy in this regard that in the case of some of
Elkind's figures neither of the component identities was recognised
by a majority of the children in the youngest age groups^10^; thus,
large numbers of children (occasionally more than 50 per cent)
failed to recognise either of the component identities. The second
factor limiting the value of Elkind's results as a measure of
children's ability to spot the ambiguities in ambiguous figures
(9)
Elkind (eg., Elkind and Scott, 1962) contrasts this view with the
views of Gestalt psychologists such as Kohler and Wallach who, he
says, proposed a neurological model to explain the process of spotting
ambiguities. According to Elkind,the Gestaltists predict that the
incidence of reversals should decrease with age.
This is apparent from the results presented by Elkind and Scott
(see, Elkind and Scott, 1962, Table 3 p. 625).
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concerns Elkind's failure to motivate his subjects to attend the
figures for a reasonable length of time. It is important to notice
that Elkind and Scott are aware of this problem; thus they comment:
"It might be argued that children in the present study
did not attend long enough for .... reversals to
occur. This argument cannot be refuted inasmuch as
there was no way to insure that the children attended
to the ambiguous figures (Elkind and Scott, 1962,
p. 6:27). "
In the present view one measure which might be expected to increase
subjects' motivation to continue to attend to the figures once an
initial identification has been made would be to inform subjects as
to the possibility of the stimuli being ambiguous.
There is one other study which has been conducted by Elkind and
some of his colleagues which has not yet been mentioned. Signific¬
antly, this study (Elkind, Koegler and Go, 1962) constituted an
attempt to train three groups of children - of mean age 6:7, 7:7 and
8:7 years respectively - to detect the ambiguities in ambiguous
figures. These children were first tested on one set of figures,
were then trained on a second set of figures and then finally were
re-tested with the original set of figures. The figures used were
the same as those presented by Elkind, 1964 (cf., Elkind, 1969) and
consequently included the figures illustrated in Figure 4 (p.14 ).
The training which was given involved providing the children with
progressively more revealing clues with regard to the component
identity (or identities) which had not been detected spontaneously.
This process culminated in the hidden identity being named and, if
the child still failed to perceive it, the identity which could be
seen was then masked out so that the hidden identity was immediately
apparent. Elkind et al. found that this training did lead to
significantly improved performance by the children in each of the
age groups studied. Of particular importance is that they found that the
mean number of identities perceived immediately after the training
by the youngest group of subjects was in excess of twelve (for seven
ambiguous figures). These findings are significant because they
indicate that Elkind's other studies (Elkind, 1964; Elkind and Scott,
1962) may provide rather conservative estimates of young children's
ability to detect ambiguities. Elkind et als' training study does
however have two limitations. The first of these is that the seven
figures in each of the two sets of figures which were presented were
very similar; specifically, only one of the fourteen figures lacks a
face profile whilst three of the figures in each set portray goblets
and two of the figures in each set portray trees. In view of these
similarities it seems quite likely that the beneficial effects of
the training which Elkind et al. report may be restricted only to
this very limited range of contents and that their subjects did not
actually learn general techniques suitable for detecting ambiguities
for themselves. The second limitation of Elkind et als1 study is
that it was not concerned with the youngest groups of children who
might reasonably be expected to detect ambiguities.
The present study is designed to examine the extent to which
preschool children are able to detect the ambiguities in ambiguous
figures when they are fully informed as to the nature of the stimuli.
The figures presented each depicted familiar identities and in the
case of one of these figures at least, the component identities were
reasonably highly articulated. In addition, it was decided to
examine, in an exploratory fashion, whether there is any evidence
that preschool children are responsive to practice in the detection
of ambiguities.
The manner in which the children were informed of the possibility
of ambiguities was to tell them that they were to be shown some
"magic pictures" which changed their appearance when they were
viewed for an extended period.^"'" ^ Only two ambiguous figures were
presented. The first of these (cf., Figure 21, A.i) was a specially
drawn, frontally reversing 'house-face' figure. The second figure
(cf., Figure 21.A.ii) was the equi-probable version of Jastrow's
'duck and rabbit', reproduced by Fisher (1968). The reason for
drawing the 'house-face' figure was that it was considered that none
of the established figures (including the 'duck and rabbit') were
really ideal for presenting to young children.^^ Consequently the
(lia)
This is of course untrue since it is the viewer's perceptual
organisation of the figure which changes; in addition it should be
noted that there is a danger with such a format that subjects will
simply wait passively for the picture to change rather than seek
actively for an alternative organisation of the stimulus. The
present format was however thought to be justified because it does
at least seem likely to convey satisfactorily to young children the
special character of the figures in terms which they can readily
understand and to thereby ensure that the children will continue to
attend the figures once an initial identification has been made.
The 'duck and rabbit' figure was considered not to be ideal
because it involves a 'left-right' rather than a 'frontal' reversal.
Frunlal reversals seem to be more obvious.
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presentation of both the 'house-face' figure and the left-right
reversing 'duck and rabbit' figure permits children's performance on
the new figure and on an established figure to be compared. In
addition however, these figures were also selected so as to permit
them to be used for the practice experience intended. Specifically,
these figures make it possible to expose, immediately below the
figures themselves, non-ambiguous extensions of either of the
component identities in the figures. Thus, if children fail to spot
the ambiguities spontaneously, they can be shown an extension of the
Figure 21 Ambiguous figures and the associated contextual aids
presented to children participating in Study Seven.
A. Ambiguous figures (full-size).
(i) 'House-Face' (ii) 'Duck and Rabbit'
B. Ambiguous figures with associated contextual aids
(i) 'House-Face' (ii) 'Duck and Rabbit'
identity which has not been spotted. For example, a child who,
having been presented with the 'duck and rabbit' figure, detects the
duck but not the rabbit, can then be shown the figure with a rabbit's
body in the appropriate position beneath it. Four such unambiguous
contextual aids (one for each of the two component identities in each
figure) were used in the present study; each of these aids is
illustrated (together with the pertinent figure) in Figure 21.B. It
is apparent that the use of these contextual aids bears considerable
resemblance to the masking techniques employed by Elkind et al.
(1962); the present system would, however, seem to possess the
advantage that the ambiguous figure itself may be preserved intact
throughout the training period.
In relation to the presentation of the unambiguous contexts it
should be noted that although the likelihood of Gestalt effects
would seem to be such that the presentation of these contexts will
aid the recognition of ambiguities, this is not necessarily what
will happen and whether it does happen poses an interesting question
in its own right. The reasons why the contextual aids may not assist
the detection of ambiguities derive from the traditional view (cf.,
Section 1.2) that preschool children, in attending to objects or
representations of objects, will typically centre their attention on
particular parts rather than perceive the stimuli as integrated
wholes. Indeed, there would appear - theoretically at least - to be
a minimum of four possible responses which children who have
identified only one of the two component identities might make to
the exposure of a contextual aid. The first of these is that
subjects may keep their attention centred upon the component
identity in the ambiguous figure which has already been recognised;
for example, having first identified the 'duck and rabbit' figure as
a duck, subjects might continue to affirm, when the rabbit's body is
exposed, that the picture as a whole portrays a duck. A second
possibility is that subjects may centre their attention on the part
most recently exposed and still not fully appreciate the ambiguity
of the ambiguous figure part. Thus, having, for example, first
identified the 'duck and rabbit' figure as a duck, the whole stimulus
(that is, the ambiguous figure plus the contextual aid) might be
identified as a rabbit. A third possibility is that the drawing
might be identified as consisting of two discordant parts. Thus in
the example given above, subjects might continue to affirm that the
head is that of a duck but nevertheless, identify the body part as
that of a rabbit. Finally, of course, there is the possibility that
exposure of the contextual aid might indeed cause subjects to
reorganise their perception of the ambiguous part of the figure; that
is, subjects may identify the whole figure (that is the ambiguous
figure plus the contextual aid) wholistically. Thus, with regard to
the example given above, subjects may identify both the 'duck and
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rabbit' figure and the rabbit's body as portraying a rabbit. Never¬
theless, it is apparent that, having done this, children may still
be unable subsequently to reorganise their perception of the
ambiguous figure alone at will.
The extent to which the contextual aids elicit each of these
four kinds of response will yield useful information concerning
young children's ability to integrate visual material. It should be
emphasised however that if a reasonable number of subjects are not
enabled to spot the ambiguities by the contextual aids then this
will indicate that the presentation of such aids is not a technique
which is suitable for training children in the detection of
ambiguities. Piloting for the present study did suggest though,
that such contextual aids are likely to produce a fairly large
proportion of integrated identifications.
At this point the three main questions which were examined by
the present investigations of children's ability to spot ambiguities
should be summarised. The first question concerns the number of
spontaneous reversals occurring for each of the two ambiguous
figures presented and concerns, in particular, whether children spot
the 'house-face' ambiguity more readily than the 'duck and rabbit'
ambiguity. The second question concerns the number of reversals
occurring for each of the two ambiguous figures when children who
have not spotted the pertinent ambiguities spontaneously are given
an unambiguous contextual aid. Of particular interest is how the
number of such reversals compares with the number of other responses
which occur. The third and final question concerns whether there is
any evidence of a practice effect whereby subjects are more capable
of detecting the ambiguity spontaneously on the second ambiguous
figure received than they were on the first ambiguous figure
received.
It has previously been noted in relation to the present inves¬
tigations concerning children's ability to detect anomalies that a
screening session involving presentation of head and body parts must
be carried out before the critical stimuli to be presented can be
determined. By contrast, it is clear that there can be no flexib¬
ility with regard to the materials to be presented relating to
children's ability to detect ambiguities. Nevertheless, the screening
session in this study will be used to provide useful information concerning
subjects' ability to identify correctly the unambiguous contextual
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aids to-be presented in association with the ambiguous figures.
Clearly, if any of these parts are incorrectly named by a large
proportion of subjects then this may have serious implications for
the interpretation of the results obtained when these parts are
presented as contextual aids.
5.2.2 Screening session
5.2.2 (a) Method
Eighty-five preschoolers, 44 boys and 41 girls (mean age 4:4:
age range 3:3-5:2), each attending a single nursery class in
Edinburgh,were screened. Each of these children was individually
presented with a series of 24 drawings. Of these 24 drawings, 4
were the ambiguous figure contextual aids (cf., Figure 22.A) whilst
the remaining 20 drawings (cf., Figure 22.B), each portrayed either
the head or the body of one of ten kinds of animal and were presented
in order to provide for the future presentation of anomalous animals.
It should be noted that the majority of the drawings illustrated in
Figure 22 (specifically, A3 and B2, B3, B5, B7, B8, B9, BIO, B12,
B13, B15, B17, B18, B19 and B20) were obtained by decapitating test
items of the Columbia Mental Maturity Scale, First Edition
(Burgemeister, Blum and Lorge, 1954). The advantage of using
drawings obtained from such a test was that the source drawings had
been standardised for use with young children.
The E sat opposite each S at a child-sized table and presented
the drawings one at a time. The cards upon which the drawings were
mounted were shuffled at the beginning of each session so that the
order varied. The E began as follows:
"Today I am going to show you some pictures (E
gesticulates to the cards he is holding). They are
rather special pictures because they were drawn by
a teddy bear. But do you know what the teddy bear
did? .... - he only drew bits of things in the
pictures, - he didn't really finish the pictures.
What a silly teddy ay! So if I show you the pictures
would you tell me what the teddy started to draw?
Right then. Let's try this one (E shows the child the
first drawing). What do you think the teddy was trying
to draw in this picture?"
This latter question was then repeated with regard to each of the 23
remaining drawings with minor alterations from time to time; for
example, the E might have asked:-
"and this one? ... What was the teddy starting to
draw here?"
Figure 22 Drawings (reduced by half) presented in screening session.
A. Ambiguous figure contextual aids
At the end of the session, the E spoke to each child as follows:
"So those were the teddy's pictures. He was a lazy
teddy wasn't he? Because he didn't finish the
pictures did he? Well, when you come the next
time I'll bring the teddy. And we can then make
sure that the teddy finishes, the pictures. We'll
make sure that he draws the heads- and the bodies.
O.K.? And then we can see if he really can draw
the pictures properly. So, that's what we'll do
the next time."
5.2.2 (b) Results
Table 17 indicates for each of the drawings presented, the per¬
centage of the 85 children making a correct identification.
Included for comparative purposes is the percentage of correct
identifications made by a group of adults for each drawing (see
Appendix G for details concerning the collection of the adult data).
The children proved to be far more knowledgeable as to the type-
identity of the drawings than had been anticipated. The mean number
of correct identifications the children made (out of 24) was 17.85
(range 3-24; median 20). This compares with an adult mean score of
22.7 drawings correctly identified (range 21-24).
It should be noted that in scoring these responses, identifi¬
cations were held to be correct so long as the the correct genus was
cited (or appeared to have been cited). In cases where, for example,
Ss identified a horse part as a 'pony', a dog part as a 'wolf' or an
elephant part as an 'Indian elephant', the responses were scored as
correct. The scoring used in regard to three items merits particular
attention. First, several Ss - children and adults — identified one
of the horse parts as a donkey (this happened both for the horse
head and for the horse body; cf., Figure 22.B.7 and Figure 22.B.17
respectively). This response was scored as correct. Second, with
regard to the duck body (cf. , Figure 22.A.3) the responses 'goose'-
(used by one adult and two children) and 'bird'were scored as
correct whilst the responses 'pigeon' and 'chicken' were scored as
incorrect. Third, in respect of the drawing of a garden (cf.,
Figure 22.A.1, since only very rarely did either adult or child Ss
name it as a 'garden', responses were scored as correct so long as
they indicated that an outdoor scene was portrayed. Details of all
the identifications made by both the adults and the children of the



















































































































































































































































As previously indicated, it was the proposed investigation of
children's ability to spot anomalies that was most dependent upon
the outcome of the screening session. In deciding upon which
anomalous stimuli to present, the first requirement was for animal
parts which a reasonable proportion of the children failed to
identify correctly (cf., Section 5.2.1(a)). It is apparent from the
results obtained that the parts available were the heads of the dog,
elephant, giraffe and pig and the bodies of the cat, cow, dog,
elephant, giraffe and monkey. The requirement of the preferred
design (cf., Section 5.2.1 (a)) was for two monsters which share one
part (either the head or the body) but which differ with regard to
the remaining part such that one monster comprises a more compatible
combination of parts than the other. In addition, the preferred
design requires that each monster be presented to three groups of
subjects; one group knowing the type identity of both parts, the
second group knowing the type identity of one part only (that is,
the part shared by the two monsters) and the third group knowing the
type identity of neither part. In the event, however, the present
results do not make such a design possible. In particular, no
single pair of monsters could be devised which could be presented
both to a reasonable number of subjects who knew the type identity
of none of the component parts and also to a reasonable number of
subjects who knew only the type identity of the part shared by the
two monsters. Instead of presenting a single monster pair it was
therefore decided to present the three monster pairs shown in Figure
24, C (p.188). Each of these monsters was presented to one or two
subject groups as indicated in Figure 23. Thus, the horse monsters
and the camel monsters were each presented to subjects who knew the
type-identity of both of the relevant parts and also to subjects who knew
the type-identity of the shared part only (that is, the horse head
and the camel body respectively) whilst each of the pig monsters was
presented solely to subjects who knew the type-identity of neither
of the relevant parts.
The presentations just described permit nine comparisons to be
made statistically. Four of these comparisons are concerned with
whether subjects who know the type identity of only one part are
less able than subjects who know the types of both parts to recognise
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Figure 23 Subject groups receiving the six critical anomalous
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These subject groups are indicated by ticks. The arrows indicate the
comparisons of interest; these comparisons are discussed in the text below.
the horse-cow, horse-monkey, giraffe-camel and dog-camel monsters
respectively. Of some interest here is whether the performance
differentials between these two knowledge groups are affected by
whether the stimulus parts are compatible or relatively incompatible.
The four pertinent comparisons are indicated by horizontal arrows in
Figure 23. The remaining five comparisons are concerned with whether
the relative compatibility of the parts combined to form each monster
influences the probability of these stimuli being detected as monsters
independently of subjects' knowledge of the type identity of the
component parts. The strength of this effect can be assessed
separately for subjects who know the type identity of both parts,
for subjects who know the type identity of one part only and for
subjects who know the type identity of neither part; these five
comparisons are indicated by vertical arrows in Figure 23. It should
be noticed that because it was decided to control for the subject
groups pertaining to each of the nine comparisons, the number of
(12)
drawings correctly identified on the screening session and the
mean age and age range, it was necessary to have two subject groups
for the majority of the categories of subject group indicated in
It seemed advisable to control for subjects' overaJ1 knowledge
of type-identity because otherwise the comparisons as to whether
knowledge of the type-identity of particular parts affect the like¬
lihood of monsters being detected might have degenerated into
comparisons between subjects who were generally competent at judging
type-identity and subjects who were relatively incompetent at
judging type-identity.
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Figure 23. Full details of the characteristics of each of these
subject groups are given in Appendix H.
It will be apparent that the comparisons which have been cited
in relation to the camel monster pair are precisely the same as
those identified in relation to the horse monster pair. The main
reason for presenting both of these monster pairs was that there is
a considerable similarity between the horse monster pair and the pig
monster pair arising from the cow and the monkey body parts that are
shared by the members of these pairs. The camel monster pair was
therefore included to provide more variety and to decrease the like¬
lihood of the occurrence of order effects; see Section 5.2.3 (c) ii
for details of the measures taken. It should be observed here though
that whereas the shared part in the camel monster pair is the body
part (this part being hypothesised to be the relatively dominant part
in the case of the 'compatible' camel monster - cf., Figure 24, C
(j) p.188), the shared part in the case of the horse and pig monster
pairs respectively is the head part.
One very important consideration is whether adults judge the
relative compatibility of the members of the three monster pairs
selected to be in the direction hypothesised. In this regard it
should be noted that a study conducted with eighteen first-year
psychology students found (cf., Appendix G for details) that these
subjects judged the horse-cow monster to be less bizarre than the horse-
monkey monster (applyingX2 for one sample case, p L 0.001) and the
pig-cow monster to be less bizarre than the pig-monkey monster
(applyingX2 , p £ 0.001). When however, these same subjects were
asked to judge the relative compatibility of the giraffe-camel and
the dog-camel stimuli, they were not found to consider the giraffe-
camel to be less bizarre at a comparably significant level (applying
(13)X2 , p L 0.1 ; approaching 0.05).
It has previously been intimated (cf., Section 5.2.1 (b)) that
the design of the ambiguous figure study was not dependent upon the
outcome of the screening session. The screening session data does
however provide useful information concerning the children's know¬
ledge of the type-identity of the unambiguous contextual aids to be
(13)
N.B. The precise chi-square value obtained was 3.555. The chi
square value indicating a probability of 0.05 (two-tailed test- for
two degrees of freedom) is 3.84.
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presented in the main experimental session. It is evident from Table
17 (p.183) that these contexts are largely identified correctly.
The single exception is that of the rabbit body which was not
generally identified correctly. This finding will prove to be of





Of the 85 children participating in the screening session, 72
(35 of them boys) were presented with monster stimuli and also with
the ambiguous figures. The mean age of the selected group of child¬
ren was 4:3 years (range 3:3 - 5:2).
5.2.3 (b) Materials
As previously noted, the monster drawings which were presented
in this study are illustrated in Figure 24:C. Several other
drawings were presented in association with the monster stimuli.
Specifically, two drawings of transport vehicles (cf., Figure 24:A)
were invariably presented as exemplars and up to five accurate
drawings of different kinds of animal (cf., Figure 24:B) were
presented as distractors. In relation to the drawings illustrated
in Figure 24, it may be observed that neither the head of drawing (c),
nor any of the parts comprising drawings (a), (b), (f) or (g) were presented
in the screening session. Excluding drawing (b), these additional
drawings were each obtained from the Columbia Mental Maturity Scale,
First Edition (Burgemeister, Blum and Lorge, 1954).
The ambiguous figures and the drawings used in connection with
the presentation of these figures have already been both described
and presented (cf., Section 5.3.1 (b) and Figure 21 p .177 respect¬
ively). It should be noted however that the two contextual aids for
each figure were mounted one on top of the other, each on a separate
flap (hinged vertically). The uppermost contexual aid on each card
was covered with a plain white flap.
Individual subjects were not dropped from the study at this
stage on the basis that they failed to identify the rabbit body
correctly, because there was no guarantee that they would, in any
case, be required to be shown the rabbit body.
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Each of the stimuli presented in the study were drawn on a
white card. The E sat opposite each S at a child-sized table
covered with white paper. A teddy bear, seated in an appropriate
sized 'high-chair', was positioned next to the E.
Figure 24 Anomalous drawings and drawings presented in association
with the anomalous drawings (reduced by half).
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5.2.3 (c) Design
5.2.3 (c) i General features
Each S was shown the predesignated anomalous drawings (together
with the associated exemplars and distractors) before the ambiguous
figures were presented. Once selected for the anomaly detection
task, each S automatically participated in the ambiguous figure
study as well. As previously indicated (cf., Section 5.2.2 (c)),
the selection of Ss for the anomalous drawing task was constrained
by the requirement that the Ss selected should permit nine compar¬
isons to be made between groups of Ss with varying knowledge of the
type-identity of the critical monster parts. In addition, it was
required for each of these comparisons (cf., Section 5.2.2 (c)) that
the number and age of Ss and also the number of drawings which they
correctly identified on the screening session,should be controlled.
Each S received the anomaly and ambiguity detection tasks in a
single session. The mean interval between the screening session and
the second session was 21.8 days (range 14 - 27 days).
With regard to the selection of Ss for the anomaly detection
task it should be further noted that the method followed was to use,
for each statistical group, as many of the 85 Ss who were screened
as was possible, up to a limit of 20 Ss per group. Because however,
of the factors controlled for between these groups and also because
of a general shortage of Ss in the relatively unknowledgeable groups
(unknowledgeable that is as to the type-identity of one or both of
the component parts), this limit of 20 Ss was reached only in the
(15)
case of one pair of statistical groups. It should be noted in
relation to the assignment of Ss to the statistical groups in which
Ss were unknowledgeable as to the type-identity of one or both of
the component parts that no S was assigned to such a group if he or
she wrongly identified a pertinent part on the screening test as
belonging to one of the types of animal with which it was to be
combined to form a monster. Such identifications were particularly
The minimum number of Ss in these statistical groups was 9 and
the mean number of Ss in these groups was 14. As previously noted,
full details of all the statistical groups are given in Appendix H.
(16)
marked in the case of the cow body; specifically, 14 Ss wrongly
identified the cow body as the body of a horse on the screening test.
Clearly, an investigation of the effect of knowledge of the type-
identity of the parts combined upon the ability to detect discord¬
ances would have been severely prejudiced if these Ss had been
entered into the type ignorant group for this stimulus. (That is,
because Ss who wrongly identified the cow body as the body of
a horse would be seemingly bound to accept the 'horse-cow' monster
as a valid picture of a horse, such a result would not indicate
anything about the power of a known part to determine the inter¬
pretation of an unknown part.)
Concerning the presentation of the two ambiguous figures, the
order in which these figures were presented was counterbalanced.
Specifically, for the presentation of these figures, the 72 Ss were
subdivided into two groups of 36 Ss and the Ss in each group
received the figures in the reverse order. For both groups, the
mean age was 4:3 years and the mean number of drawings correctly
identified on the screening session was 18. In addition, the age
range, the range in the number of drawings correctly identified on
the screening session and the sex composition of each group was
balanced.^17 ^
The remaining features of the design of the anomaly detection
task are considered in the next section. The remaining design
features of the ambiguity detection task are given in conjunction
with the description of the relevant procedures (cf., Section 5.2.3
(d) ii).
The only other such identifications which occurred were as
follows: one S said the monkey body was a horse's body, three Ss
identified the giraffe head as that of a camel and nine Ss identi¬
fied the pig head as a cow's head. The relatively large number of
Ss who identified the cow body as a horse's body and the pig head
as a cow's head does serve to emphasise just how compatible are the
horse-cow and pig-cow monster combinations.
(17)
Specifically, the group receiving the 'duck and rabbit' figure
first, comprised 17 boys and 19 girls, had a range in the screening
session identification scores of from 8-24 correct identifications
and had an age range of 3:3-5:2 years. The group receiving the
'house-face' figure first comprised 18 boys and 18 girls, had a
range in the screening session identification scores of from 8 to 23
correct identifications and had an age range of 3:4-5:1 years.
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5.2.3 (c) ii Anomaly detection task
The requirement of the task as it was described to the Ss
receiving it was to decide whether drawings constructed (ostensibly)
by the teddy from the heads and the bodies presented on the screening
task had been put together correctly or not. To assist the Ss to
appreciate that they were required to differentiate accurate from
errant drawings, Ss were shown first the two exemplars illustrated
in Figure 24.A. Of these exemplars, the accurately drawn train was
invariably presented first. In those few cases where the car-plane
anomaly was not spotted spontaneously, this error was pointed out.
The rationale for using inanimate rather than animate exemplars was
that Ss would not then be given any indication of the degree of
monstrosity which they might expect. After being presented with the
two exemplars, individual Ss then received anything from two-to-five
of the monsters. Having determined the number of monsters each S
was to receive (this allocation was based upon the groups to which
each S had been assigned - cf., Sections 5.2.2 (c) and 5.2.3 (c) i),
each S received an equivalent number of non-anomalous drawings. To
determine which of the non-anomalous drawings were presented, these
drawings were simply placed in a fixed series (this series was from
drawings (c) to (g) respectively in Figure 24.B) and the required
number of drawings was then selected by starting with the drawings at
the top of the series and ending with the last. (Thus, drawing (c)
was always selected first and drawing (g) last.)
The order in which Ss received the selection of monsters and
non-anomalous drawings which they had been allocated was varied. It
was however contrived that monsters which shared a part in common
were not presented in such an order that they followed each other
directly. By preventing the occurrence of these order sequences it
was considered that the likelihood of gaining independent judgements
for each monster would be maximised.
5.2.3 (d) Procedures
5.2.3 (d) i Anomaly detection task
For each S, the E, holding the appropriate drawings in the
predesignated order (the drawings were not initially visible to the
Ss) began as follows:
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"Well, I said that I was going to bring the teddy-bear
didn't I? - And here he is (E gesticulates in the
direction of the teddy). Now, the last time that you
came I showed you some pictures that the teddy had
made didn't I? And do you remember? - He didn't
finish the pictures did he? - He either drew just the
heads, or he drew just the bodies (E pauses). Well
today, teddy has got some more pictures to show you.
And this time he has drawn the heads and the bodies.
But do you know what? - Sometimes he's put the wrong
heads with the wrong bodies! - he hasn't put the
right bits together! So we're going to look at the
pictures and see which ones teddy has put together in
the right way and which ones teddy has put together
in the wrong way. And if we find one that he's got
wrong would you tell him? So, let's see the first
picture. So what about this one then. Has teddy
put the right bits together or the wrong bits together
- what do you think?"
The E then presented the drawing of the train. If Ss indicated that
they thought the right bits had been combined but failed to say what
they thought it was a picture of, they were asked: "Well what is it
a picture of then?"; all Ss making such a 'right bits' judgement
were then additionally asked:
"How do you know it's a (ie., name given by S)?
Because it's got what ....? Because it's got ?"
If alternatively! Ss indicated that they thought that the wrong parts
had been combined but failed to say what they considered that the parts
were, they were asked to be more specific, for example, a S might
have been asked: "What's he done wrong then ... what are those bits?"
When the questioning relating to the first drawing had been
completed, Ss were presented with the anomalous practice example,
and then with the experimental monsters. For each drawing the
critical question was repeated - that is,
"has teddy put the right bits together or the wrong
bits together - what do you think?"
- and the same justification questions were asked as appropriate.
It has previously been noted (cf., Section 5.2.3 (c) ii) that
only for the two exemplars (cf., Figure 24.A p.188) were Ss given
any assistance if they failed to give correct replies. In relation
to the train drawing, a few Ss did indicate that they thought the
teddy had erred in producing such a drawing (for example, one S
complained that the train wasn't quite on the track); in such cases
it was explained that the offending part was not actually an error
since the teddy had at least put the right bits together. For these
Ss too the relative severity of the error in the car-plane drawing
was stressed when it was presented. Alternatively, a few Ss correctly
accepted the train drawing as non-erroneous but were unable to
provide a satisfactory justification for their acceptance of the
drawing. In such cases, the E gave an appropriate justification as
an illustration; for example:
"You can tell that's a train because it's got train
wheels and look,it's going along a railway track."
In relation to the car-plane exemplar, there were a few Ss who failed
(18)
to notice the anomaly. For these Ss the E would say something
like:
"But look, do you see what the teddy has done? (E
then covers up each part of the drawing alternately.)
He's drawn part of a (E pauses) car (yes that's
right (I-®)) and he's drawn part of an (E pauses) -
(yes part of an) aeroplane and he's put them together.
So those are the wrong bits aren't they? What a
silly teddy!"
5.2.3 (d) ii Ambiguity detection task
When Ss had received all the anomalous or anomaly associated
drawings which they had been allocated, they were given a break of a
few minutes and were then briefed with regard to the presentation of
the ambiguous figures as follows:
"Now there are just two pictures left. But these ones
are rather special pictures. And do you know why they
are special? - they are special because they are magic
pictures. And the magic is that when children look at
the pictures they sometimes see different things. They
look at the picture and they see something but then,
when they're looking at the picture, the picture
changes into something else. And then, while they're
watching, it changes back into what it was before ...
and it keeps on changing ... that's why they're magic
pictures - because they keep on changing.(20) gD
would you like to see one? Now, part of the picture is
Invariably these Ss identified the drawing as that of an aero¬
plane. It should be noted that strictly speaking this drawing is not
anomalous since it is a drawing of a permissible real world object.
As indicated above however, the great majority of Ss readily ident¬
ified this drawing as anomalous.
(19)
N.B. The E included such supportive remarks if a S correctly
identified the part cited.
(20) . . _
This is of course strictly untrue (cf., footnote no. 11 p.176
for comments on this aspect of the procedure).
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covered up but you can see the magic part. So you
look very hard at the picture and tell me exactly
what you see. O.K. there it is."
At this point the E showed each S the first picture - with the
unambiguous contexts concealed - that he or she had been allocated
to receive. The E held on to the figure to ensure that the
unambiguous contexts remained concealed. In all but a single case,
Ss named one of the identities immediately or almost immediately.
The E then asked Ss to identify a single feature of the drawing.
The features used were the windows/eyes in the case of the house-
face figure and the beak/ears in the case of the duck and rabbit
figure. The E simply pointed to the relevant feature and asked:
"What's this bit then?" Once the part had been named, Ss were asked:
"Right, now keep on looking at the picture and see
if you can see anything else. What else could it
be if it isn't a (ie., type name of identi¬
fied identity)?"
Occasionally, a S complained at this stage, - eg., "but it isn't
changing." For these Ss the E replied:
"Well actually the picture doesn't change but you
should be able to see something else there. What
could the picture be if it isn't a (ie.,
type name of identified identity)?"
The E waited until the S either discovered the second identity
in the figure or else started failing to attend the figure (the
children's attention span lasted anything from 1-3 minutes or so
but typically lasted considerably less than 2 minutes). If a S did
spontaneously recognise the ambiguity in the figure, he or she was
then requested to name certain features of the figure, firstly for
the identity most recently discovered and secondly for the identity
originally perceived. These features are shown in Figure 25. Those
Ss who could name all the relevant features correctly plus those Ss
Figure 25 Features of the ambiguous figures which subjects were
asked to identify.
Figures Identities Features
House-Face house windows; door; roof
face eyes; nose; hat
Duck-Rabbit duck beak; direction of gaze
rabbit ears; direction of gaze; nose
who correctly identified all but one feature were scored as having
succeeded in spotting the ambiguity spontaneously and were then
presented with the second ambiguous figure.Those Ss however
who, according to the aforementioned criteria, failed to detect the
ambiguity of the figure spontaneously, were then shown the unambiguous
context which complemented the identity in the figure which had been
least well (or not at all) apprehended. The procedure followed for
these Ss was thus:
"O.K. Well now I'm going to show you the rest of the
picture. Allright? And when I've opened it (that is,
the flap) would you tell me, - has teddy put the
right bits together or has he put the wrong bits
together? (The E then exposed the appropriate context.)
So then, what do you see there? You tell me."
What happened next depended upon the nature of the children's replies.
If a S perceived the two parts (that is, the ambiguous figure and the
unambiguous context) as conflicting then he (or she) was not
questioned any further with regard to the figure. If however, a S
did appear to perceive the parts as being complementary and did
therefore seem to perceive the second identity in the ambiguous
figure, then the extent of his perception of it was determined by
questioning him as to what various features of the drawing were.
This questioning began with certain features of the unambiguous
context (cf., Figure 26) and then progressed to the features of the
a
Occasionally, Ss who were asked to name one or more features for
one identity of an ambiguous figure, named such features in terms of
the other identity represented in the figure. For example, a S may
have identified the house-face figure as a house but then named the
windows as eyes. In such cases, the E waited until all the parts
had been named and then asked a question such as: "So these are eyes
are they? But houses don't have eyes do they? What could these be if
this is a picture of a house?" Alternatively, Ss sometimes identified
a feature in terms of an identity which they had not yet named or
which they could no longer recall. In such cases the E would ask
questions of the following form: "You said those could be eyes didn't
you? So what could this be (E gesticulates to figure) if those are
eyes? ... What could it be a picture of?" The rule in this question¬
ing was not to introduce any information concerning the identities
of the figures or the features of the identities in the figures which
the S had not himself initially pointed out. If, as a consequence of
such questioning, Ss demonstrated that they could recognise the
ambiguities in a figure and identify all or all but one of the
pertinent features correctly when asked, they were scored as having
detected the ambiguity.
Figure 26 Features which subjects identifying fully exposed
drawings as non-anomalous were asked to name in the
unambiguous contexts.
Figures Contexts Features
House-Face garden tree; pond
man feet; arms
Duck-Rabbit duck feet; wings
rabbit tail; legs
relevant ambiguous figure (cf., Figure 25). In this way it was
possible to determine what precisely each S saw and, in particular,
whether Ss had genuinely reversed their perception of the ambiguous
figure or whether rather their identifications were based simply
upon the unambiguous context. Where a S correctly identified the
features of the ambiguous figure in accordance with the identity
complementing the unambiguous context, this context was then
concealed once again and Ss were asked for the last time to state
the identities contained in the ambiguous figure. The questioning
used was of the following kind:
"So then,what is this (E indicates figure) a picture
of? And can you tell me what else it could be. What
could it be if it isn't a (E repeats the
identity named first by the S)?"
If a S failed at this point to name both identities correctly, the
questioning with regard to this figure was discontinued. Where,
however the two component identities were correctly named, Ss were
asked to name the relevant features for each of the two identities
(cf., Figure 25).
Once the procedures relating to the first ambiguous figure had
been completed, Ss were presented with the second ambiguous figure.
Only the critical procedures relating to whether Ss could detect the
ambiguity in the figure spontaneously were repeated in relation to
these presentations.
5.2.4 Analysis of results
5.2.4 (a) Anomaly detection task
Besides reporting the results of the present study with regard
to this task, the current section also reports some revealing results
which were gained by a comparative study which was conducted with
adults; as previously indicated the relevant details of the adult
study are given in Appendix G. The results of both the study
conducted with children and that conducted with adults will be
discussed jointly in Section 5.2.5 (a).
5.2.4 (a) i Detection of anomalies by preschool children
The results of the study conducted with preschool children
relate to two distinct questions (cf., Section 5.2.2 (c)); first,
whether the detection of monsters by children is affected by whether
they know the type-identity of both the component parts rather than
just one of the component parts and second, whether children's
detection of monsters is affected by the relative compatibility of
the parts combined independently of their knowledge of the type-
identity of the component parts. The results pertaining to these
two questions are given in Tables 18 and 19 respectively.
Table 18 Percentage of children detecting monsters who knew the


























N.B. The part known is either the horse head or the camel body.
(2)
These arrows indicate the pertinent comparisons.
Consider first the results shown in Table 18. It is apparent
that whilst, for each of the four monsters, Ss who knew the type-
identity of both parts were indeed more likely to spot the anomaly
than were those Ss who knew the type-identity of only one of the
(21b)As previously indicated, the composition of the subject groups
for each of these sets of comparisons varied because of the factors
controlled for between the subject groups relating to each set of
comparisons (cf., Section 5.2.2 (c)). Consequently, the results
reported in Tables 18 and 19 concerning the horse and camel monsters
respectively strictly pertain only to the relevant set of comparisons.
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component parts, none of these effects are very marked. The strongest
effect occurs in the case of the giraffe-camel monster but this
result does not attain statistical significance (applying%2, p/L0.2).
Consider next the results shown in Table 19. These results
indicate that for each of the three monster pairs, the incompatible
monster is more often recognised to be anomalous than the compatible
monster; this effect persists moreover, whether Ss knew the type-
Table 19 Percentage of children knowing the type-identity of both
parts, one part or neither part who detected the compatible
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neither — — — — 19% <4.6 —> 75%
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The pertinent comparisons are indicated by arrows. The number of
Ss involved in each comparison is given at the centre of each arrow.
identity of both parts or one part only and even persists in the case
where Ss knew the type-identity of neither part. All but one of
these comparisons attains statistical significance. Thus, the horse-
monkey monster is rejected more than the horse-cow monster when Ss
know the type-identity of both parts (applying sign test, p = 0.002)
and when Ss know the type-identity of the horse part only (applying
Fisher's method for sign test plus Fisher's exact probability test,
(22)
p 4lo.01). Similarly, the dog-camel monster is rejected more
than the giraffe-camel monster when Ss know the type-identity of
both parts (applying sign test, p = 0.016) and the pig-monkey
monster is rejected more than the pig-cow monster when the type-
identity of neither part is known (applying Fisher's method for sign
test plus Fisher's exact probability test, p Z.0.05). One comparison
(22)
N.B. Two of the present comparisons involve both a between-
subject component and a within-subject component. Fisher's method
was applied in the case of each of these comparisons. The pertinent
details are given in Appendix H.
does not quite attain comparable statistical significance. Spec¬
ifically, the comparison as to whether the dog-camel monster is
rejected more than the giraffe-camel monster when only the type-
identity of the camel part is known attains a p-value (applying
Fisher's exact probability test) of only 0.138. The results
obtained with regard to the camel monsters do appear, generally, to
be slightly out of line with the results obtained for the other
monsters. In this regard, results have already been noted in
relation to the figures reported in Table 18 which tend to suggest
that the effect of Ss knowing the type-identity of both monster
parts rather than a single monster part upon their ability to detect
monsters is more beneficial (though not significantly so in statis¬
tical terms) in the case of the compatible camel monster than in the
case of the compatible horse monster. Possible explanations as to
why the results involving the camel stimuli are not completely
consistent (or apparently not completely consistent) with the
results obtained for the other stimuli will be discussed below (cf.,
Section 5.2.5 a). In anticipation of the conclusion which will be
reached however, it may be noted at this point that the present
results do indicate that the presentation of the relatively incom¬
patible monsters was of greater significance in determining that
anomalies were spotted than was mere knowledge on the children's
part of the particular type-identities of the parts combined to form
these monsters. This conclusion receives particular support from
the finding (cf., above) that even two groups of comparable subjects
who failed on the screening session to identify correctly the type-
identity of either of the parts combined to form the pig-cow and the
pig-monkey respectively, nevertheless, discriminated the acceptabili'
of these two stimuli in terms of the relative compatibility of the
parts.
The finding that the children tended to respond differentially
to the compatible and the (relatively) incompatible stimuli indep¬
endently of their knowledge of the type-identity of the parts
combined does indicate that, in general, these children did not
centre all their attention upon one of the parts but rather took
into account both of the parts. This observation would seem to hold
not only with regard to the incompatible stimuli (where the finding
that the anomalies were widely spotted obviously indicates that the
children paid attention to both the head and the body parts) but
also in respect of the compatible stimuli since the very finding
that the children widely rejected the incompatible stimuli but
accepted the compatible stimuli (each of which share one part with
one of the incompatible stimuli) does imply that these children were
aware that the parts comprising the compatible stimuli are not so
incompatible as the parts comprising the incompatible stimuli. Some
evidence that the children who erroneously accepted the compatible
monsters did nevertheless take into account the features of both the
head and the body parts may be derived from the answers which these
children gave to the question:
"How do you know it's a (ie., name given by S)?
Because it's got what ...? Because it's got ....?
An analysis of these justification responses is given in Table 20.
Consider first the justifications given when Ss accepted the
horse-cow monster as a bonafide member of the horse family (typically
as a horse but occasionally as a pony or donkey - see the footnote
to Table 20 for details). For this monster (as for the giraffe-
camel monster) the responses of those children who knew the type-
identity of both parts (cf., Table 20; results column one) and the
responses of those children who knew the type-identity of one part
only (cf., Table 20; results column two) seem to be generally
comparable. The most striking feature of these results is the high
proportion of references to the body parts. A majority of children
in each of the knowledge subgroups expressly refer to the body part
or to some of its features; indeed, of the references to specific
parts, the part which overall is most often cited is not a head part
but is rather the tail (which is of course a cow's tail). Now it is
evident that the actual identifications of the horse-cow monster as
a horse must, in most if not all cases, be based upon the identity
of the head part independently of whether or not the head part is
actually referred to. The finding that the body part is so widely
cited by the children in justification of their identifications does
therefore suggest that whilst the identity of the head part is noted
the head part is not attended exclusively. Rather, the evidence
appears to indicate that the children tended to be globalistic in
their approach; that they responded to the drawing in its totality








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































whether the parts appeared to be complementary. The justifications
obtained when the horse-cow monster was accepted as non-erroneous
are not therefore entirely consistent with the traditional views
which emphasise that young children tend, when making identifications,
to centre their attention upon a single, salient part.
The justifications which were given by the children who accepted
the giraffe-camel and the pig-cow monsters respectively as non-
erroneous are not as interesting as the justifications which were
given in relation to the horse-cow monster. Consider first the
parts which were cited to justify having identified the giraffe-
camel monster as a camel (cf., Table 20, results columns three and
four). It is apparent that Ss were strongly inclined to cite the
body parts (and specifically the humps) rather than the head parts;
indeed, in the case of those Ss who knew the type-identity of the
camel part only, every one of them cited the humps as being the sole
basis of their identification. It is not entirely clear as to why
the head parts were cited so rarely. It would seem however to be
the case that the humps are of very considerable prominence relative
to the other parts of the giraffe-camel monster. This prominence
probably derives, at least partially, from the relative immediacy
with which the humps are recognised to be a type-defining value.
Consider next the parts which were cited in justification of accept¬
ing the pig-cow monster (cf., Table 20; results column five). It is
evident from the footnote to Table 20 that the results scored in
relation to this monster comprise Ss who variously identified this
monster as being either a cow, a dog, a fox, a horse or a pig.
Although however, the head and body parts received an equal number
of references, only a minority of individual Ss cited both the head
and the body parts and consequently it is not really possible to
make general deductions from these justifications concerning whether
or not Ss appeared to have attended both head and body parts when
making their identifications. It is, nevertheless, interesting to
observe in relation to these results that four of the children
identified this monstrous stimulus as being a legitimate member of
the type of one of its component parts. Since each of these Ss
failed to identify both of the component parts when they were
presented individually on the screening session, this finding may
therefore imply that children will identify parts more accurately if
they are placed in the context of another part, albeit an erroneous
one, than if they are presented in isolation. Similar insights
occurred in relation to the giraffe-camel monster. Specifically,
two Ss who correctly identified the camel part but not the giraffe
part on the screening session, then identified both parts correctly
when they were presented jointly as the giraffe-camel monster (and
(23)
rejected this stimulus as anomalous ).
Some consideration should finally be given to the justifications
which were given by Ss who rejected the three incompatible monsters.
The justifications offered by those Ss who correctly identified the
type-identity of both the pertinent parts on the screening session
proved to be the least variable. Thus, for the horse-monkey and the
dog-camel monsters respectively, the modal justification response of
such Ss was simply to identify correctly the component parts. This
kind of justification response was overwhelmingly predominant in the
case of the dog-camel but, in the case of the horse-monkey stimulus,
five Ss did identify one of the parts (for four of these Ss this was
the body part) incorrectly.
Consider next the justifications given by those Ss who rejected
the horse-monkey and/or the dog-camel monsters respectively but who
correctly identified the type-identity of only one of the component
parts on the screening session. These children rejected the horse-
monkey monster overwhelmingly on the basis that the body part
(though variously misidentified) was not a horse's body,eg.,-
"Wrong! Look! It's got wrong paws. That's (ie., the
head) a horsie but that's (ie., the body) a tummy of
a tiger."(24)
- but by contrast, rejected the dog-camel monster overwhelmingly on
the basis of correct identifications of both the component parts.
Consider lastly the interesting case of those Ss who rejected
the pig-monkey monster despite failing to identify correctly either
of the component parts on the screening test. The majority of these
Ss failed to name either of the parts - even erroneously. The
comments which these Ss volunteered included the following:
N.B. A third such S identified this stimulus as anomalous on
the grounds that the body was a body of a camel whilst the head was
that of a deer.
(24)
Two Ss did however identify both parts correctly.
- "That looks funny 'cause it's got a funny head. It's a
bad picture. Yes he should draw pictures for the zoo."
- "A silly thing. Wrong bits. Can't remember (that is as
to what the bits are)."
"Wrong bits. I don't know what it is. You tell me?( ! )"
The remaining Ss did identify either or both of the parts but only
in a single case was a part named correctly. The one insight which
did occur concerned a S who named the monster as a pig's head with
a dog's body.
In concluding this section it should finally be noted that
there was no evidence in the results obtained that, in cases where
individual Ss received any of the three monster pairs sharing a
single part (that is, the horse, camel or pig monsters respectively),
the - order in which the members of these pairs were presented had any
systematic effect upon the likelihood of either monster being
rejected.
5.2.4 (a) ii Detection of monstrous anomalies by adults
The results which are summarised in this section were obtained
by a study conducted with eighteen first-year psychology students.
Several results of this study have been cited previously (cf.,
Sections 5.2.1 (a); 5.2.2 (b) and 5.2.2 (c) respectively). The
findings reported in the present section concern the results
obtained when these students were presented with twelve drawings,
one at a time, and asked to decide for each drawing whether the head
and body matched or failed to match. The twelve drawings presented
comprised the six monster drawings presented in the child study (the
results of which have been described in the previous section; cf.,
Figure 24.C (p.188) for reproductions of these drawings) plus six
non-anomalous distractors. Table 21; results column one, indicates
the number of students who correctly identified the monsters as
anomalous. It is apparent from these figures that whilst each of
the three relatively 'incompatible' monsters was detected as
monstrous by most if not all of the students, a similar majority of
the students did not so identify two of the three relatively compat¬
ible monsters. The two monsters in question are the horse-cow and
the pig-cow monsters respectively. Thus whereas the giraffe-camel,
the horse-monkey, the pig-monkey and the dog-camel monsters were
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each more likely than not to be spotted as anomalous (applying yj ,
for one-sample case, p Z0.02; p Z0.01; p Z. 0.001 and p Z-0.001
respectively), the horse-cow and the pig - cow monsters
were just as likely to be detected as they were to remain undetected
(thus, in the case of the pig-cow monster, applying X2 for one-
sample case, p Z 0.8 only). In addition it should be noted that
Table 21 Breakdown of the numbers and characteristics of the adults



















Horse-Cow (compatible) 9 horse 9
Pig-Cow (compatible) 7 cow 6
Giraffe-Camel (compatible) 4 camel 4
Horse-Monkey (incompatible) 0 - -
Pig-Monkey (incompatible) 0 - -
Dog-Camel (incompatible) 3 camel 3
That is, the compatibility status designated to each monster in the
rationale for the study conducted with preschoolers (cf., Section 5.2.2 (c)).
C 2)
N.B. The identifications made by these Ss were, for each monster,
invariable.
although the dog-camel is not any more likely to be detected as
monstrous than is the giraffe-camel, the horse-monkey is more often
detected as being monstrous than is the horse-cow (applying sign
test, p = 0.004) and the pig-monkey is more often detected as being
monstrous than is the pig-cow (applying sign test, p = 0.016). These
findings tend therefore to suggest that the difference in compat¬
ibility between the two camel monsters is less than that which occurs
between the two horse monsters and between the two pig monsters.
Table 21; results column two, indicates, in relation to those
students who failed to detect the monsters as monstrous, what these
students supposed these drawings to portray. It is evident that, in
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each case, the students were unanimous in their identifications.
Interestingly, whilst the horse-cow was unanimously identified as a
horse, the pig-cow was unanimously identified as a cow; since these
two monsters share the same body part, this finding presumably
demonstrates how the relative prominence of a particular part may
vary according to the part with which it is combined.
Table 21; results column three, shows how the students who
failed to spot the anomalies had performed on a task (presented two
weeks previously) in which they had been asked to identify each of
the parts comprising the monsters in isolation. It is evident from
the figures tabulated that in all but a single case, each of these
students had previously identified each of the component parts
correctly.
The relevance of the present findings for the results of the
study concerning the ability of preschool children to detect
anomalies is discussed in Section 5.2.5 (a).
5.2.4 (b) Detection of ambiguities by preschool children
There were three questions of interest concerning preschoolers'
performance with the ambiguous figures. The first question concerns
whether children spot, when unaided, the house—face ambiguity more
readily than the duck—rabbit ambiguity (the house—face ambiguity
being considered likely to be the more obvious because it involves
a' 'frontal' rather than a 'left-right' reversal). : It is apparent
from Table 22 that there were indeed more spontaneous reversals for
the house-face figure than there were for the duck-rabbit figure. ^25^
This difference fails only marginally to attain statistical significance
(applying X*", p \ 0.05 just ^26^).
The second question concerns the extent to which children who do
not spot ambiguities spontaneously are enabled to spot such ambiguities
(25)
Where Ss named a figure as depicting an identity similar but not
equivalent to one of the identifications intended (specifically, the
naming of the face as that of a robot - or even, in one case, as that
of a kangaroo, the identification of a church or tower rather than a
house and the identification of an ostrich, goose or penguin rather
than a duck), these identifications were accepted provided that Ss
identified sufficient features (cf., Section 5.3.2 (d) ii) to be scored
as having reversed spontaneously. In fact however, there were no Ss who,
having named two appropriate identities, failed to name sufficient
features to be scored as spontaneous reversers.
(26)
N.B. The precise chi square value obtained was 3.6.
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Table 22 Numerical breakdown of children's performance on those
figures first received.
A. House-Face Figure
unaided see house only see face only
reversals
13 23 0
- - shown man1s body shown garden
reverse reverse no reverse reverse no
and also but not reversals and also but not reversals
reverse persisting at all reverse persisting at all
when when when when
context context context context
covered covered covered covered




see duck only see rabbit only
5 26 5































8 5 13 5 0 0
by being shown unambiguous contextual aids.
It is evident from Table 22 that
there is a marked skew as to the identities in each figure which
these children first perceived. Specifically, in the case of the
house-face figure, these children unanimously perceived the house
rather than the face (applying X2 , one-sample case, p £ 0.001) whilst
for the duck-rabbit figure,these children were far more likely to
spot the duck than the rabbit (applying X2 » one-sample case,
p L. 0.001). When they were shown the appropriate unambiguous contex¬
tual aid, they generally tended (cf., Table 22) to then reverse their
perception of the ambiguous figure. This tendency is not however
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marked in respect of those children who had, for the duck-rabbit
figure, spontaneously identified the duck only. Additionally it is
apparent that not all of those children whose perception of the
figures was reversed when a context was presented could subsequently
reverse their perception of the figure at will when the context was
covered up. Nevertheless, in the case of those children who spon¬
taneously detected only the house in the house-face figure and also
in the case of those relatively few children who spontaneously
detected only the rabbit in the duck-rabbit figure, the predominant
response was to reverse the identity perceived upon presentation of
the context and then to continue to be able to reverse the ambiguous
figure when the context was re-covered. This response tends to
dominate the other two responses coded in Table 22; thus applying
the binomial test for the children first identifying a house and for
the children first identifying a rabbit, p = 0.002 and p = 0.062
respectively. In relation to those children who spontaneously
detected only the duck in the duck-rabbit figure, the explanation
as to why such a relatively small proportion of children reversed
the identity perceived as a consequence of being shown the unambig¬
uous context would seem likely to derive, at least partially, from
the failure of many of these children to identify the rabbit body
correctly. To begin with, twelve of those children who were presented
with the rabbit body context had failed to identify the type-identity
of this part correctly when it was presented in isolation on the
screening session. Of these twelve children, seven failed to identify
this part correctly when it was presented as a contextual aid and
failed therefore to spot the rabbit portrayed in the duck-rabbit
figure. Furthermore, of the remaining six children who failed to
spot the rabbit identity in the ambiguous figure when the rabbit
context was exposed (and who supposedly knew the type-identity of
the rabbit body), four children identified the rabbit's body as
being that of a squirrel. In sum therefore, eleven of the thirteen
children who failed to spot the rabbit identity in the duck-rabbit
figure when the rabbit context was exposed, failed to identify the
rabbit body context correctly. A second contributor to the greater
effectiveness of the duck than the rabbit contextual aid in promoting
reversals (besides, that is, the difficulty of identifying the rabbit
body) is the relative dominance of the duck identity in the ambiguous
figure itself. This dominance made it easier to assist subjects to
identify the duck than the rabbit.
One additional point is that, of those subjects who failed to rev-
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erse when the contextual aids were exposed (of., Table 22 for details),
the predominant response was to identify the two parts as anomalous
rather than to centre on either part and make a unitary identificat-
(27)
ion; indeed, only one S made such a unitary identification.
At the beginning of this section, reference was made to three
questions which are the focus of interest in relation to the presen¬
tation of the ambiguous figures. So far, only the results pertaining
to the first two of these questions have been reported. The third
question was concerned with whether there is any evidence that the
experience of being shown a contextual aid in association with the
first ambiguous figure presented, facilitates the spontaneous
spotting of the ambiguity in the second ambiguous figure presented.
Table 23 provides a numerical breakdown of the children's perfor¬
mance on each figure as a function of the order in which the figures
were received. It is evident that for each figure, the number of
Table 23 Children's performance on those figures received second
(with the performance on each figure of those children



















21 (13) 14 (23) 1 CO) 8 (5) 24 (26) 4 (5)
children who spot the ambiguity spontaneously is greater when the
figure is received second than when it is received first. Whilst,
however, this effect is only negligible in the case of the duck-
rabbit figure, it is, in the case of the house-face figure much more
pronounced. Even so, in statistical terms, the greater number of
spontaneous reversals occurring for the house-face for the children
who received it second than for the children who received it first,
only just achieves significance (applying X2 , p Z.0.05; one-tailed
(28)test). With regard to the interpretation of this result, it
should be emphasised however that not all of the children who failed
(27)
N.B. This S identified the duck-rabbit figure and rabbit
context as a duck.
(28)
N.B. A one-tailed test is justified here on the basis that it
would have been unreasonable to have assumed that children's ability
to detect ambiguities spontaneously might have deteriorated.
to spontaneously reverse their perception of the figure they received
first were enabled to spot the ambiguity in this figure by being
shown a context. Moreover, so far as the children who received the
house-face figure second was concerned, the number of these children
who had not been enabled to recognise the ambiguity in the first
figure would seem to have been inflated by the difficulty which many
of these children had with identifying the rabbit body (cf., above).
Consequently, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the contexts
probably had a more facilitative effect upon the children's ability
to detect ambiguities than might first appear.
5.2.5 Discussion
The main findings of the present study were firstly that the
great majority of the preschool subjects detected the most bizarre
anomalies and secondly that a considerable proportion of the children
detected the ambiguity in the 'house-face' figure without being given
any assistance with regard to this figure. These findings are of
some significance since it is fairly widely held (cf., Section 5.1)
that young children are not able to detect anomalies and ambiguities.
The present study did however find there to be several constraints
upon preschool children's ability to spot anomalies and ambiguities.
The constraints which were found to be operative in the case of
anomalies and ambiguities are discussed separately below.
5.2.5 (a) Detection of anomalies by preschool children (and
adults)
There was one factor which was found to limit the children's
ability to detect the monstrous stimuli. Specifically, whilst, as
has just been noted, the children reliably detected the monsters
which were the most bizarre, they generally failed, even when they
had previously correctly identified each of the parts combined, to
detect the monsters which were (as indicated by adult ratings) less
bizarre. It should be noted however that although in percentage
terms the three 'incompatible', monsters were each detected much more
often than the respective 'compatible' monsters with which they were
compared (cf., Section 5.2.2 (c) for details concerning these
monster pairs) there was one comparison which failed to gain a level
of statistical significance comparable to the rest. This comparison
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was that for the two camel monsters in the case of those children
who correctly identified the type of the body part only on the
screening session. The most likely explanation for the relatively
low level of statistical significance which this comparison attained
would seem to be that this comparison was made on the basis of a
fewer number of subjects (at least five subjects fewer) than each of
the other comparisons (see Table 19 p.198 for the number of subjects
upon which each of these comparisons was based).
In considering the camel monsters it is noteworthy that the
study conducted with adults yielded two lines of evidence that the
giraffe-camel monster was not as compatible relative to the dog-
camel as the horse-cow and pig-cow monsters were in relation to the
horse-monkey and pig-monkey monsters respectively. The first line
of evidence is that the adults did not identify the dog-camel as
being a monster significantly more often than they identified the
giraffe-camel as being a monster (whereas they did detect each of
the other two 'incompatible' monsters significantly more often than
the respective 'compatible' monsters; cf., Section 3.2.4 (a) ii).
The second line of evidence is that the adults were not as reliable
when rating the giraffe-camel as being a more compatible monster than
the dog-camel as they were when rating the horse-cow and the pig-cow
monsters as being more compatible than the horse-monkey and the pig-
monkey monsters respectively - cf., Section 5.2.2 (c). There was
one other feature of the results pertaining to the camel monsters
which distinguished them from the results obtained for the other
monster pairs. Specifically there was some limited evidence, in the
case of the giraffe-camel monster, that children who had on the
screening session identified the type of both the pertinent parts,
were significantly more likely to recognise the giraffe-camel as
anomalous than were those children who had correctly identified the
type of only the camel part. Now, as just indicated, the results of
the adult study do appear to suggest that the giraffe-camel monster
was not as compatible as the two other 'compatible' monsters. It
therefore seems that whilst knowledge of the type-identity of
both the component parts of a monster was not a powerful influence
in enabling children to spot anomalies when the monsters were over¬
whelmingly compatible (as in the case of the horse-cow and pig-cow
monsters) or else overwhelmingly incompatible (as in the case of the
horse-monkey and pig-monkey monsters), this knowledge did, in some
way facilitate the spotting of a monster of a more intermediary
level of compatibility.
The question arises then as to the implications of the present
findings for the view espoused especially by Vurpillot (cf., Section
5.2.1 (a)) that young children tend, when identifying objects and
representations of objects to focus their attention solely upon
specific characteristic details. It is apparent from the present
results that preschool children are capable of making identifications
which are based upon a much more co-ordinated view of the whole
stimulus than Vurpillot suggests. In this regard it has already
been observed above (cf., Section 5.2.4 (a) i) that although the
present subjects typically failed to spot the most compatible
monsters, the finding that they generally spotted the 'incompatible'
monsters does indicate that they generally took some account of both
the head and the body parts. The analysis of the justifications
which the children gave for their identifications has also shown
this. Nevertheless, although it is clear that the children did
generally take some account of both the head and the body parts
before accepting the most compatible monsters as non-anomalous it
would also seem to be undeniable that in such cases, one of the
parts may be of far greater influence than the other in determining
the identification which is made. For example, in the case of the
horse-cow monster, these identifications were based exclusively upon
the identification of the head part. Since such identifications
were predominant even when the children had correctly identified the
type of each of the component parts presented separately, it can be
legitimately argued that the children must, at some level or other,
have been centering their attention upon the identity of the head
part (that is because otherwise the anomaly would have been detected).
At this point however, the very interesting result obtained when
adults were asked to discriminate the monsters from accurately drawn
animals should be considered. Specifically, a large proportion of
the adult subjects failed to identify what would appear to be the
two most compatible monsters (that is, the horse-cow and the pig-cow)
as anomalous despite having correctly identified the component parts
separately. This finding is very important because it indicates
that whilst children may not detect the most compatible monsters it
is also the case that a large proportion of adults do not detect
(29)
them either. Thus whilst children may sometimes base their
identifications predominantly upon the basis of a single part rather
than both parts, adults may do the same. Both adults and children
then apparently allow some of their identifications to be determined
by salient features which are generally supported by other features
in the stimulus. It should be emphasised, though, that the propor¬
tions of adults who detected the compatible monsters were higher
than the comparable proportions of the child subjects. The relative
superiority of the adults' performance presumably derives both from
their being rather more adept at looking systematically for head-
body anomalies and from the greater consolidation of their knowledge
of the type-identity of the pertinent animal parts. It nevertheless
remains that there were considerable qualitative similarities between
the abilities of the adult and preschool subjects to detect the
'compatible' (and even more so the 'incompatible') .monsters.
One critical issue raised by the present results concerns the
basis - given that it appears not to have been knowledge of the
type-identity of the parts combined - upon which the preschool
subjects responded differentially to the compatible and the incom¬
patible monsters respectively. One possibility which would seem to
be quite viable is that the children's judgements were based on some
understanding which they possessed of the sort of parts which may
and which may not co-occur in 'real world' animals. In other words,
the children's responses may have been based, at least in part, upon
knowledge of the relevant taxonomy at levels of abstraction higher
than that of type. The appropriateness of this explanation is most
clear in the case of the acceptance of the compatible monsters as
non-anomalous. For these monsters it is apparent that relatively
high level knowledge does have the potential to override the know¬
ledge of the type-identity of the parts which subjects may possess
and to lead thereby to failure to spot the anomalies. This would
then appear to be an instance were gestalt effects are operative in
the identification of representational materials. For example, in
It should be stressed in this regard that since the adults were,
like the children, warned about the possibility of anomalies, it
would seem to be unreasonable to assume that these discordances were
merely tolerated.
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the case of the horse-cow monster, subjects might note the highly
definitive head part, notice also that the body part is basically
consistent with what they know that a horse's body should look like,
and then identify the drawing as one of a horse.
Consider next the case of the widespread rejection of the incom¬
patible monsters. It is evident that the identification of these
stimuli as monstrous is not necessarily dependent upon a knowledge
of the particular types of both or one of the parts combined;
specifically, a certain amount of superordinate level knowledge of
the relevant taxonomies is sufficient to determine that these
monsters are anomalous. For example, a subject would require only
to know, in order to identify the horse-monkey as a monster, that
animals with hands must also necessarily possess a (primate) face.
It should however be emphasised that in the case of those preschool
subjects who correctly identified the type of both the pertinent
parts and even in the case of those subjects who correctly identified
just one of these parts, the recognition that the incompatible
monsters were anomalous was (as suggested by the justifications which
these subjects gave) probably not generally based exclusively upon
superordinate knowledge but rather based, at least partly, upon type-
level knowledge. (Several preschool subjects for example, identified
the horse-monkey as monstrous on the basis that the bodies of horses
do not have 'claws'.) The argument that subjects did use their
superordinate knowledge of animal taxonomies to reject the incompat¬
ible monsters therefore derives most support from the widespread
rejection of the pig-monkey monster by preschool subjects who failed
on the screening session to correctly identify the type of either of
the component parts.
Something should next be said with regard to the significance
of the superordinate knowledge which, it has been suggested, was
used by the preschoolers participating in the present study. This
knowledge would appear to involve some awareness of the abstract
concept of possibility. Donaldson (1976) accords special significance
N.B. In the case of the pig-cow monster, the preschool subjects
who considered that it was non-anomalous were by no means 'agreed'
as to what it was; interestingly however, those adult subjects who
failed to identify this stimulus as anomalous consistently identified
it as being a cow.
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to this concept. Specifically, she notes:
"Among the abstract concepts the notion of possibility
is of rather special importance. For consideration
of possibilities and making decisions about whether
two world states can possibly both occur - that is,
whether they are compatible or incompatible with one
another - are at the root of inferential thinking.
And it is one of the distinguishing characteristics
of the human intellect that it is a system capable of
inference. We conceive of the world as a place where,
given certain information, we can be sure of other
things of which we have no immediate knowledge,
things which we have not verified in any direct way
(Donaldson, 1976 p. 278)."
Consider then the present finding that whereas the children who knew
the type of neither the pig's head nor the cow's body generally
failed to identify the pig-cow as anomalous, the children who knew
the type of neither the pig's head nor the monkey's body nevertheless
generally identified the pig-monkey as anomalous. This finding
suggests that children as young as four-years or so can make certain
deductions from the knowledge of animal types which they do possess
about the kinds of animal which are ecologically permissible. It
should be emphasised that these deductions may be more intuitive
than deliberated; what is clear however is that the acceptability
of the pig-cow relative to the pig-monkey so far as the children
were concerned was consistent with the considered judgements made by
adult subjects concerning the relative oddity of these two monsters.
The present results do suggest that young children possess some
knowledge of the visual appearance of animals at multiple levels of
abstraction; this implies in turn that children have some under¬
standing of the hierarchical nature of the pertinent classificatory
structures. This is significant because it has previously been
noted (cf., Section 1.3) that the evidence that children possess
superordinate level knowledge is fairly limited.
The present suggestion that children possess some superordinate
level knowledge concerning legitimate types of animal is in some
ways consistent with the view of Rosch and her colleagues (cf.,
Section 1.3) that young children are responsive to real world
correlational structure. It should be emphasised however that Rosch
considers the correlational structure she describes to be focused at
her 'basic' (or the present 'type') level of abstraction and also
stresses (eg., 1977) that young children probably do not have well
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formulated superordinate level concepts; whereas by contrast, the
present study would appear to indicate that young children possess
some knowledge of correlational structure which is not limited to
the basic level.
The final topic which should be given some consideration here
is whether the present results have any implications with regard to
the manner in which young children go about identifying objects and
representations of objects. In particular, the strong suggestion in
(31)
the present findings that, of the compatible monsters, the horse-
cow monster was the least often detected and the giraffe-camel
the most often detected, is consistent with the hypothesis that
children, when making identifications of animals do, although they
attend all the parts, pay particular attention to the heads. Thus
it may be that the horse-cow is not so often recognised as anomalous
because subjects, having identified the very type-distinctive head, do
not check up on the identity of the body part with very great care.
Alternatively however, in the case of the giraffe-camel, the body
part, atypically, has a very type distinctive feature (that is the
humps) which is salient for young children; the head part neverthe¬
less appears to receive a fairly detailed examination by some of the
children and, because this head (as most other heads) is fairly type
distinctive, the anomaly is thereby spotted. It is interesting to
note, in relation to these considerations, that observers of
children's spontaneous drawings of mammals (including people) have
commented that children tend to begin by drawing the head part and
then progress to drawing the body parts (eg., Goodnow, 1977; Sully,
1896).(32)
N.B. This finding was not clear-cut because strictly speaking
the statistical groups (cf. , Section 5.2.2 (c)) do not permit such a
comparison.
(32)
Nevertheless, one puzzling feature of these two accounts is
that they include reproductions of monster drawings. Apparently
such drawings occur spontaneously in development. Sully comments
explicitly on the appearance of these drawings (the bulk of those he
reproduces combine human parts with those of other animals but he
includes - as does Goodnow - non-human monstrous combinations) and
attributes the appearance of these drawings to force of habit; thus
in Sully's view, the production of such drawings indicates that
manual reproduction is far behind visual imagination.
It is evident that many structurally compatible mammalian
monsters can be produced by combining a distinctive head with a body
which is - in prototypical terms - broadly satisfactory but which is
in fact actually type-discordant. The present findings clearly
suggest that children (and also a large proportion of adults) would
not spontaneously recognise such stimuli as being anomalous. It is
worth reiterating that in the present studies both child and adult
subjects; were given a warning as to the possibility of the presented
stimuli being monstrous; consequently, it would seem reasonable to
suppose that, so far as everyday identifications are concerned -
where stimuli are not expected to be anomalous - neither children
nor adults will generally notice minor anomalies spontaneously.
In conclusion, the present study has demonstrated that the
ability of preschool children to detect anomalies compares quite
favourably with that of adults. It should be recognised that the
current study presented several anomalies which were grosser than
many of the anomalies presented by Vurpillot (1962). Nevertheless,
the findings reported are not consistent with the view that young
children necessarily identify objects (or representations of objects)
on the basis, exclusively of single attributes; rather it is apparent
(33that children take a co-ordinated view of the whole of a stimulus.
Concerning possible future studies, further investigation of children'
knowledge of different kinds of the more incompatible anomalies may
potentially be very revealing. In addition to following up, in more
detail, children's knowledge of various structural incompatibilities
there remain at least two further kinds of incompatibility which
could be usefully investigated; these are firstly that based upon
postural incompatibility (cf., Figure 19 p.168) and secondly that
It is noteworthy in this regard that several children actually
had insights into the type-identity of particular parts when these
parts were presented in the context of a discordant part. This is
precisely the opposite finding to that which conventional wisdom
might have anticipated since it is customarily held that young
children will fail to spot an anomaly because their attention is
centred on a particular part. By contrast however, the present
findings suggest that children's ability to co-ordinate the elements
in these stimuli is such that, in certain cases at least, children
are enabled to identify parts by viewing them within the context of
a discordant part.
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based upon disproportionately sized parts (cf., Figure A; Appendix
G).<34'
5.2.5 (b) Detection of ambiguities by preschool children
There were three main findings. Firstly, with regard to those
figures received first, the children found it easier to spontaneously
detect the ambiguity in the 'house-face' figure than the ambiguity in
the 'duck and rabbit' figure. 36 per cent of the relevant children
spotted the ambiguity in the house-face figure spontaneously. It should
be noted however that contrary to expectations, the two component
identities in each of the figures were found not to be equi-
discriminable.
The second major finding concerned how subjects responded when,
having failed to spot spontaneously the ambiguity in the figure
first received,they were then shown a contextual aid complementary
to the perceptual organisation of the figure which they had failed
to perceive. Overwhelmingly, the response of such subjects - when
they were familiar with the type of the identity portrayed by the
contextual aid - was to reorganise their perception of the ambiguous
figure and to identify each figure feature as being complementary to
the contextual aid. Moreover, the great majority of these children
were then able, when the unambiguous aid was re-covered, to reorgan¬
ise their perception of the ambiguous figure at will (or else with
only minimal assistance - cf., footnote no. 21a p.195).
The third and final set of findings relate to whether there was
any evidence that the children were more likely to spontaneously
spot the ambiguity in the figure received second than in the figure
received first. Unexpectedly, although subjects were, for each
figure, more likely to spot the ambiguity when the figure was
received second than when it was received first, this effect was
only significant (in statistical terms) when the potential practice
transfer was from the 'duck and rabbit' figure to the 'house-face'
figure. Specifically, 58 per cent of the children who received the
'house-face' figure second, spotted the ambiguity spontaneously.
It should be noted in regard to this figure that the adult
subjects in the study reported in this Appendix, unanimously rated
the proportionately sized monster (that of a sheep-pig) as less
bizarre than a disproportionately sized monster (that of a sheep-
elephant ) .
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It follows from these results that a fairly large proportion of
preschool age children will spontaneously spot ambiguities if they
are given suitable figures and that an even larger proportion of
such children will spot ambiguities spontaneously if appropriate
practice has been gained. These then are the main constraints
upon performance which have been identified in the present study.
It should be stressed however, that it remains unclear at present
what precisely makes an ambiguous figure a 'suitable' figure for
presenting to children. In this regard it may be of some signif¬
icance that whereas the ambiguity in the 'duck and rabbit' figure
involves a left-right reversal, the 'house-face' figure ambiguity is
a straightforward 'frontal' reversal. Thus, it may be that specific
left-right reversal practice is required before large proportions of
young children will be able to spot left-right ambiguities spontan¬
eously. The use of colour in the 'house-face' figure may also have
been a facilitative feature. More generally, the information which
was given to the children concerning the 'magical' nature of the
figures may also have been instrumental in facilitating performance.
Additionally, as Elkind and his colleagues have shown, (cf., Section
5.2.1 (b)), the more each of the component identities is articulated,
the more apparent is the ambiguity. It would seem therefore to be
likely that an investigation of the factors which assist children to
spot ambiguities spontaneously will elicit even greater proportions
of successful spontaneous reversals than that obtained in the present
study. In particular perhaps, it would be interesting to conduct
some (relatively elaborate) training studies based on the present
practice techniques and showing subjects a whole series of figures
rather than just a pair of figures.
One particular limitation of the current study is that the two
interpretations of the figures used were not equally salient, which
(35)
seems to have made the children less likely to see the ambiguities.
Despite this limitation however, it is apparent that the present
results do confirm that preschool children have a propensity for
spotting ambiguities in representational figures that has not been
(25)
N.B. It was particularly surprising that the 'duck and rabbit'
figure was not found to be equi-ambiguous since Fisher (1968) reports
of the precise figure used that it is equi-ambiguous. Presumably
however, Fisher's report is based exclusively upon adult data.
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detected in previous studies. Particularly significant is that 58
per cent of the children who received the house-face figure second,
spotted the ambiguity spontaneously. This percentage - obtained
(36)
from a group of children with a mean age of 4:3 years - is
considerably in excess of the negligible-to-zero proportion of
spontaneous reversals gained by Elkind and Scott (1962) with children
of comparable age. The present results suggest that conclusions of
the kind made by Vurpillot (1976 a) from Elkind's studies with
composite figures - namely that,
"It is this double role of a single unit that children
appear to be incapable of appreciating before the age
of about 7 years (p.147)"
- are premature.
It remains finally, to comment on the present finding that the
exposure of the unambiguous contextual aids did lead so often to
subjects reversing their perception of the adjacent ambiguous figure.
It was noted above (cf., Section 5.2.1 (b)) that the response of
subjects to these contextual aids would constitute an interesting
question in its own right. In the event, the results obtained
clearly support the conclusions reached above in relation to the
findings gained with the monster stimuli (cf., Section 5.2.5 (a))
that young children can attend and co-ordinate disparate parts of a
picture when making an identification. In particular, the present
results confirm that children prefer to organise drawings wholisti-
cally rather than as disparate parts. Thus, whilst, in the case of
the compatible monsters the children (and often the adults) made
wholistic identifications as a consequence of assimilating a fairly
type-neutral part to a strongly type-defining part, in the case of
the ambiguous figures with an unambiguous (and initially conflicting)
part adjacent, the children made wholistic identifications by
changing their perceptual organisation of the ambiguous part. The
preference which subjects evidenced for organising drawings wholis-
tically surely confirms that preschool children possess considerable
abilities with regard to the co-ordination of perceptual cues and
indicates, once again, that children's identifications are based upon
an integrated view of the component parts rather than (as tends to be
assumed by Vurpillot and her associates) upon single parts only.
(36)
N.B. The mean age of those of these children who spontaneously
spotted the ambiguity in the 'house-face' figure was 4:5 years.
CHAPTER SIX: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
"A three-year old child sees a painted landscape with a
boat in it, and says: "It's summer now!" even though
it is really a winter scene that is represented. The
boat is an individual moment in the childlike exper¬
ience, and immediately determines the meaning of the
entire picture." Heinz Werner, 1948 (p. 238).
At the heart of classical Piagetian theory is the idea that the
perceptions and thoughts of young children are characterised by a
profound inflexibility. Operational inflexibility is attributed in
particular to preschool children's lack of the mental operation of
reversibility and is said to result in a tendency to centre upon
single, salient sources of information rather than a tendency to co¬
ordinate information from a variety of sources. This lack of co-
ordinative ability is said to result in poor performance on both
logical problems and perceptual problems involving quantitative
comparisons. Recently, (Elkind, 1975; Vurpillot, 1976 a), Piaget's
notion of centring has been invoked - though rather more explicitly
be Elkind than by Vurpillot - to explain the poor performance of
young children on a variety of tasks involving the identification or
comparison of representational materials. As indicated previously
(cf., Section 1.2) it is not entirely clear that Piaget would have
explained young children's poor performance with representational
materials in terms of the notion of centring; nevertheless, it is
clear from Werner's comments (quoted under the chapter heading
above) that such an explanation of this performance is, in many ways,
a traditional kind of approach.^^^
In Chapter One it was argued (cf., Section 1.2) that many of
the studies which have been taken to support this traditional view
are characterised by quite severe limitations and that consequently,
young children may in fact be better able to co-ordinate perceptual
cues than has previously been supposed. The first level therefore
at which the present series of studies attain significance concerns
whether the resultant findings provide any support for the propos-
Indeed, it should be noted in this respect that Werner's comments
are based upon an observation by Lombrosso.
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ition that young children's co-ordinative skills in relation to
representational materials have, in the past, been underestimated.
And, as has been observed repeatedly in the experimental chapters,
the present results do not appear - in general terms - to be very
consistent with the conclusions reached by Elkind and Vurpillot. In
addition, however, the present studies yield a considerable amount
of information about how young children recognise and categorise
representational materials in a variety of circumstances. In the
next four sections the most important of all the present findings
will be reviewed and discussed. These findings are grouped in terms
of the four subject areas outlined in Section 1.1.
6.1 Preschool children's judgements of correspondence between
objects and pictures
The judgements which will be considered in this section are
those which were made in circumstances where children were indicating
what they considered to be satisfactory pictures (or the most satis¬
factory pictures) of objects. This section is not therefore concerned
with the results obtained when model objects were presented in type-
same sets (see Section 1.4.4 for a discussion of this distinction).
The first finding was that when, for specific object models, a
straightforward choice was given between a shape-only discordant, a
colour-only discordant and an absolute concordant, preschool children
typically preferred the absolute concordant. This preference was
maintained whether the model object was physically presented or
whether it was verbally described (cf., Section 2.2). This finding
is significant because it indicates that young children are capable
of co-ordinating more than one dimension of correspondence at a time.
This finding also acquires significance, though, in relation to a
second set of findings. Specifically, although preschoolers
preferred the absolute correspondents they did not necessarily
require these correspondents; rather they were willing, in certain
circumstances, to accept pictures that failed to match the model
with regard either to shape or to colour or even that failed to match the model
with regard to both shape and colour. Most importantly however,
this tolerance of erroneous pictures (tolerance that is, because,
generally speaking the children were seemingly aware of the
discordances which they permitted) was found to be highly system-
atised. Thus, the children almost always rejected those pictures
which portrayed a different type of object to the type of the model.
Additionally, however, whilst when objects were physically presented,
preschoolers did not generally reject pictures which were discordant
with regard to a type-modifying value, they did often reject such
modifier-discordants when the model objects were not physically
(2)
presented but were instead described. Significantly, these
results (which were obtained by Studies One and Two; cf., especially
Section 2.3.3), were each found to occur independently of shape or
colour correspondence per se. The results therefore disconfirm the
widespread view (cf., Section 1.3) that young children tend always
to pay more attention to shape correspondence than to colour corres¬
pondence. Nevertheless, although children do not necessarily pay
more attention to shape correspondence than to colour correspondence
it would seem to be almost undeniable that because shape changes
will result, far more often than colour changes, in pictures becoming
ambiguous or misleading as to type, there will be an effective
attentional bias towards shapes relative to colours. The present
argument is however that the generally greater attention paid to
shape does not arise from any intrinsic attraction which children
have for shape correspondence relative to colour correspondence.
These findings would seem to constitute strong evidence of
young children's ability to co-ordinate their perception of shape
and colour correspondences. It is unclear however to what extent
children's correspondence judgements were based upon deliberated
strategies. Thus, in the first place it is evident that generally
speaking, young children do, at least for the relatively gross
bases of correspondence manipulated, exercise a preference for a
correspondence relation which is based upon logical identity. This
is significant in view of the emphasis placed by Vurpillot upon
young children's inability (as she: supposes) to consistently judge
logical identity accurately (cf., Section 1.2). It is possible
however, that those subjects who in the pertinent study exhibited a
preference for correspondence relationships based upon logical
identity based their judgements more upon a process of straight-
This effect did not however persist at a significant level.when
modifiers accompanied the physical presentation of the objects.
forward perceptual matching than upon a conscious appreciation of
the necessity for identity in representational pictures of objects.
The results of the present correspondence requirements tasks may (by
comparison with the results of the correspondence preference tasks)
be rather more indicative of deliberated strategies. Specifically,
these findings showed that although children do evidence a certain
willingness to centre on single dimensions of correspondence, the
patterns of 'centring' displayed are flexible and tend to be ordered
systematically according to the type-concordance of the picture and,
to some extent also, according to the modifiers which are given.
Because of the flexibility in the dimensions which are 'centred upon'
and because also, the correspondences which the children required
were often less than those which, in comparable circumstances they
preferred, the children's performance on correspondence requirement
tasks does tend to suggest that many of them were - at some level or
other - following a chosen rather than an involuntary mode of
operating. In particular it would seem to be likely that in the
case of the type-based correspondence requirements which were made
when objects were physically presented, the children were systematic¬
ally following some kind of cognitive rule; even so however, it is
not certain that children were following such a rule consciously.
Consider next the results obtained when children were offered a
restricted choice between a shape-only discordant and a colour-only
discordant - for specific object models. It was found that preschool
children tend to opt for the picture corresponding with regard to
the type-defining value rather than the picture corresponding with
regard to the type-modifying value. This effect was most pronounced
when objects were merely physically presented but in the case of
shape-type object models, it also persisted both when additionally,
the models were described at the level of the noun phrase and when
they were so described in the absence of the objects. In the case
of colour-type object models however, the children did not generally
opt for the type-defining value concordants when modifiers were given
(cf., Section 4.3.3 for details). These findings confirm the
conclusion reached in relation to the results of the correspondence
requirements tasks that young children do indeed attach great
importance to the type names by which objects are commonly called;
but they also illustrate the responsiveness of young children to the
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giving of relevant modifiers.
The last set of results to be summarised in the present section
largely concerns preschool children's performance when they were
required to identify anomalous figure-line drawings with no specific
referents as anomalous. The children generally detected the most
bizarre (type) anomalies (as would be expected on the basis of the
previously obtained results) but they did not detect the least
bizarre anomalies (cf., Section 5.2.4 (a) i). Very interestingly,
however, significant numbers of adults also failed to detect the
least bizarre anomalies, (cf., Section 5.2.4 (a) ii). These findings
are of particular importance because the great majority of the
drawings and pictures which children identify in the course of their
everyday experiences have no specific referents and may therefore
only be recognised to be incongruous at the type level of abstraction
(3)
and on the basis of internalised type knowledge. Specifically,
these findings seem to suggest that children do not pay very close
attention to certain less distinctive features of the depicted
objects (as for example, in the case of the body of a horse). This
finding does in some way accord with the position of Vurpillot that
children tend to focus their attention on certain salient features of
objects. Very significant therefore is the finding that adults
often focus their attention in a similar way. Taken together, these
findings indicate (not surprisingly perhaps) that children and often
adults interpret pictures wholistically; that is, they come to
pictures expecting, reasonably enough, to make positive identifica¬
tions and in making such identifications they often fail to notice
minor type discordances. Most importantly however, the finding that
the most bizarre monsters are rejected suggests (cf., Section 5.2.4
(a) i) that in actuality, neither the identifications of adults nor
children were based upon consideration of just one part alone. Thus,
even when the identifications were based primarily upon one of the
parts, subjects' attention was not centred exclusively upon this
part. In considering the relevance of these findings for children's
everyday identification of pictures it should be noted that because
Clearly however there are exceptions, for instance, family photo¬
graphs (eg., of people, pets and possessions) which typically have
specific referents with which children are familiar.
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the subjects in the present study were warned as to the possibility
of the occurrence of anomalies it may well be that more subjects
would fail to notice the more bizarre anomalies if no warning were
to be given. How children and adults respectively would perform on
such a task poses an interesting question for further research.
Evidently, however, it is the case that drawings with a type-defining
feature and reasonably compatible parts are not given the scrutiny
which subjects' knowledge of the identity of the component parts
would permit.
Consider now some more general implications of the findings
reviewed in this section. To begin with, it is noteworthy that
children consistently accepted pictures which were anomalous as to
type so long as these pictures remained unambiguous as to type.
This is evident both from the results of Study Seven (which showed
that children fail to notice the most minor type discordances; for
example, a bull's body was almost universally assimilated to a
horse's head) and from the results of Studies One and Two (where
many children would seem to have been aware that they were accepting
type-discordants; for example, a blue giraffe). It was noted in
Section 2.3.3 that the correspondence requirements made by the
children participating in Studies One and Two were eminently reason¬
able in informational terms since they permitted all the objects to
be satisfactorily distinguished. The results obtained by Study Six
cast some doubt however upon the likelihood that the subjects part¬
icipating in Studies One and Two accepted non-misleading type-
discordants solely because they were informationally sufficient for
the task in hand. Specifically, Study Six found that children's
correspondence preferences for objects occurring in type-same sets
did not generally reflect systematically the task requirement of
differentially coding the objects when no modifiers were given (cf.,
(4)
Section 6.3 for a discussion of this finding). It therefore
appears to be quite likely that the widespread acceptances of non-
misleading type discordants (such as blue giraffes) arises, at least
in part, because such 'pictures' are in someway regarded as satis¬
factory (though albeit not the most desirable) pictorial represent-
_
N.B. The finding that the giving of modifiers influences subjects'
correspondence requirements (cf., Section 2.2.3) also suggests that
children's correspondence requirements were not solely a function of
the informational requirement to differentiate the objects.
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ations. Young children may not therefore have strong expectations
that pictures of objects should correspond very closely - in visual-
perceptual terms - to the objects which they portray. Donaldson
(personal communication, 1983) has suggested that young children may
actually have only a vague idea of the distinction between pictures
and written symbols and that this lack of differentiation may lead
them to suppose that symbolic-like representations of objects (such
as that of a blue giraffe or, for a blue round candle, a purple
tapered candle) constitute valid pictures of those objects. One
interesting line of evidence which Donaldson cites (Donaldson, In
Press), concerns reports that young children may be uncertain
whether adults read the words or the pictures when a story is being
read to them. As Donaldson observes, it is precisely this kind of
evidence which led Reid (1966) to the conclusion that young children
actually have to learn the difference between pictures and written
symbols. Donaldson also cites some recent work by Ferreiro (1978)
(5)
who has come to a similar conclusion on the basis of findings
indicating that many young children pass through a 'stage' in which
they expect that the only components of a spoken utterance which are
represented in a transcription of that utterance are the (concrete)
nouns. Interestingly, Clay (1979) has devised a 'Concepts about
Print Test' in which she has incorporated a test item relating to
whether children are aware that the message of a story is carried
by the print and not by the pictures. Significantly, Clay (op.cit.)
reports standardised data indicating that the proportion of
'average European children' succeeding on this item does not exceed
/ g \
fifty per cent until five years of age.
The present suggestion is then that young children generally
construe the essential relation between objects and pictures of
(7)those objects more in symbolic than in figurative terms.
(5)
Ferreiro considers (cf., Ferreiro, 1978) that four-year olds do
make some distinction between drawings and writing but, she suggests,
the dividing line between these two modes of graphic representation
is, for such children, rather nebulous.
( 0 )
N.B. The test question is as follows: "I'll read you this story.
You help me. Show me where to start reading. Where do I begin to
read?" Children who indicate the print are scored as correct whilst
children who indicate the picture are scored as incorrect.
(7)
That is, in quite arbitrary terms.
228
Interestingly, Sully reached this conclusion many years ago. Thus,
in commenting on children's drawings he observes:
"The child is content with a schematic treatment which
involves an appreciable and even considerable depart¬
ure from truthful representation.... the little artist
is still much more of a symbolist than a naturalist
(Sully, 1896 p. 383, 390)."
It is indeed well known that young children will accept very sketchy
outlines as drawings of all manner of things; thus, for example,
children may variously identify two irregular shapes and a few
scribbled lines as a car or as a train and so on. The identification
of such drawings tends of course to be very idiosyncratic. In the
present studies however, young children's judgements of object-
picture correspondence gave evidence of a considerable uniformity of
opinion with regard to the acceptability of certain, quite symbolic
correspondence relationships.
The preceding considerations suggest then that young children
may possess a significant facility for learning to use quite arbit¬
rary written symbols. It does seem likely though that as, with the
course of development, the propensity of the young child for what
may, in the very broadest terms, be called symbolisation becomes
channelled into the acquisition of public written symbols, so there
will be a corresponding decline in the general willingness with
which the more individualistic pictorial representations of objects
are accepted as pictures. (Until, that is, the much later development,
if it occurs, of a readiness to accept abstract art forms.) Never¬
theless, it seems likely that some willingness to use publically
unambiguous symbolic drawings as pictures of objects persists
throughout childhood. In this regard it would seem to be evident
from the results reported by Barrett and Light (1976 - cf., Section
2.1) that the drawings of specific objects made by children in early-
to-middle childhood are often much more publically symbolic in
character than those produced by younger children. Deregowski (1977),
citing Barrett and Light's study, raises the possibility (cf., also
Cameron, 1938) that the use of such symbolic drawings may persist
even in the case of sophisticated adults.
Although the present results do suggest that young children may
not necessarily expect pictures to correspond very closely to their
referents it would seem to be likely that children will only be
inclined to accept the more symbolic relationships between objects
and pictures in certain circumstances. Thus, to take the most
blatant kind of case, it seems highly unlikely for example, that
preschool children of European ancestry would be generally willing
to accept a drawing of a South East Asian man or woman as a picture
of their mother or father respectively. Support for this prediction
may be derived from the proposal by Piaget (1968 a) that children
develop an early appreciation of qualitative identity relationships
which is based upon the dissociation of invariant from variant
properties. It may be of course that such individual identity
relationships are in a league of their own so far as children's
object-picture correspondence requirements are concerned; however,
it is possible that besides failing to tolerate symbolic object-
picture relationships at the level of individual identity for
personally known and distinguishable referents, children will also
not tolerate the occurrence of symbolic object-picture relationships
in other circumstances. One such possibility is that children's
correspondence requirements (and preferences) may vary systematically
according to the function which the picture is to serve. Thus,
whereas children may consider for instance, that free drawings or
pictures serving a coding function or pictures in cartoons may each
be symbolic in character, the same children may not be so inclined
to accept symbolic 'pictures' as, for example, illustrations in a
nature book. It might also be interesting to examine at what age
children become more intolerant of discordances between picture and
referent when pictures occur in photographic rather than more
informal graphic representational media.
Something should be said concerning the degree to which
children's correspondence requirements were found, in the present
studies, to be influenced by the giving of relevant modifiers. In
particular, the finding that children were generally very responsive
to modifiers when these modifiers were not accompanied by a physical
presentation of the object referents has some implications for the
kind of correspondence relations which young children like best
between the text (which is read to them) and the pictorial illus¬
trations in their picture books. The present results suggest that
children desire such correspondences to be as close as possible and
that whilst they will generally tolerate type-discordances so long
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as the portrayed identity remains unambiguous as to type, they will
not be so willing to tolerate dimensional values which are in
conflict with a relevant modifier which is given.
It has previously been observed (cf., Section 2.3.3) that the
results of the correspondence requirements tasks are consistent with
Luria's (1961) description of the development of verbal controls on
behaviour. This account of Luria has been modified by Flavell (1977)
who has suggested that the substantial growth of self-control which
occurs in early childhood should not be attributed exclusively (or
perhaps even primarily) to the influence of verbal factors. It is
significant however that Flavell does consider that the ability to
reflect on the meaning of language is a crucial contributor to
children's success at school (cf., also, Beveridge and Dunn, 1980;
Donaldson, 1978). The present evidence that the correspondence
requirements of even very young children may be influenced by the
giving of mere modifiers is of some relevance to these considerations
because it suggests that many preschool children do already possess
the ability to pay considerable attention to what is said to them.
(See McGarrigle, Grieve and Hughes, 1978 for further evidence of
young children's sensitivity to modifiers.) It should be emphasised
though that the subjects in the present studies were not generally
found to be responsive to modifiers when these modifiers accompanied
the physical presentation of the model objects.
One new line of investigation which might warrant future
investigation is the examination of the kinds of effect (if any)
that superordinate level object category labels (such as 'animal
standing up' or just 'animal') have on children's judgements of
correspondence between objects and pictures of a different type but
with a shared superordinate. Suppose for example that children were
presented with a toy horse standing up but that the picture was of a
toy cow standing up. Now such a relationship between an object and
a picture of that object is not normally permissible (cf., Section
1.4.2) and indeed the findings of the present studies do suggest
that children would not normally be willing to tolerate such a type-
misleading discordance. The possibility has been considered above
however that young children may not have a fully developed under¬
standing of the kind of relationship which should exist between an
object and a picture of that object (as intimated perhaps by their
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ready acceptance of a blue giraffe for example). Consequently,
given that children do show some responsiveness to linguistic cues
it may be that if the superordinate label 'animal standing up' or
even just the label 'animal' was given, children would be more
inclined to accept such a superordinate object-picture correspon¬
dence .
6.2 Preschool children's concepts of objects
The findings discussed in the previous section are consistent
with the view that the first categories acquired by young children
are type based. Particularly consonant is the finding that child¬
ren's chief spontaneous concern in judging object-picture correspon¬
dence is, apparently, that pictures of objects should be unambiguous
as to the type of the referent object. Clearly, if it is assumed
that children's judgements about the adequacy of pictorial repres¬
entations of objects in such circumstances can tell us about what
children cognise to be the critical visual features of the referent
objects then this finding strikingly confirms the view expressed in
Chapter One (cf., Section 1.3) that the child's world is generically
organised. Such a proposal is not new (cf., Section 1.3). The
distinctive feature of the present proposal however, is that it is
explicitly recognised that colour as well as shape may code gener¬
ically definitive information and moreover that where this is so,
young children will often attend to colour.
It should be cautioned that any deductions which are made from
children's judgements of correspondence between objects and pictures
concerning children's concepts of objects must to some extent remain
open to question since clearly, more than conceptual processes are
involved in judging object-picture correspondences. Accordingly,
two sets of findings were obtained in the present studies which were
intended to constitute a more direct assessment of children's
concepts of objects. The first of these findings was that the spon¬
taneous categorisations of representational material made by both
children and adults were found to be type based (cf., Sections 3.2
and 3.3 respectively) rather than shape or colour based per se;
since it is widely reported that young children do not easily make
groupings at higher levels of abstraction (cf., Section 1.3), this
finding provides some confirmation of the present proposition that
the first categories established by children are type-based. The
second finding also supports such a conclusion; specifically, when
given model objects and offered a choice between a perceptual object
correspondent and a functional object correspondent, preschool
children reliably opted for the correspondent which preserved intact,
the type of the model, independently of perceptual or functional
correspondence per se (cf., Study Five: Section 4.2). Besides
providing a powerful illustration of the varying importance of the
various perceptual and functional bases which comprise different
concepts, these two findings demonstrate then that young children
are sensitive to such variations. Taken together, these findings
strongly suggest that theories of conceptual development should
allow for the rapid development of attention to language, which - it
would seem - structures such sensitivity (cf., Section 1.3). It is
important to point out that these findings should not be supposed to
indicate that, in everyday life, identifications of different objects
are necessarily based upon just colour or just shape or whatever; for,
as Rosch and her colleagues have pointed out, there is often a
considerable amount of correlation between these factors. What
these results do draw attention to however are the limitations of
those accounts of the conceptual processes of young children which
pay insufficient attention to the diversity of the various perceptual
and functional bases which evidently, may underlie these processes.
Three specific conclusions emerge. Firstly, the present results
highlight the shortcomings of Rosch's suggestion (eg., Rosch, 1977)
that shape and functional cues are invariably correlated at the
generic level of abstraction. Secondly, the present results suggest,
contrary to popular opinion (as expressed for example, by Rosch,
1977; Clark, 1974; Nelson, 1974 and Vernon, 1971) that young children
do pay considerable attention to colour correspondence when making
categorisations (and particularly so when making categorisations
involving natural rather than artificial objects.) Thirdly and
finally, these findings have some relevance for the ongoing debate
between E. Clark and K. Nelson as to whether perceptual or functional
factors are primary in conceptual development. Specifically, to the
extent that these two theorists stress that either perceptual or
functional cues are the essence (or the most fundamental aspect) of
people's concepts of objects, the present results provide a
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qualifying emphasis upon the considerable variance which exists
between different concepts as to the relative prominence of these
factors in psychological terms.
It is apparent that the type groupings which were obtained in
the present studies occurred at the generic (or type) level of
abstraction and were underlain by nominal correspondences at this
level. In the present view these nominal correspondences were of
substantial significance in stimulating the groupings obtained.
These features of the present results are significant because trad¬
itionally it is denied that such categorisations possess the status
of genuine conceptual behaviour. The first reason for this is that
the classical grouping experiments with representational materials
(eg., Bruner and Olver, 1963) have required groupings to be at a
level of abstraction which is one step higher than that at which
generic groupings may occur. In addition however, Inhelder and
Piaget (1964) have described the regrouping of objects as a function
of the names by which these objects are called in terms of 'pre-
concepts', reserving the terms of 'class of equivalence' and 'concept'
for the so-called logical classifications (see Section 1.3 for a
discussion of logical classifications). Piaget's position would
seem to be (Piaget, 1951) that until the child reaches the stage of
concrete operations, the same words are used in reference to a wide
variety of meanings varying greatly with context and that consequ¬
ently, groupings made by young children which are nominally based are
unstable. In Piaget's view, stable internal representations do not
develop until the child's concepts become hierarchically organised
(cf., Section 1.3). It was noted in Chapter One, however, that
everyday observation would seem to suggest that young children do
use many common nouns reliably for a wide variety of referents in
each of the appropriate categories. Such observations do provide
considerable grounds for supposing that the type based groupings
which occurred in the present studies would in fact be stable over
the course of time. In the present view therefore there is no basis
for rejecting type-based groupings as being non-conceptual on the
grounds that they are likely to be unstable. There would not seem
to be any good reasons either for assuming these groupings to be
non-conceptual merely because they do not occur at a 'superordinate'
( g )
level of abstraction. As Rosch (1977) has commented in relation
to some generic groupings which she and some of her colleagues
obtained with young children, such findings indicate that what has
appeared, in the past, to be a critical difference in the structure
of the thought of adults and young children is in fact partly due to
an artifact (that is the requirement for superordinate level
groupings) of the content of the tasks customarily presented. Simi¬
larly, the present results also imply that, at the generic level of
abstraction, there is little in the way of qualitative differences
between the categorisations made by adults and the categorisations
made by children. It is interesting to note, in considering these
findings, that Fodor, in criticising Vygotsky's assumptions as to
what it is to think logically, has commented that,
"the young child differs from the adult not in the
kinds of conceptual integrations it can effect but
rather, in the areas in which it can effect them
(Fodor, 1972 p.93; emphases in original).")
It was noted in Section 1.3 that there is indeed a strong case
for reviewing the classical doctrines with regard to the nature of
genuine conceptual behaviour. This case is concisely summed up by
Arnheim (1969) who has observed that,
"unsuitably narrow notions of what constitutes abstract
behaviour (also) derive from a devotion to the so-
called categorial attitude - the ability to perform
logical classifications (p.199)."
Thus rather than defining conceptual thinking strictly as the
abstraction of a set of defining features and the relation between
them, conceptualisation should perhaps be envisaged more generally
in terms such as,
"the process of constructing complex representations
of the world (including oneself) and using these
representations for the purpose of directing
behaviour (Donaldson, 1976, p.277)."
The attraction of the latter kind of definition is that it allows
for rather more flexibility in the kind of performance which is
regarded as deriving from genuine conceptualisations. In the
( Q )
Though there is some evidence which tends to suggest that pre¬
school children do have some categorial knowledge at levels of abst¬
raction higher than that of type (cf., Section 1.3 and, in relation
to the present Study Seven, Section 5.2.5 (a)).
(9)
It is also noteworthy, in relation to this issue of the alleged
superiority of superordinate level categorisations, that Fodor (1976)
has rejected the classical assumption that conceptual structures are
necessarily hierarchically organised.
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present view such flexibility is required because it is emphasised
that everyday objects are perceived and acted upon in a variety of
different contexts and that the same objects are likely to be
differently conceptualised in different contexts (for example,
depending upon whether or not verbal cues are given). Such a
definition of conceptualisation also permits the various kinds of
generic categorisation to be classed as genuinely conceptual.
In relation to Study Five (cf., Section 4.2) it is possible to
argue that the box task, based as it is on the specific function of
coding box contents differentially, is not the kind of neutral
context which is traditionally used when evaluating individuals'
concepts. In this way it might be argued, the box task procedure
may have predisposed subjects to prefer the linguistic (type)
correspondents rather more than would have been the case with a
traditional 'context'. It may indeed be that the degree of linguis¬
tic correspondence preference may vary according to the function to
which the object (or picture) is put (cf., Section 6.1); however, if
this is so, it is not at all clear that sorting tasks carried out in
neutral contexts necessarily constitute the most valid test of pre¬
school children's natural conceptual groupings. Moreover it may be
contended in this regard that since there would appear to be few, if
any, real-life situations where objects are not serving some
function or other - even if this function is purely aesthetic - it
would surely be unreasonable to study conceptual thinking indepen¬
dently of contextual influences. It should be stressed in this
regard that functional cues have roles in everyday contexts which
they can rarely fulfill in artificial contexts. It is noteworthy
that recently there has been some movement away from the old approach
of studying children's conceptual thinking in artificial contexts
(see, for example, Nelson and Gruendel, 1981). One more naturalistic
study of children's conceptual thinking which arises from the present
findings would be to carry out a correspondence requirements study
with objects (exclusively) in which children would be sent to the
'shops' to obtain specified items. The children could be provided
with information about the purpose for which the object was to be
used and their choice of options when they arrived at the shops
could be systematically controlled. Such a study would surely tap
the classes of equivalence which children (and adults) have to'use
in everyday life.
One factor which is stressed in the classical accounts of
concept development which has not been discussed so far is that
subjects should be conscious of the grouping principles underlying
the categorisations made. The question is then whether the child
and adult subjects who made the type-groupings which have been
reviewed in this section were conscious that the grouping principle
underlying their categorisations was that of generic type. It was
noted in Section 1.3 that, traditionally, the criterial indicator
that subjects are conscious of the grouping principles is the
demonstration that subjects can regroup stimuli by a second grouping
criterion. Such regroupings are however notoriously difficult to
obtain with young children (cf., Section 1.3). Significantly,
however, the third and final finding to be reviewed in the present
section is precisely that a majority of preschool children were
found to evidence the ability to make regroupings when the materials
provided a sound reason for doing so (cf., Section 3.2).
Two such double groupings were widely made; in each case, one
grouping was colour based whilst the other grouping was shape based.
Whereas, however, in the first case, one of the two groupings was
within-type^ ^ whilst the second grouping was between-types, in the
second case, both of the groupings were type-based. It is important
to emphasise however that each of these four groupings was based
upon a real-life association. Thus, although the subjects made
multiple groupings using distinct criteria - which indicates that
these groupings were deliberated over - the groupings made were not
arbitrary. The children were not able to group objects which were,
for them, experientially unassociated. In assessing the children's
inability to make more arbitrary groupings it is interesting to
consider the observation of Fodor (1972) that it is difficult to see
why young children should be expected (as traditionally they are on
classification tasks) to deduce that they are required to make
purely dimensionally based groupings. In this regard also there has
N.B. With regard to the widely made between-type pairing of the
blue fork and the blue spoon it is possible that the shared colour
of these items may have had little to do with the frequency with
which they were paired. Whether or not the colour correspondence
was significant in this respect poses an interesting research
question.
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been some discussion in the relevant literatures as to the possib¬
ility that the logical implications of terms such as 'same' may not
be the same for children as for adults. It nevertheless remains,
despite these observations, that young children do appear to be
relatively poor (relative that is to older children and adults) at
spontaneously making purely decontextualised groupings which are
based on arbitrary grouping criteria.
Two main conclusions then have emerged so far. Firstly, young
children appear to perform comparably to adults with regard to
certain groupings based on real-life experiential associations
(including associations which are based upon generic equivalence).
Young children seem likely moreover to be conscious of some or all
of the criteria upon which these groupings are based. Secondly,
young children appear to be relatively poor at making more arbitrary
groupings (and they are also probably poor at making groupings at
levels of abstraction superordinate to the generic level). It
should be emphasised that the suggestion that classificatory skills
develop earlier with respect to some contents than others is not new
(see, for example, Farnham - Diggory, 1976). Piaget too (cf.,
Brainerd, 1978) recognised the occurrence of such performance
variance and invoked the concept of 'horizontal decalage' to explain
performance differentials with respect to the same logical content
in different situations. In purely logical terms there would not
seem to be any distinction between groupings arising in relation to
meaningful and less meaningful materials and consequently it seems
likely that, in the Piagetian view, the notion of decalage would be
invoked to explain the present finding that the ability to regroup
material with multiple experiential associations occurs in advance
of the ability to regroup material with only a single experiential
association. What is striking about the present results however, is
that evidence of regrouping was obtained from children as young as
3:1 years. Since implicit in the notion of horizontal decalage is
an acknowledgement that such performance differentials should be
accounted for in terms of a quantitative rather than a qualitative
lack of the necessary cognitive structures, the Piagetian interpre¬
tation of the present results would appear to be that children as
young as three years possess cognitive structures sufficient for
some logical classifications. It is evident however that young
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children may have considerable difficulties with logical classifi¬
cations which are not based upon real-life associations - even when
adequate reasons are provided for such groupings (cf., the results
of Study Six; Section 4.3.3). Consequently, the present results are
perhaps most reasonably regarded as having tapped not a single
ability but rather two separate kinds of ability. It should be
emphasised however that the classificatory skill which young children
do display would seem to amount to much more than mere automated and
perceptually based responding.
It has been suggested above that young children form represen¬
tations of objects based upon their everyday experience which should
be regarded as being genuinely conceptual. It has been further
suggested that many of these representations will be type based. It
is perhaps reasonable to envisage therefore that when 'presented
with' objects in the real world, children (and adults) are fairly
widely predisposed to encode type-defining values more
prominently Jthan cues at other levels of abstraction. There
are however, several qualifications which should be made in respect
of the present emphasis upon the widespread attention to object
types by young children, older children and adults. The first of
these qualifications concerns the bases which may function as type-
defining values. In the present studies, the only type-defining
values which have been investigated have been shape, colour and to a
lesser extent, functional cues. It is evident however that many
other kinds of perceptual value may function for a smaller or a
greater number of individuals as type-defining values for certain
types of object; these include texture, movement and size as well
as values in each of the non-visual perceptual modes. Very little
work appears to have been done though on young children's ability
to recognise the non-visual cues. In particular perhaps, the
auditory mode would seem to provide type-defining values for a great
many types of object (eg., different types of machine and animal).
Children's ability to identify auditory cues is of special relevance
to their conceptual understanding of what they hear on television;
indeed an interesting question in this regard concerns how young
children perform when they are asked to detect auditory-visual
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discordances for different types of object.^^^
A second qualification pertaining to the present proposition
that children and adults widely adopt a generic based approach to
objects in the real world arises from some observations made in an
influential paper by R. Brown (1958 a). Brown (op.cit.) - upon
whose ideas Rosch based her formulations concerning the 'basic'
(12)
level of abstraction - proposed that things have particular
names which tend to be the names most often used to refer to them:
these names Brown observes,are at 'the usual level of utility in the
(13)
adult world' and tend to be the names first acquired by children.
Brown identifies two factors however which may cause the name given
to an object to be something other than the utility name. The first
of these factors concerns special interests,and knowledge which may
be possessed about the object (for example, certain individuals who
have a particular interest in cars may spontaneously name a red
Lotus eclat as 'an eclat' rather than as 'a car'). The second factor
pertains to those cases where a special relationship exists between
the object and the person naming the object (each of us will, for
example, have a group of people and animals with whom we are on
'first name' terms). In consideration of Brown's very reasonable
remarks it seems clear that individuals (children as well as adults)
will always spontaneously categorise some everyday objects at levels
of abstraction other than that of type; which objects are so
categorised will, however, vary greatly between different people.
Olson (1970) has extended the preceding line of thinking and
has suggested (as has been noted elsewhere) that different names for
the same referent may be used by the same people to draw attention
to different aspects of the (same) concept. This variance is not
necessarily constrained however by factors so overt as the immediate
N.B. A case study carried out by the writer with a single four-
year old child found that a variety of identity conflicts between
still photographs and sounds obtained from a B.B.C. sound effects
record, were detected with considerable facility.
(12)
Rosch was Brown's doctoral student.
(13)
N.B. Brown does point out however that children and adults may
not commonly categorise some kinds of object at the same level of
abstraction (the example that Brown gives is that whereas American
adults speak of 'dimes' and 'nickels', young children will speak
rather of 'money').
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context in which an object appears; one of the examples Olson gives
is the implicit difference implied by the descriptions: 'King of
England' and 'Owner of Buckingham Palace'. It follows from Olson's
observations that names for particular objects should not be
regarded as static labels which an individual will always produce;
different names may be used to provide particular information about
a referent to which the speaker wishes to draw attention. Olson's
remarks amount to a third qualification of the proposition that
objects will generally be spontaneously categorised at the type
level of abstraction; specifically, the circumstances of the cate¬
gorisation may influence the identification processes. There are
other kinds of circumstance, though, which may cause some or all of
the type-defining values of an object to be omitted from the initial
stages of everyday categorial processes or alternatively to be
omitted from the processes of identification altogether. Many such
situations arise when objects must be identified on the basis merely
of parts of the object because the rest of the object is obscured,
absent or not operable. Consider for example, the case of identi¬
fying objects at sea. Certain objects may be initially identified
as just an object of a particular colour but may then become clearly
identifiable as a boat (rather than as, say, a buoy or beacon);
other objects viewed only at a considerable distance may only be
identified however as an object of a certain colour (or even as just
'something').
It remains finally in this section to comment upon the poor
appreciation shown by a surprisingly large proportion of preschool
children of the type discordance of certain type-discordant pictures.
Children were particularly ill-informed about type-legitimate colours
but were generally rather more knowledgeable concerning type-legiti-
(14)
mate shapes. It should be noted that children probably possess
more type knowledge than the results of the present type knowledge
tests initially suggest; thus, for example, whereas a large propor¬
tion of the children participating in Study Three said that blue
One reason for this may be that the shapes of objects much more
often than the colours will be constrained by functional considera¬
tions (cf., Section 3.3.4). Additionally, however, children may be
more exposed to colour-type discordances than to shape-type discord¬
ances in everyday life (see the following discussion).
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giraffes do occur in the real world, few of these children made a
spontaneous grouping involving the blue giraffe; rather they prefer¬
red to pair the two type-concordant pictures (cf. , Section 3.2.3).
Nevertheless, however, the fact remains that large numbers of child¬
ren failed to correctly identify many of the type-discordant stimuli
as anomalous. In considering the development of type knowledge it
is apparent that the modern Western child has to contend with many
unnaturally coloured objects (eg., punk hair styles, yellow poodles
and the like) as well as many unnaturally coloured and shaped repre¬
sentations of objects in the various visual media (eg., pink eleph¬
ants and stylised rabbits). Clearly>the high incidence of such type
discordances in the young child's world can serve only to impede the
development of accurate type knowledge. It is of course, possible
to control children's access to the media (eg., books and television)
in such a way as to reduce their exposure to type-discordant stimuli.
It should be noted however that the consequences, from the child's
point of view, of being exposed to a wide variety of type-discordan¬
ces may not all be dire. In this regard, Bettelheim (1976) has
speculated that the existence in the child's world of some ambiguity
as to what is real and what is not may stimulate the development of
imagination and creativity.
6.3 Preschool children's ability to use more symbolic forms of
external representation
It has been noted in the last section that young children do
show some ability to make cross-type groupings involving items which
are associated in their everyday lives. The results of interest in
the present section concern preschool children's ability to make
cross-type groupings which are not intrinsically meaningful but
which are meaningful in informational terms given the circumstances
of the groupings. In the relevant study (that is Study Six; cf.,Section
4.3), preschool children were given the task of using pictures to
code objects differentially. Four critical objects were each pres-
sented in a type-same and a type-different object set. The type-
same sets constituted the experimental conditions. Specifically,
for each object the children were given a straightforward choice
between a picture discordant with regard to a type-defining value
and a picture discordant with regard to a type-modifying value. The
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nature of the picture options was so arranged that for the objects
occurring in the type-same sets, the children were obliged - if they
were to code the objects differentially - to make cross-type
pairings (for example, to use a picture of a red jug to code a red
toothbrush). In this way the children were provided with a sound
external reason for making cross-type pairings (that is, a reason
not based on a real-life association between the items grouped).
The results obtained indicate (cf., Section 4.3), when the picture
choices for the same model objects occurring in type-different and
type-same object sets is compared, that significant numbers of
children shifted their correspondence preferences according to the
composition of the object sets in such a way that they were more
likely to make cross-type pairings in the case of the type-same sets.
There is however, an important qualification which should be made
with regard to these results. Specifically, this shift in corres¬
pondence preferences only occurred reliably (that is for each of the
four critical models) when the models were both described and physi¬
cally presented. (There was strictly limited evidence of this effect
when objects were merely physically presented and only slightly more
evidence of this effect when objects were merely described at the
level of the noun phrase.) Nevertheless, there was fairly strong
indication in the justifications given by the children for their
picture choices that many of those children who did choose the
type-discordant pictures for the models in the type-same sets, did
so in a deliberate fashion, being consciously aware of the inform¬
ational consequences of their choices. Taken together, these results
therefore suggest that preschool children possess quite a considerable
ability to use symbolic kinds of external representation in meaningful
(15)
ways. These results also confirm that preschool children possess
a fairly substantial ability to make multiple classifications of the
N.B. The pictures discordant with regard to a type-defining value
whilst, in some way physically resembling their respective models were
hardly proper figurative representations (ie., physically similar to
the referent) and consequently their essential status seems more
accurately described as symbolic rather than as figurative. Incid¬
entally, to the extent that the present findings indicate that pre¬
school children can consciously use pictures as symbols, they would
seem to disconfirm the supposition (cf., Section 1.2) that young child¬
ren fail to fully appreciate that pictures are merely representations
of objects.
same material and, most importantly, they additionally indicate that
preschoolers may, in certain circumstances, group items that are not
associated in everyday life. Such findings are significant because
traditionally, the ability to make the more arbitrary kinds of
grouping has been regarded as a cornerstone of conceptual thinking
(classically defined) and has been assumed therefore to be beyond
the capabilities of the preschool child (cf., Sections 1.3 and 6.2).
One important question concerns the reason why the children
participating in Study Six did not reliably code the objects occur¬
ring in type-same sets differentially unless the objects were both
physically presented and verbally described. It bears repeating in
relation to this finding that both Luria (1961) and Babska (1965)
have reported that very young children are assisted to distinguish a
single target box from other boxes by the introduction of names for
(1G)
the distinguishing feature of (or on) the box (cf., Section 2.1).
It would seem clear that the present results indicate that children's
spontaneous thinking (that is,in the absence of modifiers) is so
influenced by type considerations that they are generally very
limited in their ability to make cross-type groupings spontaneously
other than those based upon a real-life association (cf., Section
6.2). Nevertheless, children's ability to make non-experientially
based cross-type groupings would seem to be greatly facilitated by
the giving of modifiers. It is attractive to understand this finding
as a case where, in Olson's terms (cf., Olson, 1970) the modifiers
were used to reinforce to the children the significance placed by
the experimenter upon these values; a significance moreover which
children appeared to pick up quite readily. What is not so clear
however, is whether the children for whom the objects were not
(1G)
N.B. It appears that in both these studies there was no physical
similarity between the object in the target box and the distinguish¬
ing feature of (or on) this box. Additionally, the subjects in both
studies would seem always to have seen the target objects. It should
be emphasised however that whereas these studies required subjects
merely to remember the distinguishing feature, the present study
required subjects to choose the pictures which would differentially
code the box contents. The present task would therefore seem to be
far more demanding cognitively. Interestingly, Babska (op.cit.) also
reports that the kind of cover on the boxes - that is, as to whether
they were geometric figures, colours or pictures of animals - was
also a determinant of children's performance. Infuriatingly though,
the precise effects obtained are not specified.
described (who did not generally make cross-type groupings) were
aware of the informational consequences of their picture choices.
Thus, it may be that these children failed to notice the need for
objects in the type-same set to correspond to the type-modifying
values; alternatively, however, it may be that these children did
recognise this need but were limited in their ability to set aside
type correspondence. What would be very interesting in this regard
would be to examine preschool children's spontaneous correspondence
requirements for objects occurring in type-same sets to see whether
they generally require absolute correspondence for such objects
(thereby evidencing recognition of the informational demands of the
composition of the object set) or whether they merely require the
correspondents to be unambiguous as to type. An alternative method
of examining children's spontaneous sensitivity to the informational
demands set up by type-same sets would be to employ the same restr¬
icted picture choice as Study Six to the extent that children would
be required to choose between a shape-discordant and a colour-
discordant but to omit the requirement for the children to have to
choose a picture discordant with regard to a type-defining value;
for example, children could be given a set of objects and picture
choices along the lines of those illustrated in Figure 15 (cf., p.117)
The present evidence that language may have a facilitating
effect upon children's ability to use pictures symbolically does
provide some illuminating hints concerning possible methods which
might be effectively used to train young children to use symbols-
In the first place, the preschool subjects appeared to appreciate
readily the task requirement of using distinguishing labels to code
the location of objects. The present results suggest, moreover, that
young children might be quite easily taught - via the use of exter¬
nally given modifiers (which, in Luria's (1961) terms, may modify
children's perceptions) - to use the nearly fully symbolic type-
discordant representations used in Study Six to code hidden objects
uniquely. It seems only a short step, once this point has been
reached, to teach young children to use (for themselves) completely
arbitrary symbols for the concrete referents in such a situation and
ultimately to do so without the need for being given verbal cues.
The possible benefits of such a preliminary programme for later
training pertaining to the use of publically shared symbols may be
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(17)
considerable. In a similar vein,Reid and Low (1972) have
suggested that signs with a comprehensible context in public print
actually serve as a way of attracting children into reading. The
serious implementation of a training programme of the kind suggested
would constitute,because of its rather indirect approach, a shift
from traditional emphases in educational practice. The immediate
everyday benefits from the acquisition of the ability to use public
symbols would however make the implementation of such a programme
worthwhile if it were to be shown to be more successful than estab¬
lished techniques.
6.4 Preschool children's ability to detect ambiguities
The final major subject area to which some of the present
results have relevance is that of children's ability to detect
ambiguities in representational figures. The most significant of
the present findings was that after having previously received just
one ambiguous figure (which in most cases also involved being given
the opportunity of a brief training experience), a majority of pre¬
school children subsequently receiving the 'House-Face' ambiguous
figure were found to spot this ambiguity spontaneously without any
further assistance. This finding is significant because it has been
concluded by Elkind and his colleagues (and also Vurpillot) - cf.,
Section 5.2.2 (b) - that young children are basically unable to
recognise such ambiguities. It should be emphasised however that
although up to 58 per cent of the children spotted the ambiguity of
the 'House-Face' figure, it must be presumed - on the basis of the
data reported by Elkind (eg., Elkind, 1964) - that from 8:6 years or
so, the very great majority of older children would, having been
instructed to look for ambiguities, have spotted the ambiguities in
both the figures presented.
There are reasons why the present result may not tap fully
preschoolers' ability to spot ambiguities (cf., Sections 5.2.4 (b)
and 5.2.5 (b) respectively). Nevertheless, even so, young children
would still seem likely to have more difficulty with spotting
ambiguities than older children. It may be however that the
(17) "
Additionally, such a programme could of course be used to teach
children the distinction between representational pictures and
symbolic representations.
difficulty for young children lies net so much in a basic inability
to spot ambiguities per se as in the particular difficulty of
detecting pre-specified ambiguities. It is noteworthy in this
regard that young children will often give evidence of a spontaneous
recognition of ambiguities informally - for example, they might
comment of an odd shaped and slightly wrinkled tomato that, 'it looks
like the face of a man'. Thus, the standard technique of presenting
figures with pre-set ambiguities to identify may constitute a
conservative measure of children's ability to detect ambiguities per
se. One alternative method would be to present figures which are so
little articulated that they permit the children to appreciate readily
that they may not have made the identification intended by the drawer.
One attraction of such a method (which would not specify acceptable
identifications in advance) is that it would make use of children's
known readiness (cf., Section 6.1) to identify the most minimal out¬
lines as drawings of particular objects.
6.5 Methodological issues
At the outset of this thesis (cf., Sections 1.2 and 1.3) it
was suggested that the traditional view that young children are
severely limited in their ability to co-ordinate information may
derive, to some extent, from the failure of traditional studies to
employ the most appropriate materials, procedures and results' assess¬
ment criteria. With regard to classificatory skills it was suggested
that young children will employ a variety of categorisation criteria
and that the particular criteria used may vary systematically accord¬
ing to the kind of material and the circumstances of the categorisa¬
tion.
In accordance with these ideas the present studies investigated
how children categorise different material in a variety of circum¬
stances. Considerable care was taken to inform subjects concerning
any special characteristics of the material presented and concerning
the purpose of the categorisations requested. In this way the cate¬
gorisations made by different children in different circumstances
were explored for systematic variations.
At the beginning of this chapter (cf., p. 222) it was observed
that the results gained by the studies reported in this thesis are
not generally consistent with the view that young children are
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severely limited in their ability to co-ordinate information.
However, two important methodological issues arise. The first of
these concerns the limited scope of the present investigations;
in particular, each of the present studies have examined children's
performance with only small stimulus samples. The second issue
concerns the extent to which the information given to subjects
concerning the purpose of the categorisations requested (including,
where necessary, the special characteristics of the material
presented) was communicated satisfactorily.
Consider then the limits placed on the present research by the
small stimulus samples. It has been stressed in the preceding
paragraphs that the present research has sought to investigate how
flexible children are in their categorisations in different cir¬
cumstances and with different kinds of material. In the present
view, insufficient attention has been paid in the past to the
possibility that children's categorisations do vary according
to such qualitative constraints. The present studies therefore
tapped children's categorisations for a variety of objects in
situations where they were required to identify (Study Seven),
judge correspondence adequacy (Studies One and Two), make groupings
(Study Three) and code objects differentially (Studies Five and
Six). There is both a disadvantage and, at the same time, an
advantage with such an approach. The disadvantage is that, because
the number of content areas sampled was large, the present studies
were restricted in the amount of follow-up work which could be done
in any one area. In consequence, the number of stimuli sampled
was often limited to those which could be included in a single study.
However, the advantage of the present approach is that the sampling
of performance over a wide spectrum of tasks provides a much broader
base of information about children's categorisations in different
situations than could otherwise have been obtained.
It should also be pointed out that considerable effort was taken
in many of the studies to maximise the range of categorisations
obtained. This applies in particular to the selection of materials
used in the studies which examined children's (and adults') type-
based categorisations (that is, Studies One-to-Five and, to some
extent also, Study Six) and children's ability to detect anomalies
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(Study Seven). In these studies the selected materials facilitated
the examination of whether children respond in systematic ways to the
qualitative differences that arise between different objects. Con¬
siderable evidence was gained-particularly with regard to the system-
atised use of type-defining values as classification criteria - that
young children do indeed tend to respond systematically to these
qualitative variations. It may well be of course that if some Qther kinds
of materials had been used, then the amount of systematically
structured responding would have been less. The discovery of the
limits of this qualitative responding must remain however a matter
for further research. It should be emphasised in this regard that
the fact that these limits warrant investigation is something which
has been established by the present research. It should be remem¬
bered that all too often in the past, children's categorisations
have been studied or discussed independently of qualitative
constraints altogether. This omission is widely found, for example,
in the choice-preference literature - see, for example, pages
46, 47; in the debate concerning the relative prominence of per¬
ceptual and functional factors in children's categorisations -
c f., page 117 ; and also arises in the case of Rosch's criteria
for the internal representation of her 'basic level' objects -
c f. , pages 31, 32.
The second of the two methodological issues identified above as
requiring discussion concerns the extent to which subjects were
adequately informed with regard to the purpose of the categori¬
sations reques.ted. Four major questions arise. The first of these
concerns two features of Study Five which, it might be argued,
prejudiced subjects towards the choice of the functional corres¬
pondents relative to the perceptual ones. Specifically, subjects
were asked to state 'what you do' with each of the model objects
(p. 122). No comparable question was asked of subjects in
relation to the perceptual features of the model objects. Moreover,
in the case of two object models the stress on function was increased
by lighting the candle and by writing with the lollipop-pen. The
reason for stressing the functions of the model objects was that it
was necessary to ensure that the object functions were fully under¬
stood and thereby to ensure that subjects were fully informed
concerning the functional as well as the perceptual correspondence
options which were offered for each model. It should be emphasised
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though that the bringing of subjects' attention to the functions of
the object models was not as great a source of bias as might first
appear. Specifically, the perceptual cues of each model - and also
of each choice object - were operative throughout the experiment's
duration in a way which the functional cues were not, as the objects
were neither generally functionally operative nor acted upon
according to their function. By contrast, the model objects were
functionally operative for only a very limited period and the choifie
objects were at no point functionally operative. In the present
view therefore, if there was any overall bias in the procedures
used, it acted to prejudice subjects towards the choice of the
perceptual correspondents.
A second question concerns the degree to which subjects
participating in the object-picture correspondence studies apprec¬
iated that they were to select pictures that would code the model
objects differentially. The critical study was Study Six
(c f., Section 4.3) where the object sets and picture options were
arranged so that differential coding could only be achieved if
particular grouping criteria were used. In this study (as with
all the correspondence studies), the children were fully informed
of the coding requirement of the task but additionally, they were
shown (cf., p. 144) all the object models and picture options in
each stimulus set before they were asked to make any correspondence
choices.
It has been previously indicated (cf., p. 155-159) that some
subjects may possibly have chosen the appropriate pictures on
Study Six as a response to perceptual cues rather than because of
recognition of the coding requirements. In consequence the main
evidence pertaining to the degree to which subjects were aware of
the coding requirements probably derives from the spontaneous
comments and solicited justifications which were made in relation
to the picture choices. This evidence is not completely compre¬
hensive but nevertheless it does indicate that many of the
children who did shift their correspondence preferences appropria¬
tely (as well as a small minority of those who did not) were
fully aware, not only of the coding requirements of the task but
alsOj of the informational consequences of their own choices
(cf., p. 155-159, 242). With regard to the remaining children
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it is noteworthy that those who failed to shift their correspondence
preferences appropriately may well have done so because of an unwill¬
ingness to set aside their preferred choices rather than because of a
failure to appreciate the informational demands of the task. This
question remains unresolved however and further research is desirable
to establish whether children generally make picture choices which
code objects differentially in situations where they are not required
to set aside their own preferences (see p. 244 for some proposals in
this regard). It may well be though that the modifiers promoted
appropriate shifts in correspondence preferences in Study Six
because they reminded subjects of the coding requirements. If this
is so, it may be that when the point comes to make the picture
choices, children who receive,purely physical object presentations
will be less conscious than children who receive verbal object
presentations of coding requirements.
The third and fourth questions, concerning the extent to which
subjects appreciated task instructions, arise in relation to the
anomaly and ambiguity detection tasks respectively in Study Seven.
Consider first the effectiveness of the instructions to look for
anomalies. Both the child subjects (cf. , p. 192) and the adult
subjects (cf., p.285) were informed that the anomalies would comprise
head-body mis-matches. Furthermore, for each stimulus, both child
and adult subjects were asked to say whether the head and body
matched or failed to match. Subjects would seem therefore to have
been fully informed concerning the nature of the anomalies to look
for; moreover, the manner of framing the critical question asked
in relation to each stimulus should have reinforced this awareness.
Despite this emphasis however, it is apparent that considerable
proportions of the children, and also of the adults, failed to
detect the least bizarre anomalies. The question arises then as
to whether these low detection rates are largely attributable to
shortcomings in the instructional format used. In the present view
this appears unlikely. Rather, the main explanation seems simply to
be that both adult and child subjects found the least bizarre
anomalies difficult to detect; the more bizarre anomalies were,
after all, widely detected by both groups. It may be however that
the detection rates would have been greater if subjects had been
previously shown some relatively mild monstrous combinations as
exemplars.
Consider finally the instructions used in relation to the
presentation of the ambiguous figures. These instructions
(cf., p.193) involved telling subjects - falsely - that the picture
itself would change. In a few cases children responded after a
while that the picture was not changing (cf., p. 194). There is
therefore a possibility that the instructional format used
discouraged subjects from seeking actively for alternative per¬
ceptual organisations of the stimuli (cf.. footnote no. 11 p. 176).
This limitation could be avoided by changing the instruction simply
to - 'this is a picture of two things at the same time - can you
see what they are?'. Alternatively, the present instructional
format could be retained but it could additionally be stressed at
the beginning - 'that you have to look for the change - it doesn't
just happen.'
6.6 Final remarks
As indicated by the preceding discussion of the present results
four separate sections (that is, Sections 6.1 - 6.4), the results
of the present studies do not lend themselves to a corporate analysis
Despite this, there is a central theme: specifically, each of the
studies have been in some way concerned with the ability of young
children to co-ordinate diverse sources of information when cate¬
gorising representational material. The sources of information
varied have predominantly been perceptual cues; however the role
of linguistic factors in children's categorisations has also been
of central concern. It is these main issues which will be the
basis of the discussion in this final section.
As has been observed repeatedly in the present chapter, the
present results strongly suggest that young children are much more
sophisticated in their categorisations than traditional investi¬
gators have supposed. In particular the results suggest that
young children evidence a considerable degree of flexibility in
their categorisations and that these categorisations are often
tailored to suit individual situations. Young children's approach
to categorisation then appears to be to a considerable degree
constructive. However the present results do also expose
several ways in which young children are limited in their ability
to make categorisations.
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In considering precisely what the present results reveal
concerning young children's categorisations it is helpful to analyse
the requirements made by the present tasks for perceptual and con¬
ceptual processing respectively. As it was noted in Section 1.2,
the mere recognition of representational materials necessarily
involves conceptual as well as perceptual processes; indeed the
determination of the roles of these two processes is a recurrent
question in work on figurative perception (cf., Elkind 1969).
Vurpillot (1976a) though, taking the view that perception is a form
of knowledge, contends that the search for a precise boundary between
what is 'perceptual' and what is 'intellectual' is a'pseudo-problem'.
It would certainly seem that with regard to figurative perception at
least, it is not possible to draw a distinct boundary between what is
perceptual and what is conceptual. Nevertheless, it is perhaps help¬
ful to imagine the present tasks as being on a continuum from (at one
pole) the tasks which would appear to most involve perceptual processes
relative to conceptual processes to (at the other pole) the tasks
which seem to be more completely conceptual in character. The present
tasks would seem to be clustered at three points on the continuum
(cf., Figure 27); it would seem to be more certain however that
each of these clusters is correctly ordinally scaled than that the
order of tasks within each cluster is correctly scaled. Thus, closest
to the perceptual pole is the correspondence preference task and the
ambiguity detection task-for which the only role for the conceptual
processes would seem to be to permit the recognition of the depicted
identities (and even this role would not seem to be necessarily
fulfilled for satisfactory performance on the correspondence prefer¬
ence task). The four tasks in the middle cluster of tasks would each
appear to reveal something about the nature of the child's categorial
systems concerning everyday objects; nevertheless, the more tradi¬
tional grouping tasks (cf., task numbers 5 and 6 in Figure 27) would
seem to provide the clearest measure of these systems because they
give the child more categorial possibilities. Finally, at the
'conceptual' pole there are two further tasks: the differentiation of
objects in type-same sets by the choice of type-discordant pictures
and, the spontaneous making of second choice groupings which are not
based upon real-life associations. These latter two tasks require
the task materials to be treated much more arbitrarily than do the
other tasks.
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Figure 27 A tentative scaling of the present tasks according to
their relative requirements for perceptual versus
conceptual processing.
MOST PERCEPTUAL/LEAST CONCEPTUAL
1. Object-picture correspondence preference judgements (Study One).
2. Detection of ambiguities in ambiguous figures (Study Seven).
3. Detection of anomalies (Study Seven).
4. Object-picture correspondence requirements judgements
(Studies One and Two).
5. First-choice groupings of representational material
(Studies Three, Four and Five).
6. Second-choice groupings based upon real-life associations
(Study Three).
7. Choice of type-discordant pictures to code objects in
type-same sets differentially (Study Six).
8. Second-choice groupings on basis of purely arbitrary
grouping criteria (Study Three).
MOST CONCEPTUAL/LEAST PERCEPTUAL
It is evident that whilst, with the possible exception of the
(18)
ambiguous figure task, the children mostly performed fairly
well on the first six tasks (that is task numbers 1 - 6 in Figure 27),
they did have difficulties with the two tasks which were most
arbitrarily conceptual in character. Nevertheless the findings gained
by the first six tasks would seem to provide considerable evidence of
young children's ability to co-ordinate perceptual cues in categori¬
sations. The range of co-ordinations tapped by these tasks is
considerable - including, as they do, accurate judgements of absolute
-correspondence, recognition of ambiguities, detection of anomalies,
systematised tolerance for object-picture discordances (systematised,
that is, with regard to object types and verbal cues), first-choice groupings
(18)
N.B. Although the children participating in Study Seven did not
actually perform very well on this task, there are reasons (see, for
example, Section 6.4) for supposing that young children may be rather
better at detecting ambiguities than the present results suggest.
based upon object types and second-choice groupings based upon
experiential associations other than type. Together, these
results confirm that young children evidence considerable flexi¬
bility with regard to the properties of objects which they use in
their categorisations. In addition, in the present view, the
tasks in the middle cluster in Figure 27 provide important
information concerning how children's flexible approach to cate¬
gorisation is systematised by their use of their conceptual knowledge
of objects and by their sensitivity to verbal cues. This informa¬
tion will now be considered in some detail.
In Section 1.3 (p.20) a distinction was drawn between concepts
- that is, all the knowledge a person possesses - and categories,
which are usually formed on the basis of only some of a person's
conceptual knowledge. It was pointed out that there is considerable
disagreement in the pertinent literatures as to which of the possible
perceptual and functional bases of similarity are those actually
used in the formation of categories. The suggestion was made
(eg., P> 24, 25) that a consideration of all the qualitative differ¬
ences arising between different kinds of natural object strongly
implies that the bases upon which particular categorisations are
made will be greatly influenced by the kind of material being
categorised. It was further suggested that linguistic cues lead
to the emphasis of different kinds of information in children's
internal conceptualisations of different objects and that these
differences in encoding will be reflected in the categorisations
which children make in relation to this conceptual knowledge.
One particular scheme was developed to investigate whether these
qualitative differences between objects are reflected in the
criteria used by young children in their spontaneous categori¬
sations. This scheme was that which distinguished different object
types. Specifically it was proposed that, from the early pre¬
school years, language is heavily involved in mediating the develop¬
ment of children's knowledge of the particular bases of the generic
(or type) categories referenced by common nouns. Each of the first
five of the present studies were directly concerned with investi¬
gating children's (or in one case, adults') tendencies to make
type-based categorisations (cf., task numbers 4 and 5 in Figure 27);
these studies merit particular attention at this point.
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The basic proposal was that adults and children will generally
respond spontaneously toQbjects.at the generic (or type) level of
abstraction - that is, the level of abstraction denoted by the noun
most commonly used to refer to each object. A critical distinction
made was between type-defining and type-modifying values. This
distinction contrasts the range of dimensional values implicit in
a type name with those which vary between different members of a
given object type and are not implicit in the type name (cf., p.48).
It was suggested that when making spontaneous groupings of, and
judging correspondence between, representational materials, children's
and adults' decisions will generally tend to be based upon type-
defining rather than type-modifying values. Thus the categorial
criteria used would be expected to vary between different objects
according to those bases which are required to preserve object types.
The present results generally confirm this proposal; in
particular, evidence was gained that children and adults will tend
to group representational materials by types rather than by perceptual
or functional cues per se or else unsystematically (cf., task number
5 in Figure 27). With regard to object-picture correspondence judge¬
ments however (cf., task number 4 in Figure 27), children's cate¬
gorisations were not wholly regulated by whether or not all the type-
defining values were preserved. Specifically, the present results
indicate (contrary to expectations) that so long as the object type
is conveyed unambiguously, young children will tolerate some type-
discordances. It was also found that the overt articulation of
particular type-modifying values tended to reduce subjects toler¬
ance of discordances pertaining to these values. Thus, when
judging correspondence adequacy, young children are not concerned
solely with type correspondence. Nevertheless, these results still
disconfirm the traditional view that, when making categorisations,
young children centre their attention more or less arbitrarily upon
salient cues. By contrast there is considerable co-ordination of
linguistic, perceptual and also functional cues. The co-ordina¬
tions evidenced in first-choice groupings appear to be largely
a direct function of children's conceptual knowledge of all the
qualitative properties of the (linguistically clefinec()object type.
The co-ordinations evidenced in correspondence judgements are a
256
function both of children's wider conceptual appreciation of the
correspondences necessary to convey type unambiguously and also,
of how, if at all, the object is described. These results appear
therefore to confirm that children respond in systematic ways to
qualitative variations between different objects; they also
confirm that the notion of object types and the distinction between
type-defining and type-modifying values is a useful basis for
analysing some of this responding.
It bears comment that the present evidence gained for the
widespread use of type-based categorisations confirms that lin¬
guistic cues do play an important role in children's categorisa¬
tions. Thus, for objects or pictures which are not named (or else
given type names), children tend to prefer to categorise by the
perceptual or functional values implicit in the type name rather
than by other characteristics. Moreover, children's judgements
of correspondence adequacy are influenced by externally given
modifiers. It should be pointed out however that the potency
of the modifier effects may be in some part due to the coding
function which the pictures served in the present correspondence
tasks; modifiers may have less effect on children's judgements
of correspondence adequacy in other contexts.
Although the findings relating to type-based categorisations
dominate the results gained by the first six tasks coded in
Figure 27, one other finding warrants mention. Specifically, the
anomaly study (cf., task number 3 in Figure 27) gained evidence
which suggests that children also use superordinate level con¬
ceptual knowledge in their categorisations. The most pertinent
finding was that the pig-monkey monster (but not the pig-cow
monster) was generally identified as anomalous by children who
could not correctly identify the type of the component parts
(cf., p. 213-216). This finding lends further support to the
present suggestion that children's approach to categorisation
is a highly flexible one.
Consider next the two most conceptual tasks indicated in
Figure 27 (p.253). These tasks - requiring as they do that
the subject consciously make intrinsically arbitrary classi¬
fications - correspond most closely to the traditional kind of
conceptual task (cf., Section 1.3). It is not therefore
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surprising that of all the tasks presented, children performed least
well on these tasks. In the present view, the capacity for the
more arbitrary forms of thinking required for satisfactory per¬
formance on these tasks is not necessary either for conceptualising
or categorising (cf., Section 1.3). Clearly however, the develop¬
ment of these abilities is a fundamental aspect of cognitive
development - one of the skills required for arbitrary thinking for
example is the most important skill of self-regulation.
The present findings suggest that young children are not gener¬
ally able to group representational materials by purely arbitrary
grouping criteria. Significantly, however, one of the present
studies (task number 7 in Figure 27) found that young children do
sometimes make intrinsically arbitrary object—picture groupings when
they are provided with a sound external reason for doing so (it was
explained that the model objects had to be coded differentially).
The factor which was critical in eliciting these intrinsically
arbitrary groupings was a verbal one. Specifically, the arti¬
culation of pertinent modifiers substantially increased children's
ability to treat the representational materials arbitrarily. When
the model objects were both shown and described, 46 per cent of the
preschool subjects changed their grouping criteria appropriately
for two or more of the four critical object models. This finding
suggests then that young children do possess some ability to make
intrinsically arbitrary categorisations and is consistent with
Luria's (1961) theory concerning the role of language in the develop¬
ment of self-regulatory mechanisms.
Consider at this point the full range of categorial skills
displayed by young children in relation to the tasks coded in
Figure 27. It is apparent that many young children do evidence
considerable flexibility in their categorisations. However, there
are several qualifications which should be made. Firstly, as has
just been observed, children's generally constructive approach to
categorisation is constrained by their limited abilities to carry out
categorisations based upon arbitrary grouping criteria. Secondly,
children evidenced some limitations in the categorial flexibility
which they could employ when identifying anomalies and ambiguities.
It should be emphasised that the present results are not generally
consistent with the traditional assumption that, when identifying
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representational materials, young children tend to centre their
attention involuntarily upon salient features of the materials.
Instead the present evidence that many young children detect bizarre
anomalies and simple ambiguities (and also, are generally influenced
by contextual aids to shift their perceptual organisation of ambig¬
uous figures) indicates that young children will generally pay atten¬
tion to various of the properties of the stimuli when making their
identifications. Nevertheless, there were limits to the categorial
flexibility displayed; not all the children were successful and, with
regard to the detection of anomalies, young children did appear to be
marginally less adept than adults. There was also evidence that
certain characteristics are ultimately more determinative of children's
identifications than others. A third limit to children's flexibility
in making categorisations follows on from this last point. Specific¬
ally, children would seem to be constrained by a tendency to make
type-based categorisations rather than other kinds of categorisation.
There are several reasons for thinking this. First, children (and
also many adults) tended to identify relatively compatible anomalies
in terms of the type of one of the component parts (task number 3
in Figure 27). Second, when judging the adequa.cy of pictures as
correspondents of physically presented objects, children did not often
require absolute correspondence but did typically require the pictures
to convey type unambiguously (task number 4 in Figure 27). Third,
children's spontaneous groupings (as with adults' groupings) were
generally type-based (task number 5 in Figure 27). Fourth, children
did not easily forgo type correspondence when this was required in
order to code objects differentially or when they were simply asked
to make arbitrary groupings (task numbers 7 and 8 respectively in
Figure 27). Of these reasons, the second and fourth tend to suggest
that young children are more predisposed to employ type-based cate¬
gories in their categorisations than adults are. This is because
adults would generally be expected to judge object-picture correspondence
in absolute terms and also to make arbitrary groupings upon request or
whenever the informational constraints of a task demand this. It
appears then that whilst both adults and children possess much of
the conceptual'know-how' required to make many and various type-based
categorisations, children are particularly likely to employ type-
based categories in their categorisations. It would also seem that it
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is children who use the greater variety of type categories (consider,
particularly, children's toleration of some type-discordances between
objects and pictures). It does not appear then that children's type-
based categorisations are based wholly upon static internal type-
categories; rather these categories show some flexibility. Thus,
although children are more predisposed to make type-based cate¬
gorisations than adults, children do show some flexibility in the kind
of type-categories employed.
In this thesis great stress has been placed upon children's
tendencies to make categorisations which are based upon type-
defining values. Typically, the present studies have contrasted
children's tendency to make spontaneous groupings based upon type-
defining values with their avoidance of groupings based upon type-
modifying values. The present studies have however only sampled
a few of the many possible type-based categorisations (cf., Section
6.5). One important question which therefore arises concerns the
extent to which type-defining values can be accurately and reliably
identified across the whole range of object types in the world;
more fundamentally perhaps, the question arises as to whether the
distinction made between type-defining and type-modifying values
can always be maintained. In asking this question it is worthy
of note that there is something of a parallel between the present
distinction and Katz and Fodor's (1963) contrast between semantic-
(19)markers and semantic distinguishers. Katz and Fodor failed to
precisely specify the criteria to be used in distinguishing
semantic—markers and semantic distinguishers and, in consequence,
the whole basis for the contrast became a contentious issue
(see, for example, Bierwisch 1969). So then it is important
to ensure that the present distinction between type-defining
and type-modifying values is clearly made.
(19) This distinction was intended to contrast the part of the
meaning of a lexeme which is systematic for the language with that
which is not systematic. The systematic meaning components were
represented by semantic-markers and the non-systematic components
by semantic distinguishers. The markers permit the recognition
of anomalous word combinations (eg., 'male' cannot be combined with
'pregnant') in a way which parallels the present idea that an
appreciation of type-defining values permits the recognition of
visual anomalies.
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The use of the present terms was stated originally in Chapter
Two (p.48) and has been re-stated in the present section (p. 3,4).
Specifically, type-defining values are the range of dimensional
values implicit in a type name whereas type-modifying values are
the values which vary between different members of the same type
but are not implicit in the type name. The materials used in the
present studies were such that the pertinent type—defining and type-
modifying values could be reliably specified. The question which
arises however is whether this distinction can be generally main¬
tained. Five factors warrant mention in this regard. First,
the present studies tended to manipulate type-defining values which
were simple and dominant - as for example, in the single shape-
type value implicit in the type "ball". Many type-defining values
are however more complex - compare, for example, the various shape-
type values of the type "typewriter". Second, as previously noted
(p.105), many dimensions other than shape and colour supply type-
defining values. These other defining values derive, for example,
from auditory, olfactory, tactual and functional cues. Third (also
as noted previously, cf., p.240) the type-defining values for a given
object may not be simultaneously operative (eg., a candle may not be
lit, a car engine not switched on or a bicycle wheel missing);
alternatively, they may still be operative but not all may be
perceivable. Fourth, it is important to emphasise that the same
dimension may provide both type-defining and type-modifying values.
For example, the colouring of tigers is a type-defining value and
the type hypothesis therefore predicts that correspondence will be
preferred with regard to this value than with regard to a posture
change merely (cf., p.47); clearly, however, certain shape changes
(e.g., those required for a change from tiger to lion) would constitute
an alteration of type-defining shape values. It is evident then that
dimensions per se are not type-defining or type-modifying for an
object; rather it is particular values which are. The fifth and
final factor is that in certain cases, the status of a value - that is,
as to whether it is type-defining or not - may vary according to
context. One case is that of ball-size. Ball-size is, to a limited
extent, a type-defining value; for example, certain objects could not
reasonably be identified as a ball because either they are too large
or they are too small. Consider though the case of the identification
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of a picture of a ball. If the picture contains an adequate
indication of relative size (eg., a boy), ball-size is maintained
as a type-defining value; if, however, no information is given
concerning relative size, ball-size ceases to operate as a type-
defining value.
It is evident, from a consideration of the five factors identified,
that the specification of all the type-defining and type-modifying
values which are usable for particular objects in specific contexts
is not necessarily a simple business. Nevertheless, in the present
view, many of these values can be accurately specified in most
circumstances. Most importantly, once a value of a particular
object in a particular context has been identified, it should then
be possible to determine whether it is a type-defining or a type-
modifying value. The critical rule to follow here is that if the
value can be changed in unlimited ways and yet the type-identity
of the object be maintained, it should be classified as a type-
modifying value; to the degree however that such changes are not
possible, the value is type-defining.
One pertinent question which arises from the present research
concerns the extent to which the identification of type and type-
modifying values provides a basis for accurately predicting the
categorisations made by children (and/or adults) in particular
circumstances. It has been previously noted (eg.,p.250) that the
present research indicates that children will sometimes make
categorisations which do not use all the type-defining values of
the stimuli as categorial criteria. Such categorisations were
however systematically regulated. Thus, when judging correspon¬
dence adequacy in a coding task, children simply required that
pictures of physically presented objects should be unambiguous as
to type. Because children's use of type-defining values does
appear to vary systematically according to the circumstances of the
categorisation the present work does imply that the distinction
between type-defining and type-modifying values is useful as a
tool for predicting categorial behaviour. Clearly however further
work is required to discover more about the precise conditions in
which particular type-based categorisations occur; such work
should include study of the range of stimulus types to which each
of the sets of type-based categorisations identified is applicable.
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Another important issue concerns the extent to which type-based
categorisations are influenced by first, specialised knowledge
of the materials and second, lack of type knowledge.
A second area for further research which follows on from the
issues just discussed and which, to some extent,overlaps them
concerns the role of contextual factors in children's categori¬
sations. The present studies found that children were quite
sensitive in their categorisations to localised contextual cues on
particular tasks; for example, the articulation of modifiers tended
to reduce children's tolerance for discordances pertaining to the
values marked, contextual aids facilitated children's recognition
of ambiguities and so on. There is however considerable scope for
varying the wider context of the tasks themselves; specifically,
the present studies have exclusively been concerned with identi¬
fication, decontextualised grouping and object coding tasks.
The main emphasis has been on object coding. There are however
many other contexts in which children's judgements of correspon¬
dence between objects and pictures can be investigated; moreover
it seems likely that the context may have a critical influence upon
the judgements made. It would be interesting and informative for
example to compare children's correspondence judgements on object
coding tasks with those made when pictures are being used for purely
decorative purposes (eg., illustrating a greetings card). It may be
that children's correspondence requirements for pictures serving a
decorative function would be very lax indeed. Thus it may be that
children would relax their requirements for unambiguous representa¬
tion of object type in such circumstances; in addition, they might be
far more inclined to tolerate discordances with regard to verbally
marked type-modifying values. These issues particularly warrant
empirical attention because of the present emphasis upon the con¬
structive approach to categorisation displayed by young children.
Thus, in the present view, if the contexts in which children's
categorisations are tapped is strictly limited, then the categori¬
sations that are observed will be unrepresentative.
A third set of issues for further research arises in relation
to the present evidence (cf., task number 7 in Figure 27 - p.253 )
that young children show some ability to make intrinsically
arbitrary groupings when they are provided both with a sound reason
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for doing so and pertinent linguistic cues. Children's relative
inability to make arbitrary groupings (relative, that is, to groupings
with experiential associations) has been identified above as a major
limitation of their generally constructive approach to categorisa¬
tion. Significantly then, the coding format of the present study
appears to provide a useful basis for an investigation of how
children might be assisted to make intrinsically arbitrary and,
ultimately, completely arbitrary groupings (cf., p.244). One
specific question which could be researched in conjunction with such
an investigation concerns whether, for physically presented object
models, young children would select correspondents which adequately
distinguish the models if they were not required to set aside type-
correspondence in doing so. Such a study would clarify the extent
of young children's spontaneous appreciation of the informational
demands of such a task (of., p. 155-159, 250). If young children
were found to be sensitive to the informational demands set up by
different model sets, this would - together with the present findings
- confirm Ford and Olson's (1975) suggestion that whilst young
children show some sensitivity to informational demands, they tend to
prefer to discriminate objects from a context of alternatives which
is wider than that necessary. That is, such a finding would show
that, in the case of representational objects, young children have
to code object type as well as the critical type-modifying values.
Several suggestions regarding how such a study might be set up are
given in Section 6.3 (p.244).
The general theory of cognitive development which is most
consistent with the present results is perhaps that of Bruner (eg.,
Bruner, 1957; Bruner, Olver and Greenfield, 1966; Bruner. 1974).
Bruner conceives of three forms of representation - the enactive,
iconic and symbolic modes respectively - which develop additively.
This sequence is in fact very Piagetian (cf., Section 1.3); most
importantly however, whereas Bruner does recognise there to be a
role for language in cognitive development (cf., also Butterworth,
1978), Piaget regarded this role of language to be strictly limited.
Bruner also recognises there to be a role for perception in cognitive
development; indeed he proposes (cf., also, Dewey, 1891 ; Werner, 1948
and Wohlwill, 1968) that there is a direct continuity in development
between perceptual and conceptual processes. Such a continuity view
is not necessarily required to account for the present results;
however, it is an attractive mechanism, especially so in view of
Bruner's emphasis (Bruner, 1957) on the generic base to all
perception. The present results would perhaps tend to suggest
though that the iconic mode of representation is rather more
flexible than Bruner intimates; such a shift in stress is however
in line with recent accounts of imagery which emphasise that images
need not necessarily be static, illogical or even concrete but may
develop into more dynamic and abstract forms (see, for example,
Kaufmann, 1980; Kosslyn, 1978).
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Appendix A: Details of the subconditions of Study One and of the
comparisons made
A (iCorrespondence requirements tasks
Table A lists four picture sets, each comprising four pictures.
Each child participating in Study One was presented with all the
pictures in one of these sets; one picture (as appropriate) for each
of the four critical objects. Altogether,twenty children (ten of
whom were shown the objects and ten for whom the objects were
described) were offered the pictures in each of the four picture
sets.
Table A Critical picture sets presented.
Objects Picture sets
green ball red ball red ball diamond 'ball' diamond 'ball'
triangular square pink & blue pink & blue square sandwich
sandwich sandwich 'sandwich' 'sandwich'
orange triangular triangular purple 'orange' purple 'orange'
'orange' 'orange'
blue,square round orange orange button round button
button button button
Consider first the data yielded by the subjects for whom the
objects were physically presented. Ten binary comparisons were made.
These comparisons are listed in Table B below, together with a
breakdown of some pertinent characteristics of the subject groups
involved. It is evident that these comparisons comprise between-
group comparisons and also comparisons involving both a between-
group and a within-group component. As was noted in Chapter Two
(p.70), in the latter kind of case (cf., in Table B below, comparison
numbers 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10), Fisher's method was used to obtain an
overall p-value for the between- and within-group components. A
worked example of this procedure is given at the end of this
appendix.
Consider next the comparisons made between the performance of
subjects for whom the objects were physically presented and that of
those subjects to whom the objects were described. Table C (below)
lists these comparisons and gives a breakdown of the pertinent














































































































































































































































































































































































The comparisons made evaluated the degree to which the corres¬
pondences which the children preferred were more absolute than the
correspondences which they required. Two comparisons were made in
relation to each of the eight critical pictures listed in Table A;
P- 265, that is, for each picture, one comparison was made for
subjects for whom the objects were physically presented and one
comparison was made for subjects to whom the objects were described.
Thus, these comparisons were all within-group comparisons. The
pertinent characteristics of the subject groups involved are evident
from Table C.
A(iii) Worked example of Fisher's method
The example given below is for comparison number 8 in Table B
above. The steps are as follows.
1. Obtain separate p-values for the between-group comparison and
the within-subject comparison using appropriate tests. The p-values
thus obtained in the present case are 0.3034054 and 0.032 respect-
.
n (1)lvely.
2. Multiply the two p-values obtained at Step 1 (=0.0097089).
3. Find the natural logarithm of the figure obtained at Step 2.
(ie., log e of 0.0097089 = -4.6347122).
4. Multiply the logarithm by -2 (=9.27).
5. Obtain final probability from table of critical values of X.J .
Where two probabilities only have been combined, look under
(2)
d.f. = 4. (p^.0.05 just).
The two tests used were Fisher's exact probability test and the
sign test respectively. The probabilities given are two-tailed
values.
(2)
d.f. - that is, degrees of freedom. For n probabilities use %
with 2ndf.
Appendix B: Verbatim accounts of procedures used in Study One^^
(a) Correspondence requirements tasks
(a) i For physical object presentations
After the subjects had been introduced to the teddy and shown
the cash-register the experimenter continued as follows: -
"And where do you see tills like this? in shops,
yes, you do don't you? Now do you know why the
teddy has got one of these tills? Well, he's
got a till because he wants to have avlittle shop.
And teddy wants to sell some things in his shop.
And these are the things that teddy wants to
sell in his shop (E gives S the bag containing the
objects). What's inside? What has the teddy got to
sell in his shop ...?"
Once the objects had been named the experimenter placed the boxes on
the table and continued:
"Now what are these? boxes, that's right. Teddy
wants to put these things inside (E gesticulates to
the objects) so that there is one thing to sell
inside each box. So here are the boxes. Would you
help the teddy put them in? close the lids;
that's right."
When each lid had been closed, the experimenter rapidly rearranged
the position of the boxes and asked:
"Suppose the teddy gets the boxes mixed up; do you
think he would know what is inside the boxes? What's
inside that one? (E points to a box). And that one?
What's inside there do you think....?"
Once it had been demonstrated that the child could not remember the
box contents reliably, the experimenter asked:
"Well, if you don't remember what's inside the boxes
I don't think teddy will be able to remember. Do
you?.... No, so how do you think we can help teddy
to remember what's inside the boxes....?"
Typically, the child did not answer and the experimenter then
continued:
"Well we could put something onto the boxes to help the
teddy remember what's inside. In real shops, boxes have
pictures to show what's inside - don't they?.... So we
could put pictures on the boxes. Then teddy can look at
the pictures and he will know what's inside the boxes.
Now, over here teddy has got some pictures (E shows S
N.B. The procedures reported in this appendix provide a much
more complete account of the wording generally used by the exper¬
imenter. Inevitably, however, the precise wording used did some¬
times depart slightly from that given.
the distractor picture sets). So teddy is going to
choose pictures to stick on the boxes. And the
pictures are going to show what's inside the boxes.
So would you like to help him? Teddy will choose
the picture and then would you stick it on the box
for him? Thank you very much. Now sometimes teddy may
choose a picture that doesn't show what's inside
the box. So what are you going to do if teddy
chooses the wrong picture....? Would you tell him
then if he chooses the wrong picture? Because, then
we can get him to choose the right picture can't
we? Good.
So,shall we take this box first? (E gives S the
box containing the toy Christmas tree). Right, so
you tell teddy what's inside the box."
The subject then names the object and the experimenter then speaks
to the teddy:
" (ie., the Ss name) wants a picture of the
(ie., whatever the S named the object as).
Which is the picture you want teddy? Is it this
picture teddy?....no it's not that picture. Well is
it this picture then teddy?....no you don't think it's
that one either. Well is this the picture you want
teddy?.... That is the picture you want is it?(^)
Allright then,we'11 show it to (ie., Ss name) and
ask (Ss name) what (s)he thinks. (E then shows S
the picture). What do you think (ie., Ss name)?
Is this the right picture or the wrong picture?"
If a child rejected the picture chosen he or she was then asked
"Why is this the wrong picture then?" and the teddy was then asked
to choose another picture:
"
- We11 teddy, (ie., Ss name) says that this
picture (the teddy is 'shown' the picture) isn't the
picture of the (ie., whatever the S named
the object as). Do you think you can choose the right
picture this time? Which is it? Is this one the
picture teddy? No that's not it. Well is this one the
picture teddy? That one is the picture is it? Well
let's show it to (ie., Ss name) and see what
(s)he thinks."
N.B. As indicated in Section 2.2.2 (d) i the precise number of
pictures which the teddy refused was varied unsystematically though
the number of refusals was constrained by the number of pictures
under the flap.
(3)
Unless that is (as occasionally happened) the basis of the
child's rejection of the picture was spurious (eg., that there
were 'black dots' on the purple orange). In these cases the error
was pointed out and the critical question - that is, concerning
whether the picture was the right picture or the wrong picture - was
repeated.
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The procedure was then continued as before.
When a picture had been stuck onto the lid of the first box,
the S was then asked to choose the remaining boxes one at a time and
the critical procedures were repeated in relation to each. Once a
picture had been stuck onto the lid of each box the experimenter
asked the subject to name the box contents:
- "Well we stuck the pictures on so that we could
remember what's inside didn't we? So we should
be able to remember what's inside the boxes
shouldn't we? So what's inside that one ?. . . .
and that one ?.. (etc.)."
(a) ii For verbal object 'presentations'
The procedure followed for the subjects in this condition was
as close as possible to that followed for the subjects in the
physical object presentation condition. The only procedural differ¬
ences arose from the fact that in the verbal presentation condition,
instead of being asked to name the objects, subjects were always
provided with the predesignated descriptions. Consequently the only
major procedural difference concerns the manner in which the boxes
were introduced. Thus, having explained that the teddy had a till
because he wanted to have things to sell in his shop (that is, from
the end of the first paragraph in the previous section), the
experimenter then continued as follows.
-"So the teddy has put the things that he wants to sell
in these boxes (E puts the boxes on the table). There's
one thing in each box. Listen, they all make different
sounds (E rattles some of the boxes). You try (S then
rattles the boxes). Now we can't open the boxes because
look, they have sellotape over the lids. (E indicates
the sellotape.) But look, there are words on the boxes
(E points to some of the labels) and these words say
what's inside the boxes. Let's see. Inside this box
there's a (ie.,predesignated description),
inside this box there's a (E names the contents
of each box in turn). But teddy can't read the words
and I don't think that you can read the words either? Can
you read the words? (E quickly picks up a couple of the
boxes and profers the labels for S to see) .... No you
can't can you? So how is teddy going to know what is
inside the boxes? Well, in real shops, boxes have
pictures to show what's inside - don't they? And look,
over here teddy has got some pictures (E shows S the
distractor picture sets). So teddy is going to choose
pictures to stick on the boxes. And the pictures will
show what's inside the boxes. So,would you like to help
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"teddy? I'll read the words and tell teddy what's inside.
And then teddy will choose a picture and you can stick it
on the box for him. Allright? Thank you very much. Now
sometimes teddy may choose a picture that doesn't show
what's inside the box "
(The procedure is then continued as for the subjects in the physical
object presentation condition.)
(b) Correspondence preference tasks
(b) i For physical object presentations
Having placed on the table four boxes, each containing one of
the critical objects, the experimenter began thus:
"Now then, can you remember what we were doing last
time? Yes, the teddy (E indicates teddy) had
a little shop didn't he? And the teddy wanted to
sell some things in his shop. Then you put the
teddy's things into these boxes (E gesticulates
to the boxes) and teddy chose pictures to stick
on. The pictures showed what was inside the
boxes didn't they? If the picture was the wrong
one you told teddy didn't you?.... but if it was
the right picture you stuck it onto the box.
Well today we're going to do that again. But
this time you are going to choose the pictures.
So what's in the boxes? - you tell me."
When the subject had named the objects the experimenter (gesticulating
to the objects) asked:
"O.K., so which one shall we do first?(S selects
object). Right so now we'll put it back in the box
and close the lid - that's it. Now here are the
pictures. (E picks up the picture board and places
it on the table.) So which picture do you want to
choose to show what's inside the box?" (E opens the
appropriate picture flap.)
The pertinent procedures were then repeated for each of the
three remaining objects in turn.
(b) ii For verbal object 'presentations'
The procedure followed for subjects in this condition was
similar to that used for the physical object presentation condition.
Necessarily however, there were several differences. The full
procedure followed is given below. The text is underlined where
this procedure deviates from that followed for the physical
condition.
Placing the four sealed boxes on the table, the experimenter
began:
"Now then, can you remember what we were doing last
time?.... Yes, the teddy (E indicates teddy) had
a little shop didn't he? And the teddy wanted to
sell some things in his shop. And the things were
inside these boxes weren't they? (E rattles some
of the boxes). Lots of different things. And do
you remember? The teddy chose pictures to stick on
the boxes. The pictures showed what was inside the
boxes didn't they? If the picture was the wrong
one you told teddy didn't you? But if it was the
right one you stuck it on the box.
Well today we're going to do that again. But
this time you are going to choose the pictures.
First though, I'll read the words and tell you
what's inside each box. Inside this box there's
a (E names each box in turn with the pre-
designated descriptions). O.K., so which box shall
we do first (S selects box). That one. Albright. So,
I'll read the words and tell you what's inside.
Inside this box is...a (ie., predesignated label).
Now here are the pictures. (E picks up the picture
board and places it on the table.) Which picture do
you want to choose to show what's inside the box?
(E opens the appropriate picture flap.)"
The pertinent procedures were then repeated for each of the
three remaining objects in turn.
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Appendix C: Details of the subconditions of Study Two
Table A (below) lists three picture sets each comprising five
pictures. Each child participating in Study Two was presented with
all the pictures in one of these sets, one picture for each of the
five critical objects. Table B (below) indicates the numbers of





yellow knife yellow spoon pink knife pink knife
horse stand¬ horse lying zebra zebra
ing up down
red teapot green teapot teapot-spoon teapot-spoon
giraffe blue 'giraffe' giraffe kneeling giraffe kneeling
standing up
blue, round purple, tapered blue, tapered purple, round
candle candle candle candle
children in each of the three object presentation conditions who
were presented with each of the three picture sets. It is evident
from this table that twice as many children received picture set
1 as received picture sets 2a and 2b respectively. Table B
also gives a breakdown of the nurseries attended and of the mean
age, age range and sex composition of the children in each of the





































































































































































































Appendix D Breakdown of names given by P condition Ss to the





























N.B. This category comprises Ss who gave no response and, in two
cases,Ss whose responses were not recorded by the E.
(2)
N.B. One of these Ss omitted to mention the type name.
(3)
N.B. In three cases, the modifier given related to the model's
small size rather than its posture.
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Appendix E Ss1 picture choices (numbers) for the critical models in
both type-different and type-same object sets as a



































yellow comb T.D;T.S^ 0 1 0 11 6 1 0 5 4 3 1 4
T . S ; T. D 3 1 2 6 1 7 0 4 5 2 0 5
red toothbrush T . D ; T . S 3 0 1 8 7 2 0 3 5 1 0 6
T.S;T.D 1 0 1 10 5 1 1 5 3 3 1 5
round biscuit T. D ; T. S 8 2 1 1 5 5 0 2 2 10 0 0
T. S ; T. D 3 5 1 3 3 9 0 0 1 8 2 1
horse 'sitting
down'
T.D;T.S 1 0 0 11 10 1 0 1 2 6 0 4
T. S ; T . D 3 0 1 8 1 11 0 0 0 12 0 0
^
N.B. 'T.D' stands for type-different set and 'T.S' for type-same set.
Choices for type-different sets are scored first, eg., 't.m'=type-
concordants chosen for type-different set; modifier-concordant chosen
for type-same set.
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Appendix F Justifications (verbatim) given by Ss whose correspon-
dence preferences shifted from the type concordant to
the type-discordant for type-different and type-same
sets respectively. (Study Six.)
(i) Yellow comb model; P-T--M
S no.® type-different set type-same set
1
C2)
Because it's a comb.(l) 'Cause it's yellow.(2)
2 It's a comb. (1) Because it's yellow. (2)
3 'Cause there's a combin.(l) Because it's the same colour.(2)
4 'Cause it's a comb. (1) Because it's the same colour.(2)
5 Because that's a comb and
that's a comb in there. (1)
Because that's (ie., the picture)
the same colour and that's the
same colour.'Cause that's yellow
and that's yellow. (2)
6 Because the thing, that is
a brush , a comb in there . (1)
That's a yellow comb. (3)
7 'Cause there's a comb in
it. (1)
Because there's a yellow comb
inside. (3)
These S numbers make it possible to compare the various justif¬
ications given by individual Ss whose correspondence preferences shifted
for more than one model.
GD
These numbers indicate the category under which the justification
was coded in Table 15 (p.152). Thus, 1 = valid type based; 2 = valid
dimensionally based; 3 = indeterminate; 4 = none and, 5 = erroneous.
(ii) Yellow comb model; T-M
S no. type-different set type-same set
8 Because it's a comb. (1) Because it's yellow. (2)
9 'Cause it's a comb. (1) A yellow. (2)
10 Because there's a comb
inside it. (1)
Because it's yellow. (2)
11 'Cause it's a comb. (1) Because it's a yellow comb. (3)
12 'Cause that's a comb
inside. (1)
'Cause there's a yellow comb
inside that box. (3)
13 Hey! We've got mixed up -
because that's a yellow
and that's a red comb...
because it's a red comb.(3)
Yellow. (2)
14 Because it's a yellow comb.
(3)
'Cause that's (ie., the picture)
a yellow comb. (5)
15 (4) Because it's (ie., the picture)
a yellow comb. (5)
16 Because it's red. (5) This one's yelluw. (2) i
!
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(iii)Red toothbrush model; P-T-M
S no. type-different set type-same set
1 That's the toothbrush. (1) Because it's the same colour.(2)
2 Because it's a yellow tooth¬
brush; because it's a tooth¬
brush. (1)
The red one. (2)
17 'Cause it's the same, same
toothbrush, but it's yellow.
(1)
Because it's the same colour.(2)
18 Because there's a toothbrush.
(1)
It's the same colour. (2)
19 'Cause it's toothbrush. (1) Because it's red. (2)
20 'Cause there's a toothbrush.
(1)
Because there's a red one in the
box. (2)
21 This toothbrush-because it's
the same thing. (1)
'Cause it's red. (2)
22 'Cause that's a toothbrush.(1) 'Cause that's red. (2)
23 'Cause it's a toothbrush.(1) Because it's red. (2)
24 Toothbrush. (1) (4)
25 Because it's a red tooth¬
brush in there. (3)
Another red one. (2)
26 Because she'll remember
that's the same inside but
not the same colour. Because
inside is red but on top is
yellow. (3)
Because it's red on top and
inside. (2)
(iv) Red toothbrush model; T-M
S no. type-different set type-same set
10 That's a toothbrush. (1) 'Cause that's red. (2)
27 It's a toothbrush. (1) 'Cause it's a red. (2)
28 'Cause it's a toothbrush.(1) 'Cause it's red. (2)
29 Toothbrush. (1) Because dolly remember. (4)
13 'Cause it's the yellow
toothbrush. (3)
That's the red. (2)
16 Yellow toothbrush. It's the
right one. (3)
That one's red. (2)
30 'Cause dolly will remember.
(4)
Because it's red. (2)
15 'Cause I want to show what
is inside. (4)
Because I want to. (4)
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(v) Round biscuit model; P
S no. type-different set type-same set
31 'cause it's a biscuit. (1) Same shape 'cause it's a round
circle. (2)
32 That 'cause the biscuit is
in the box. (1)
Because there's a round biscuit
in that one (ie., in the box).
Because it's (ie., the picture)
round. (2)
33 It's a biscuit. (1) Because it's a circle one. (2)
34 Because it's a biscuit. (1) Because it's (ie., the picture)
a biscuit. (5)
35 Because it's a biscuit. (1) 'Cause it's a green biscuit
(ie., the picture is); 'cause
it's a biscuit. (5)
36 'Cause it's a biscuit. (1) Because it's (ie.,the picture)
a round biscuit. (5)
37 Because that's brown. (2) Because it's, it's round. (2)
38 Because it's brown;because
that biscuit is brown. (2)
(4)
39 (4) Because it's the shape.(2)
40 (4) Same shape. (2)
41 Show the dolly; see what's
in it. (4)
Because it's (ie., the picture)
a biscuit. (1)
(vi) Round biscuit model; P-T-M
S no. type-different set type-same set
21 'Cause it's the same thing;
the same biscuit. (1)
'Cause that's round. (2)
20 'Cause there's a biscuit in
it. (1)
Because it's a round biscuit in
the box. (3)
5 Because that's, that's the
same colour. (2)
Because that's a round one and
that's round. (2)
7 'Cause it's brown. (2) 'Cause that's a round shape.(2)
42 Because it's brown.(2) 'Cause it's round. (2)
43 'Cause it's brown and it's
the same colour. (2)
Because that's round. (2)
4 'Cause it's (ie., the pict¬
ure) a square biscuit. (3)
Don't know. (4)
44 (4) Because I want to. (4)
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(vii) Horse 'sitting down' model; P-T-M
S no. type-different set type-same set
3 'Cause a horse in there.(1) Because it's lying down.(2)
4 'Cause it's a horse. (1) 'Cause it's lying, sitting
down. (2)
5 Because that is a horse inside
and a horse here. (1)
Because it's sitting down and
that's sitting down. (2)
22 'Cause that's a horse. (1) 'Cause it's sitting down. (2)
26 'Cause it's a horse in there.(1) Because that one's sitting
down and that one's sitting
down. (2)
45 'Cause it's a horsie. (1) 'Cause it's sitting down. (2)
2 Because it's a horse. (1) It's a horse running, a horse
sitting. (3)
7 'Cause there's a horse inside.
(1)
'Cause there's a brown horse
sitting down. (3)
46 'Cause it's the same, same
horsie. (1)
'Cause it's a stripy one.(5)
47 Because it's a horsie. (1) 'Cause it's (ie., picture) a
horsie. (5)
23 Because it's the same colour.(2) Because it's sitting down.(2)
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Appendix G: A study of adults' identifications of animal parts,
detection of monsters and judgements of the relative
compatibility of different monsters
(i) Introduction
This study was conducted to gain information relating to three
distinct questions which arise from the study of preschool children's
ability to detect anomalies (cf., Section 5.2). The pertinent
questions were as follows.
(I) To assess the accuracy with which adults identify the animal
heads and the animal bodies which were presented to the preschoolers
(cf., Figure 22 p.181). This information was required in order to
determine firstly, how identifiable each of these parts in fact was
and secondly, the relative ability of adults and preschool children
to correctly identify these parts.
(II) To determine whether adults do, as tacitly supposed by the
relevant literatures (cf., Section 5.2.1 (a))correctly discriminate
anomalous from non-anomalous stimuli. In particular, the study
conducted with preschool children investigated (cf., Section 5.2.1
(a)) whether young children are more likely to detect as anomalous,
monsters which were assumed to comprise highly incompatible combin¬
ations of parts than monsters which were assumed to comprise less
incompatible parts. It was considered important to investigate
whether any similar effects are evident with adults.
(III) To learn how adults rate the relative compatibility of the two
members of each of the three monster pairs presented in the study
with preschoolers (cf., Figure 24.C p. 188). This information was
required so as to provide a concrete measure indicating, one way or
the other, whether the assumption that the members of each of these
monster pairs do differ qualitatively in terms of the relative com¬
patibility of the parts combined was valid or invalid. In addition,
it was also investigated how adults rate the relative compatibility
of the members of two further monster pairs between which, it was
hypothesised, the relative compatibility varies. The first of these
pairs concerns a posturally based variation in compatibility and has
been previously illustrated and discussed (cf., page 168) whilst the
second pair concerns a variation in compatibility based upon whether
or not the relative sizes of the parts combined are complementary.
This second additional pair of stimuli is illustrated in Figure A
below.
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Figure A Two monsters comprising compatibly sized parts (that is,
(i)) and incompatibly sized parts (that is, (ii)).
(ii) Method
The Ss were 18 first-year psychology students (7 men and 11
women), each attending Edinburgh University. Each of these Ss
participated in two sessions, two weeks apart precisely. In the
first session, Ss were presented with 25 incomplete drawings (in an
unsystematic order) and asked to identify each drawing. These
drawings comprised the 24 drawings illustrated in Figure 22 (p.181)
plus one further drawing of the body only of a galloping horse (this
body is that included in Figure 19 (b) p.168). Each S was given an
instruction/response sheet, a copy of which is reproduced in Figure
B below. The procedural details concerning this session are
apparent from this figure.
Figure B Instruction/response sheet given to each subject in session
one.
You will soon be given a pack of 25 drawings. Each drawing is
numbered and what you are asked to do - if you will! is to write
against each of the numbers below what you think the drawing with
the corresponding number is a part of. These drawings have already
been shown to some preschoolers and some adult data is required
for comparative purposes.
It will be evident when you receive the drawings that they are not
in order. This is intentional and you are asked please to work
through the drawings from the top one down, in the order in which
you receive them.
1 6 11 16 21
2 7 12 17 22
3 8 13 18 23
4 9 14 19 24
5 10 15 20 25
Thanks for your help.
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In the second session, Ss were presented with two further
instruction/response sheets; that is, first the sheet featured in
Figure C (i) and then the sheet featured in Figure C (ii) - see
below. These sheets provide most of the relevant methodological
details. Concerning the first of these sheets, however, (in which
Ss were asked to discriminate monsters from non-anomalous animals)
it should additionally be noted that the monsters presented were the
six monsters presented to the preschoolers (cf., Figure 24.C) and
that the non-anomalous drawings presented comprised the five
drawings illustrated in Figure 24.B plus one further drawing of a
non-anomalous rabbit. In relation to the second sheet presented in
the second session (which asked Ss to judge the least bizarre member
of each of the five pairs of monsters cited in the present introd¬
uction - cf., question three) it should be noted that the two members
of each monster pair were mounted in a horizontal plane on a
separate card and that the relative position of each pair member
(that is, as to whether it was left or right) was counterbalanced
between Ss. It should additionally be noted that these five monster
pairs were presented in an invariable order; specifically the horse-
cow and horse-monkey pair was always presented first and this
monster pair was always followed by the giraffe-camel and the dog-
camel, the sheep-pig and the sheep-elephant, the cow-horse (standing)
and the cow-horse (galloping), and the pig-cow and the pig-monkey
pairs respectively.
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Figure C Instruction/response sheets given to each subject in
session two.
(i) Sheet one: (ii) Sheet two:
You will soon be given some
drawings. As before, each draw¬
ing is numbered and you are
requested to write down against
each of the numbers below what
you think the drawing with the
corresponding number is port¬
raying. In some cases you may
not think that the heads and
the bodies match. So, for each
drawing, what you are asked to
do is to put a tick in either
the 'O.K' box (if you think
the head and body match) or
the 'erroneous' box (if you
think the head and body do not
match). Then, in the remaining
space, please indicate prec¬
isely what you think the draw¬
ing is of. So, if you have
ticked the 'O.K' box you should
say what the drawing is of or,
if you have ticked the 'erron¬
eous' box you should say what
















You no doubt decided that the
heads and bodies in some of the
drawings which you have just
identified, failed to match. You
are now asked to consider for
some further drawings whether
they vary in the extent to which
the heads and bodies fail to
match. Specifically, you are
asked to consider 5 pairs of
drawings and to indicate for
each pair, which of the two
drawings is, so far as you are
concerned, the drawing which is
the most acceptable (or, if you
like, the least bizarre). It
should be emphasised that bec¬
ause each of these choices is
subjective, there are no 'right'
or 'wrong' answers. You will
notice when you receive the pic¬
ture pairs that they are letter
coded. Please circle below the
number of the drawing in each
pair which you consider to be
the least bizarre.
PAIR A: 1 or 2
PAIR B: 3 or 4
PAIR C: 5 or 6
PAIR D: 7 or 8
PAIR E: 9 or 10
Thanks for all your help - you
are appreciated!
(iii) Results
The most important features of the results generated by the
present study have been cited directly in the text. Thus, the
results pertaining to the first question identified in the present
introduction have been presented in Section 5.2.2 (b); the results
pertaining to the second question identified have been reported in
Section 5.2.4 (a) ii; whilst the results relating to the third
question have been variously reported in Sections 5.2.1 (a), 5.2.2
(c) and 5.2.5 (a). Additionally, these results have each been
discussed in Section 5.2.5 (a). The only remaining results
considered to be of direct interest are given in Table A below;
this table indicates the number of different identifications made
by the adults of the drawing parts and includes, for comparative
purposes, a breakdown of the identifications of these parts made by























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix H: Details of the preschool subject groups receiving the
anomalous stimuli in Study Seven
As indicated in Section 5.2.2 (c) the assignment of subjects
was such as to permit nine comparisons to be made statistically. It
has also been indicated that each of these comparisons was a
straightforward binary comparison and that four of these comparisons
concerned whether children are more likely to detect specific
monsters when they know the type-identity of both component parts
rather than that of only one component part whilst the remaining
five comparisons concerned whether children are more likely to
detect monsters presumed to be incompatible than monsters presumed
to be relatively compatible when they know the type-identity of both
component parts, one component part or neither component part
respectively. Each of these sets of comparisons is summarised below
in Table A.
Table A Summary of the nine comparisons.





(constant for each comparison)
Type knowledge bases compared
1. Horse-Cow Head only known vs. both
parts known.
2. Giraffe-Camel Body only known vs. both
parts known.
3. Horse-Monkey Head only known vs. both
parts known.
4. Dog-Camel Body only known vs. both
parts known.





(constant for each comparison)
Monsters compared
5. Both parts known Horse-Cow vs. Horse-Monkey
6. Both parts known Giraffe-Camel vs. Dog-Camel
7. Head only known Horse-Cow vs. Horse-Monkey
8. Body only known Giraffe-Camel vs. Dog-Camel
9. Neither part known Pig-Cow vs. Pig-Monkey
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The various characteristics (including the number) of the children who
were allocated to each of the comparisons indicated in Table A are
given in Table B.
Each of the nine comparisons is given the same number in Tables
A and B. It should be observed that whereas the comparisons numbered
1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 were each between two separate groups of subjects,
comparison numbers 5 and 6 were each within-subject comparisons
whilst comparison numbers 7 and 9 each comprised both a between-and
a within-groups comparison. In relation to comparison numbers 7 and
9 respectively, it should be noted that Fisher's method (cf., Kendall
and Stuart, 1976) was used to obtain an overall p-value for both the
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